740.5/11–350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1

top secret   priority
niact

2377. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Eyes only. In view substance Fr plan for Ger participation Eur defense and Fr internal [Page 427] polit considerations which governed its formulation, we had not expected to be able make any great progress at Def Comite mtg itself in solving problem Ger participation. We had thought Fr desired gain time during which negots leading to at least a minimum agreement cld be reached, thus permitting Eur countries, with our aid and active participation, proceed with urgent business creating an effective NAT defense force. Accordingly Gen Marshall scrupulously avoided joining in discussion and criticism Fr plan or pressing for acceptance US-plan in order not create an impasse which might tend freeze either our position or that of Fr. It was also with this same thought in mind Gen Marshall instructed US Reps on Standing Group and Mil Comite not raise question Ger participation prior its discussion in Defense Comite. This Fr had led us believe was their wish. Moch, during course discussions, deliberately distorted our motives and in effect accused us breach of faith in now tying estab[lishment] SHAPE to settlement. Ger participation issue. (Gen Marshall replied he had personally instructed US Reps on SG and Mil Comite not raise Ger issue in order not embarrass Fr.)

With foregoing in mind, we are very seriously disturbed by attitude which Moch displayed at mtg. As we have cabled you (Deptels 2264, Oct 29, 2289, Oct 30, and 2313, Oct 31) Moch’s position was one of extreme intransigence. The Nor DefMin accurately reflected views other Mins when he said during closing discussion: “I shld like to say that personally I didn’t like this take-it-or-leave-it proposition that was presented at the very beginning of our mtg, and that he has stuck to the very end. I thought yesterday before noon that it might be an opening position. It seems to be also his last position. That is why we feel disappointed and disturbed. If we all did that I am afraid that we wld have a rather difficult time. I am afraid we wouldn’t move very far.… I shld like to appeal to Monsieur Moch that he will try to create a situation either in two days, three days, or in fourteen days where the Fr Govt can discuss the problems with us with an open mind, or if that is too much, with more of an open mind than we have experienced here yesterday and today.” Moch showed no desire whatsoever match attitudes all other DefMins that this was a vitally urgent problem which cld only be solved in spirit of give and take, and willingness compromise. In addition, Moch created a further and most unfortunate impression (in terms of security and taste) on Reps of other countries, perhaps quite unconsciously, by having Mme. Moch sit directly behind him and advise him during much of mtg, with. Gen Lecheres and other Fr mil relegated to rear ranks.

Gen Marshall’s superb and impartial handling of Chairmanship, and Secy’s remarks at his press conference [day before] yesterday [Page 428] morning (Deptel 2323, Nov 12), were, of course, both designed create proper atmosphere for negot of problem. Moch’s conduct at Def Comite mtg and, in addition, at his press conference last night during which he reiterated Fr position thus tending freeze it, further increased adverse reactions among all other NAT Reps here and have caused very deep resentment.

It wld be impossible exaggerate unfavorable character impression created on other Eur Reps. Nors and Danes struck a receptive chord in most delegs when they charged Fr plan was principally concerned with Fr security and ignored theirs. (Feeling is such that we do not believe Fr proposal cld be accepted even had it full US support). They pointed to such defects as lack of proposed defensive line which took account of their security, emphasis on control Ger manpower through cadres which wld have to be essentially Fr under present conditions in Continental Eur, limitation Ger participation to elements in a mere Eur Fon Legion and role of Eur DefMin, presumably a Frenchman, as de facto DefMin for Ger. In reply to Moch’s statement Fr plan was designed create closer Continental Eur unity, Den DefMin said: “Now Mr. Moch has in this conference argued in such a way that it is clear that two, perhaps more, of the small countries are out of the picture in Fr policy expounded (at this table) and that this is the way in which Fr will pave the way to Eur federation!” It is our own view Moch has dealt cause Fr leadership on Continent Eur, which we have encouraged, a severe blow.

If Moch’s position accurately reflects attitude Fr Govt, it seems clear there is little hope agreeing on any mil sound plan for defense Western Eur including Western Ger since other Eurs themselves think plan polit and mil unsound quite aside from Ger aspect of problem. It therefore seems imperative you put problem squarely before Pleven and Schuman in order ascertain how Fr Govt intends proceed, and ascertain whether Moch’s quasi-dictatorial intransigence accurately reflects Fr Govt’s true attitude and position. In so doing you shld make clear to both of them fol points:

