Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/11–2550: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

London, November 25, 1950—2 a. m.

Depto 221. Further on 33rd meeting Deputies November 24.

1. In opening today’s discussion on German contribution chair suggested meeting take up Netherlands suggestion for NATO HICOM and US proposal for transitional phase, Depto 202, November 21.

Agreed French Deputy request his two papers be included. French Deputy said his government’s proposals definitely contemplated NATO framework but were based on concept that it should contain three groups: American, Commonwealth, and European. European integration must be more intimate than Atlantic, European philosophy existed and had appeal to Germans, and NATO philosophy did not. German equality in NATO would entail German NAT membership, to which French Parliament now unprepared agree. Alphand said progress sought on three fronts: (1) On formation European army, (2) in European parallel to progress in Germany and (3) in replacing negative controls in Germany with positive ones. As concessions French had accepted need interim measures, European HICOM instead Defense Minister, and reg. combat teams as military unit, and advocated non-discrimination against Germany. He welcomed US agreement to European conference on means attaining objectives French proposals, but noted we failed link Germany and European steps, that no precise basis European conference to attain objectives European integration, and left final decision on military units to Supreme Command while French held to reg. combat teams as standard unit of national contingents. Alphand said new US–French effort get together needed and he would do his best. Mass of German people were reluctant rearm and needed confidence which would come if Atlantic force were established soon. He could not accept Netherlands suggestion re NATO HICOM as alternative to French proposal.

2. Netherlands Deputy observed that his NATO HICOM proposal not intended as alternative to French proposal, but reiterated Netherlands fear that such European powers as would cooperate in French proposal would be too small combination to contain German forces and still prevent resurgence German militarism.

3. Turning to US proposal (Depto 202) Netherlands Deputy asked re paragraph 7 what were French “objectives” which we supported. Were they merely prevention German resurgence or were they creation of new institutions such as European army, Defense Ministry, common budget, etc.? UK Deputy also had two questions re paragraph 7. Were discussions at proposed Paris conference to be limited to French proposals for European institutions or could other and wider alternatives be discussed? Did language imply requirement of prior agreement in principle to something approaching European federation?

4. In reply US Deputy said purpose was to separate militarily urgent matters from long-range political ones. Military measures could not be made condition of political agreement but we did not wish to deny Europeans opportunity for closer integration. We supported French general long-range objectives, provided Europeans could agree on means of realizing them which would strengthen North Atlantic community and integrated defense of North Atlantic area without delaying its realization. By “objectives” we meant Franco German rapprochement and closer European association in such manner as might be agreed, including new institutions in NATO framework if they were militarily sound and politically beneficial. Our proposal was not intended limit agenda to French proposals and we would welcome consideration of any other proposals aimed toward same objectives. US itself was concerned only with NATO as distinct from European aspects of problem. Also we did not intend imply prior agreement in principle should be necessary and did not believe countries concerned could give it.

5. UK asked if US were uninterested in outcome of conference and wished leave it to Europeans. US replied only proposals re Europe now before us.

6. Alphand observed that if such a conference were held its terms of reference would have to be carefully drawn. He agreed no advance agreement in principle should be expected but felt there must be agreement on terms of reference. US commented results must be in NATO framework and serve to strengthen it. Decisions on whether and when they were incorporated in NATO would be up to NATO. Alphand stated that if non-European NAT parties wished to attend conference they would be welcome as observers or in more active role (not necessarily as full participants). Starkenborgh asked whether “the European powers” in US paragraph 7 meant that all must attend. Alphand stated French contemplated attendance any European NAT member who was prepared accept agreed terms of reference.

7. On Netherlands proposal for NATO HICOM, chair observed that it was long-term, would entail new relationship with Germans, whereas present HICOMs Germany had reserved occupation powers and could act as NATO agent in interim period. Netherlands schemes also raised question German relation with NAT. Further US observations brought out that Netherlands suggestion for NATO HICOM to report to Committee of Ministers meant council or other NATO body. Use of Allied Forces in Germany in certain ways not possible in other countries was in Starkenborgh’s view reasonable, since need for stationing large western forces in Germany made situation there different. He thought question of German relation to NAT was present in any case, and that Germans would deal more readily with NATO HICOM than occupation power HICOMs.

8. UK Deputy expressed concern that dual approach to Germans under US proposal (by HICOMs on basis US plan and in Paris on basis European army) concurrently might cause German temporize on first until terms of second visible. Risk generally recognized but Alphand thought Germans would do the same thing in any case.

9. UK asked whether US would be prepared to establish integrated force and name Supreme Commander when agreement reached in NATO or whether we would make such action conditional on agreement by Germans. US replied we must have agreement on effective plan with no important outstanding questions which might wreck it. He therefore thought personally some indication Germans accepted plan would be necessary.

10. Netherlands Deputy stressed importance having successive stages of any phased program complete in themselves in order not prejudice transitional phase by linking immediate measures to agreement on unpredictable long-term ones.

11. Adjourned to November 27.

Sent Department priority Depto 221; repeated info Paris priority 1002 for Embassy and OSR, Frankfort priority 450, Brussels 140, Copenhagen 103, The Hague 151, Lisbon 75, Oslo 88, Ottawa 43, Rome 203, Luxembourg 33, Heidelberg for Handy 85, Wiesbaden for Cannon 109.

[Spofford]