Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

762A.5/11–450: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

top secret
niact

Paris, November 4, 1950—10 p. m.

2475. For the Secretary’s eyes only. Deptel 2377.¹ I saw Pleven tonight. He has agreed:

1. That French representatives on military committee and Council of Deputies may discuss French plan, American plan, or any other proposition affecting contribution of German armed forces to European defense but that they will not be empowered to concur in any final decisions without reference to French Government.

2. He will give such instructions to General Ely who will arrive in Paris Monday and to Alphand who is due to arrive here today.

3. He will notify Moch by cable of the instructions which he, Pleven, intends to give to Ely.

4. He was familiar with the adverse reports about the way in which Moch handled himself in Washington. He talked to me quite frankly about Moch whom he thinks he can manage satisfactorily.

5. He said that Schuman will confer with a German press representative tomorrow in Rome and will make a statement regarding the French attitude toward the issue of German armed forces which will make it clear that France does not intend to practice discrimination against the Germans.

6. That the most difficult thing politically which had confronted him before Parliament was to get acceptance of any proposition approving a German contribution to western defense. This had been accomplished and he did not intend to be stubborn on details of the French point of view if he were convinced that any of them were unreasonable or impracticable, but he must point out that unless the final solution reached incorporated the idea of a further step on the integration of western Europe and a closer rapprochement between France and Germany he doubted its approval by the French Government and Parliament.

7. He said that starting with the agreement as a basis of discussion in the two committees that there should be no reconstitution of a German national army or a German general staff, all participants should work toward a mutually agreeable and efficacious plan for defense that would include German armed forces. In reply to my insistence on the necessity of getting something concrete accomplished before the end of this year he said that he was equally desirous of so doing and saw no reason why, if the matter were approached in a reasonable and conciliatory way by all members of NAT, this could not be done.

8. He expressed himself quite bitterly against Shinwell and the pitifully insufficient British contribution of ground forces of only four divisions and the chronic British objections to any plan to bring about closer unification in Europe. He said he felt that if this matter could only be dealt with by the French, the US and the Germans, the three could reach an agreement in fairly short order that would have met the approval of the other members of the NAT. This last statement was by way of parenthesis and not as a suggestion.

9. For Secretary Acheson particularly: I do beg of you if possible to have the President make the reference to the Schuman plan in his Independence Speech. It would be immensely helpful now and in the future to any negotiations here, and would be highly appreciated by Schuman and others.

Sent Department 2475, repeated info London 594 eyes only for Douglas, Frankfort 264 eyes only for McCloy.

Bruce

1. Dated November 3, p. 426.