762A.5/11–1050: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
niact
2629. Spaak has come to see me twice in the last two days. He is gravely concerned over the situation which has arisen in regard to the contribution of German armed forces to Western European defense. He had lunch today with Guy Mollet whom he considers the coming man in the French Socialist party. He says that Mollet is anxious to have a compromise effected between the French and the American proposals and believes with enough goodwill on both sides that a practicable compromise is feasible. In reporting my conversations with Spaak I shall do so as if I were quoting him directly. This is done from recollection and is obviously not entirely exact but I think presents fairly accurately his views on the subject.
“Undoubtedly the US could have its proposition accepted by all of the NAT countries including France if it decided to force such acceptance [Page 442] upon this last named country. However, in my view, it would be tragic if such were the case, for the French resentment, even though they accepted, would be such that the ultimate objective would be imperiled for a long time to come. It is therefore necessary that some basis of compromise be found between these two points of view which do not in fact seem to me to be far separated.
On the military side the conception of a European army poses certain technical questions as to size of units, etc. on which a compromise should be possible which would make sound military sense. One must remember that no professional soldier willingly accepts such a novel conception as that of a nonnational army. This is opposed to all the traditions of the military services in every country, but in view of present conditions should not be rejected for that reason.
On the political side I am not aware of what may have been decided in regard to the French proposition by the Belgian Government. I do not believe that the proposition of France in its political aspects is as completely unacceptable to European countries as some press articles have reported. It may be that much of the feeling against it is founded on details as well as on a misconception of what the plan really intends. When it is better explained and when some of the details which have caused difficulty have been resolved by compromise, the underlying principles would have a great appeal to most of the countries of Europe. My personal fear is that any plan which envisages a closer association between European countries will be found unacceptable to Great Britain which is toying with the most dangerous of all ideas, namely, a block composed of the US, the UK and Germany. In the interests of future peace it is my personal opinion that the American Government would be well advised, if it is inclining an ear to such arrangement, to carefully examine what its final consequences in the future might be. I might also say, without impertinence, that there seems to be a contradiction in the US Government’s attitude if it seriously intends to reject the principles of the French proposal without careful examination. It is your government which has consistently supported the idea of a closer association between the European nations. There are contained in the French proposal certain principles which make a further step toward this objective. To say that the plan is impractical from a political standpoint provided that the impractical details are not found impossible of elimination would appear to me to constitute a denial of a principle that your government has always advocated.
In addition I can pretend to no special knowledge about political reactions in Germany, but I am not impressed by the argument that the German Government would find the political principles of the French proposition unacceptable. Their initial reaction in that regard, if there is indeed such a reaction, may well have been influenced by their feeling that perhaps they could make a more advantageous deal with the US and the UK. Both Adenauer and Schuman are well aware that the real solution of the German problem politically speaking is to tie Germany and France together by as many common ties as possible.”
Sent Department 2629, repeated London Niact 633 for Douglas eyes only, Frankfort Niact 281 for McCloy eyes only. For distribution as directed by the Secretary.