740.5/10–1950: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London
confidential niact
Washington, October
19, 1950—8 p. m.
Todep 67. Todep 64, Oct 18.1 The fol is State guidance which has been cleared by all interested agencies with Def clearance being ad referendum.2
- (1)
- The USG is seeking the maximum NATO mil production in the most efficient manner at the least cost in the shortest time to meet the requirements of the Medium Term Def Plan.
- (2)
- Much remains to be done in the field of internatl coordination and it is doubtful whether the MPSB as presently organized and staffed is capable of accomplishing it. However, the chances of successful accomplishment wld be greatly improved if the prestige, personnel, and powers of the mil production org were substantially strengthened.
- (3)
- First, the org (perhaps to be known as the Def Production Board) shld be led by an outstanding American with production experience and proven exec ability whose name carries weight with Europeans. He shld be in a position to recruit the best possible staff from all nations, and to integrate this staff through appropriate administrative arrangements. For this purpose it is necessary to give the mil production org as much gov backing and delegated power as will be politically acceptable in order to attract men of desirable calibre.
- (4)
- The second requirement is to give membership in the org to as many members of NATO as is consistent with efficient admin. The goals of efficient admin and adequate representation might be achieved by having a board consisting of reps of the producing nations, with the US member acting as Chairman and/or Exec Director.
- (5)
- The third requirement is for the Board to confine its activities to the most important production programs (as distinguished from [Page 398] individual projects) which involve major problems of internatl coordination among NATO members and with non-members, and to deal with natl govs rather than with individual industries in any nation. The Board wld specialize in the broad natl aspects of production. This is necessary in view of the limited personnel that will be available to the Board and in order to have the Board expedite rather than delay attainment of desired production goals. However, the Director shld have “task forces” at his disposal, consisting of highly qualified technicians to asst in screening programs in breaking bottlenecks and expediting production.
- (6)
- The fourth requirement is to provide some means of giving force to the decisions and recommendations of the Board and its Director. It does not seem practicable to give the Board power to direct affirmative action by any gov since this power wld be politically unacceptable. Accordingly, the most practicable method of giving force to Board actions is probably for the nations supplying external aid earmarked for mil production to consider in cases involving production programs of major importance, Board certification projects worthy and within framework NATO prod. planning as an essential factor in determining allocation of aid. (FYI and with respect to the preceding sentence US wld not be prepared at this time to agree that its allocation of aid wld be determined solely on the basis of these recommendations, nor to withholding allocations of aid until recommendations have been received, particularly if to do so wld impede progress in production.) When the Board has become capable of exercising the responsibility, consideration shld be given to a policy under which all nations shld agree to withhold external aid from projects which have been found ineligible by the Board, and to withhold further aid from Board-approved projects where the Board finds performance unsatis. To determine performance under agreed programs the Board will receive progress reports and the Director shld have the power to conduct independent investigations of production progress in liaison with natl auths.
- (7)
- The Def Production Board will expedite the delivery of finished mil items by natl producers to forces as directed by the appropriate NATO auths.
- (8)
- Finally, it is necessary to give the Board a procedure by which it can act as such, despite the opposition or absence of any member. Assuming an eleven-member Board (excluding Iceland), action by a two-thirds majority vote might be desirable, with the Exec Director given the utmost possible discretion to proceed and initiate action under the gen policies approved by the Board.
- (9)
- In gen it is visualized:
- a.
- The present MPSB wld continue until agreement on a new Board is reached and an Exec Director is appointed.
- b.
- Functions of the MPSB and PWS wld be gradually built up as the internatl staff becomes operative until the Exec Director takes over, but no delay in the High Priority Production Program shld be permitted.
- c.
- First-phase concentration wld be upon a carefully selected list of major equipment items sufficiently important to warrant internatl production planning.
- d.
- Based on a comparison of mil requirements with current supply and projected productive output derived from natl submissions, the Board wld recommend the allocation of production tasks in selected categories to various countries.
- e.
- Thereafter, as the Board becomes more capable, it wld recommend action by nations and arrange for technical asst in such fields as production methods, production standardization of parts and end-items and other related matters.
- f.
- The Board wld be authorized to investigate raw materials requirements for mil purposes and refer questions pertaining to their supply and conservation to the appropriate NATO body.
Acheson