Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/10–2750: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

London, October 27, 1950—10 p. m.

2434. For the Secretary.

1. In formulating our position with respect to Pleven’s proposal for the creation of a European army with a European Minister of Defense, there seem to me to be, from the vantage point of London, several fundamental considerations which must constantly be borne in mind. First, it is becoming increasingly clear that no adequate defense system for western Europe can be established without German contingents and the use of German resources. Second, it is doubtful whether the French really believe that western Europe even with such US and UK divisions as can be provided can hold the dyke against the Soviet tide without utilization of German resources and manpower and accordingly whether their will to resist will be sufficiently strong. A genuine Franco-German rapprochement is therefore essential to the creation of an adequate defense system.

2. For these reasons, among others I wholly approve of the cautiously favorable response you made in your press conference on October 25¹ to Pleven’s proposal. However, before giving wholehearted support to the proposal a number of basic issues need clarification, such as those pointed out in Frankfort’s 3497 October 26² to Department and certain infirmities in the scheme must be removed or so diluted that they are not too serious obstructions. At first sight it is difficult to reconcile certain aspects of the proposal either with the agreed principles in the New York resolution or with the earlier French proposals in their memorandum of August 17 including unity of command and suppression of Brussels treaty organs when they duplicated NATO.

3. Any European army which might eventually be created as a result of French initiative must be established within NATO. This point must obviously be clarified at once so that there is not the remotest possibility of misunderstanding with respect to it. You will have noted from Depto 134³ that the British were immediately concerned at the possible adverse effect Pleven’s proposal might have on NATO. The summary of Pleven’s remarks available to me indicates he stated that European forces placed at the disposal of the unified Atlantic force would operate in accordance with the NAT in matters of strategy, organization and equipment. Does this mean that Pleven accepts the essential proposition that the “European Army” would be within the NATO chain of command, subject to the NAT commander in chief and integral part of the NAT force? Pleven refers to equipment for the European force operating in accordance with the NATO but does this mean that the NATO will operate as completely as with any other contingent? What will be the powers of the European Minister of Defense and what will be his relationship to the NAT Council and the NAT Defense Committee, etc? Would the European Army operate subject to as well as “in accordance with” strategy established by NATO? Is a battalion really intended to be the largest German unit or the largest unit for all countries and in either case is there room for negotiation (the impossibility of limited units to battalion size is obvious)? Is the French proposal merely deliberate delaying action or is it an attempt to dominate the German situation or alternatively is it advanced in all good faith as the best if not the only way of obtaining approval of French public opinion?

4. As McCloy points out in his 3497, it is illogical for the French to make the commencement negotiations re the Pleven proposal conditional on the conclusion of a treaty for pooling of iron and steel. If we acecpted this condition, we might well face the prospect of an intolerably long delay in formulating and carrying through plans for the use of German units. We must attempt to dissociate the timing of negotiations on the Pleven proposal from the Schuman Plan, so that negotiations on the former can begin at once.

5. With respect to the latter, it seems to me that we should make it quite clear to the Germans that they cannot gain more by appealing to us and by relying on NAT contracts for German products than they can through Schuman Plan negotiations. At the same time, however, we might usefully prod the French into a less dogmatic approach to the Schuman negotiations and perhaps attempt to dissuade them from their excessive concern with cartels. The Schuman Plan is essential to genuine Franco-German rapprochement and should not become, as Bohlen suggests, a casualty.

6. If such points as those outlined above can be clarified and satisfactorily resolved, it should then be possible for us to assist the French in various respects. The proposal offers the opportunity, from the tactical point of view, of permitting the French to take lead in formulating and negotiating important measure for the integration of Western Germany with the West. It may be another important means for bringing about Franco-German rapprochement, thus permitting the formation of an effective defense of western Europe.

7. The Pleven proposal presumably is to be made to the UK as well as certain other countries of western Europe. You will have noted from Embtel 2373⁴ however that the French intend to proceed even though the British will not join. The British position has, of course, not yet been determined. Judging from past experience, I think it almost certain that British would not agree to participate in a scheme which involves a substantial relinquishment of national sovereignty and the creation of a supra-national authority if limited only to European countries. Accordingly, it would, I believe, be futile to pressure them into joining such a plan. It would be desirable to inform them that we understand their reasons and agree with their attitude but that we still wish to discuss our position with them and obtain their support in the attitude we take toward the French and Germans.

8. If a number of questions in the Pleven proposal cannot be resolved and it must be rejected, I suggest that this be done by as many other NAT members as possible.

Sent Department 2434, repeated information Paris for Bruce 728, Frankfort HICOG for McCloy 298.

Douglas

1. Department of State Bulletin, November 13, 1950, p. 777.
2. In telegram 3497, not printed, McCloy questioned the real intent of the French proposal, though he said he believed the NATO participants must make the best of it if the French intentions were sincere. He informed the Department that he had decided to go to Paris on the 27th to see Monnet, and hopefully to see Bruce at the same time (762A.5/10–2650).
3. In Depto 134 from London, October 25, not printed, the recently appointed U.S. Vice Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Theodore C. Achilles, reported on his discussion with Dixon and Shuckburgh regarding the Pleven Plan for a European army.
4. Not printed.