740.5/11–1450: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1
priority
2507. For Douglas, Bruce, McCloy, Spofford. We are delighted you are meeting jointly in London tomorrow and eagerly await your views on steps that might be taken to remove deadlock still facing us on question of Ger participation in defense of Eur.
The time factor did not permit our unilateral comments to Fr on Alphand’s presentation contained in Tel 2664 from Paris,2 rptd Lon as 651, nor are we certain, even if time had permitted, that this wld have been a wise move. In gen these instructions were a disappointment here altho they appear to contain certain modifications in previous Fr position as put forward by Moch. As analyzed here, we see these changes to be in fields of (1) size of units has been raised to “combat team” presumably about size of a regimental combat team; (2) utilization of existing structures, i. e., Schuman Plan for High Assembly; and (3) certain preliminary steps of minor nature that cld be undertaken conditionally in Ger as an interim measure. The basic structure of Fr Plan, i. e., creation of a Eur army responsible to Eur political authority as contrasted to a mil structure solely in NATO field, remains unchanged.
Cutting through all details, such as size of units, organization of Ger ministry, etc., we appear to be faced with a difficulty of most fundamental nature in that we have sponsored a move for directly integrating Ger militarily in Atlantic area and Fr have responded with counter proposal to integrate Ger only indirectly through a European Army.
It has been our policy, as you know, to encourage further moves towards greater unity on Continent and particularly Franco-Ger rapprochement. In gen in the past we have turned to arrangements in Atlantic area as being desirable primarily (1) to meet urgent current situation of common security; (2) because of Eur reluctance to move towards greater unity in absence of full and active UK participation;(3) to provide a framework of leadership which wld encourage Eur nations to obtain closer association among themselves and with Ger. [Page 451] We have encouraged a framework of solidarity in Eur which wld help us with long range solution of many Eur problems in economic and financial fields but also particularly the Ger problem. We believe this still to be sound and desire find some means in which organization in mil field, at present a necessity on NATO-wide basis, will not prejudice (1) either further moves towards integration on Continent or (2) further developments in broader field of Atlantic community which may become necessary.
We are inclined believe that (1) above is fundamental dilemma facing Fr. They probably see in our proposal prospects of quickly pulling Ger up to position of equality in loose Atlantic arrangement (at least politically so) which wld foster creation of independent Ger taking her place beside US and UK and with Fr relegated eventually to poor fourth in this arrangement. In long run they probably still look upon full US participation as problematical and this, coupled with their basic distrust of Br motives towards Continent, lead them to believe that under these arrangements Fr aims for integration of Ger into European framework before Ger regains full sovereignty cld not be realized.
We believe it in interests of US to find, if possible, some means of giving Fr hope as regards her aims on Continent and particularly that we are not deliberately working against Fr aims. If possible we wld like find some way of achieving this without sacrifice to immediate solution of moving ahead on workable and realistic basis in security field. So far we have not been able here conceive of means accomplishing this order than those expressed in Deptel 2471 to Lon.3 Device of declaration suggested therein is of course aimed to obviate conditions now held by Fr as prerequisites and convert them to statements of future intentions. It may be step in right direction but we are doubtful that it wld meet problem alone. In any event your views are needed to determine whether this line of approach has any merit.
We also believe we shld, in our own interests, find some method of moving forward with appointment of Supreme Commander at early date. Continued delay will undoubtedly cause loss of momentum in public interest that is necessary for full support of defense effort.
There has been confusion here as to whether Fr envisage an overall commander for “European Army” which wld impose another layer in chain of command between Supreme Commander and units of that army. While we had assumed this be case when Pleven Plan was first announced, there is now doubt that Fr have this in mind. If this were not case and units to be employed cld be raised to Division level, it may be mil structure below Supreme Commander as envisaged by [Page 452] Fr wld not be greatly different than under our own plan. If instead primary difference between US and Fr proposals pertains to civilian aspects of defense it may be, if other Eur nations are willing to participate in negotiations sponored by Fr on this subject, that a solution may yet be found. However in view of position which other Eur countries have taken, this appears to be long term problem. We wld welcome any initiative to pursue its solution but must insist that in meanwhile an effective build-up of West’s defenses proceed immediately. Under proper terms of reference, a Eur civilian of statute might be able contribute to production, supply and financial problems facing Eur nations.
There are many aspects of Fr Plan, in addition to question of command, that are still unclear to us. In a fol telegram we will submit series of questions to Bruce and Spofford designed clarify our understanding of Fr Plan. In meantime we wld greatly appreciate your joint views as to how to move forward in this situation.
Inasmuch as there has not been opportunity for Secy review this msg nor for clearance with Def substance shld be accepted as representing tentative thinking.