1.
We believe and still continue believe that problem of building up defs of Eur so that it wld not be overrun and subsequently liberated, is considered by Fr Gov as paramount. The other Eur countries certainly believe so and feel that this is most urgent problem on which immed progress is imperative.
2.
France has put forth a plan which is considered mil unsound by mil experts of NAT countries (FYI Fr mil from top down have [Page 429] told us privately they fully share this view although they cannot express it officially).
3.
This plan is also polit unacceptable to an overwhelming majority other NAT members, particularly UK, Nor, Den, Neth, Portugal and Italy, all of whom point out Fr plan in its present form unacceptable and even anything remotely resembling it wld take at least several years negot and obtain necessary individual parliamentary approval. (Belgium and Lux, while not buying Fr plan, were only two reps who did not vigorously oppose it. One Belg told us privately they took a conciliatory attitude re Fr “just to gain some time”).
4.
In addition, plan wld also be totally unacceptable Ger. As unpalatable to Fr and others as it may be, it is a fact Gers will not really defend Elbe or any other line in Ger unless Ger public opinion in support. This position which we did not put forward or comment on, was perhaps best expressed by Den Reps: “We cld not conceive—we cld not convince a new renascent Ger youth to stand guard on the Elbe if they did not do this with all their heart and soul. This is a problem which we will need to study. It will have to be handled with prudence. There will be many difficulties, but the solutions will undoubtedly be found.”
5.
Fr can be assured this Govt is convinced desirability of closer assoc among Eur nations in any feasible form and will welcome as in past constructive Fr efforts and leadership that direction but constructive leadership to be effective must be realistic. (This particular Fr effort has only served alienate other Eur countries from this concept and weaken Fr leadership. This was evident in Dutch Rep’s remark: “We must ask ourselves seriously, Mr. Chairman, whether the Fr proposal does not go far to endanger the realization of the very principle whose application it intends to promote.”) If Fr insist on their present plan, as interpreted by Moch, as a condition for an effective def system for Western Eur, including Western Ger, it is obvious that not only will no agreement be reached but that we will be obliged review our entire policy toward def of Western Europe. While we continue to hope Fr will be both cornerstone and leader of Continent, it wld be dangerous for Fr base their policy on assumption American Congress or people or other Eur countries for that matter—will continue give full support France regardless France’s actions.
6.
In this connection, US Gov has three times gone to Congress for large appropriations to build adequate Eur defensive strength. Since def Eur was in our own interest but also even more in interest Western Eur countries, we had expected full cooperation on their part in development of realistic and mil sound plan which we cld support. In effect in going to Congress for three previous appropriations totaling some six billion odd dollars—of which Fr receiving lion’s share—we have believed and told Congress that such realistic and mil sound plan was in process formulation and wld soon be in operation. While we have conscientiously avoided in any way linking our mil assistance program to a satis agreement on Ger participation notably in recent Moch-Petsche discussions in Wash, Fr must know that if we are to [Page 430] obtain appropriations carry on Mil Assistance Program in Eur after June 30, 1951, we must go to Congress in Jan with, sound presentation based on mil realistic plan. We do not feel we can again go to Congress on basis indefinite promises as to when we will have such plan. We are even less willing do so in light attitude adopted by Moch, particularly if it in any way reflects position held by Fr Govt. Fr must realize while we are as anxious as they are that they develop their own mil strength according present plan and we desire give them necessary assistance, in so doing we cannot ask Congress for money which we do not believe will be spent in building an effective defensive system for Western Eur as a whole.
7.
It seems to us that burden proof whether Fr sincerely desire build up defenses Eur with Amer aid and extensive participation rests now squarely with Fr Govt. Unless Fr give evidence they are willing use all available means organizing defenses Western Eur including France, they can hardly expect Amer people feel they shld make a major contribution this end. In particular, proof their sincerity will be tested by attitude which their Reps take in Mil Comite and in Council of Deps which are now endeavoring arrive at a formula which will permit us proceed forward in common task building up defensive strength of West.
8.
Contrary Moch’s allegation US proposal re Ger’s contribution was also a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, we have been and remain quite ready discuss it and modify it just as long as result makes mil sense and will prove acceptable to other NATO members and Gers. However, until we know where Fr Govt really stands on issue, we cannot judge how far we can go meet them. In particular, we must know whether position taken by Moch is shared by Fr Govt.
9.
Fr Assembly Res stressed desirability safeguards against resurgence Ger militarism as condition acceptance principle Ger participation Western Eur defense. We are acutely aware legitimacy Fr fears on grounds both history and geography and therefore fully appreciate importance such safeguards. Fr must realize however other Eur countries have same concern. We endeavored incorporate adequate safeguards in our proposals and hoped receive proposals from others. Although US proposals not specifically discussed, Fr appear consider safeguards inadequate. As indicated above, we are fully prepared explore this problem open-mindedly; it is essential Fr approach in coming discussions be likewise open-minded. We are not however prepared continue on a Fr take-it-or-leave-it basis or indefinite delay. Mil aspects will be actively under review in Mil Comite in coming weeks, where US will welcome specific criticisms its plan or constructive alternatives which wld give sound mil results. On polit and admin side, we believe exploration in Deps may show possibilities strengthening NATO organization so as achieve at least some objectives Fr proposal. Cannot over-stress conviction importance reaching genuinely workable agreement that makes mil sense well before end this year in order maintain public impetus behind effective NATO Def measures, meet Congressional time-table, and permit US [Page 431] take immed steps it wld like take get on with task remedying dangerous weakness Western Eur.

Acheson
  1. Repeated to London for the Ambassador as 2306, and to HICOG, Frankfort, for McCloy as 3284.
  2. Not printed.