740.5/10–1950: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy), at Frankfort
2952. Personal for McCloy from Byroade. Your estimate on timing factor involved in psychological and political preparations in Ger before practical steps cld be taken to raise units for contribution to Eur defense (re para 8 urtel 3215)1 is subject of concern here. Although we are aware of very complex difficulties to be encountered in Ger, we had not anticipated nearly as great a delay as you have indicated. Our concern pertains to (1) speed with which we desire to see defense preparations made as an end in themselves; (2) sense of frustration and despair that might accompany such long delay in starting physical preparations once decision has been made on such a highly publicized issue: (3) if eight to twelve months are required for these preparations [Page 395] and if they could be carried on to a degree through public discussion already under way prior to firm agreement among the Allies on the German issue, we may have been pressing unjustifiably for an immediate decision.
Difficult of course to estimate time involved in absence decision on proposition which we will be able to offer Gers. Our thinking has been based on assumption we wld eventually obtain NATO agreement on a plan similar to our own which wld assure Gers they will be treated without discrimination in integrated force while maintaining principle that national forces under Ger control wld not be raised. Based upon this assumption we had visualized that obtaining Cabinet, opposition party, and Bundestag support for definitive answer from the Ger Govt wld be matter of from two to four months, with our hopes upon former figure. During this time we had thought that Adenauer, while refraining from public steps of organization and physical facilities wld have underway great deal of planning so that the Federal Ministry and administrative agency cld be organized in skeleton form with considerable speed. It has also been assumed (1) that volunteers wld be available to meet initial requirements in Ger and hence the problem of organization for draft procedures wld be unnecessary until the later stages, and (2) that some proportion of cadres wld be avail-from Labor Service units.
Based upon above thinking we had hoped that actual acceptance of volunteers cld proceed by Mar of next year. We had also felt that Allied assistance in training and organization, plus fact that a portion of volunteers and officers wld have benefit of previous military experience, wld make it feasible to have effective units in being by end of next year. Advanced training wld, of course, be a continuing project but we had thought they wld be reasonably effective by that time. The above assumes, of course, that equipment for training and final outfitting cld be made available.
Equipment situation still unclear. We have considered that planning for equipping Ger units shld be based upon length of time required to organize Ger units. Perhaps (although this wld need to be discussed further in Wash) we cld utilize Austrians MDAP stockpile to meet any early needs in Ger, with later replacement to that stockpile from new procurement. If such solution were possible, this wld provide without delay most essentials of full equipment for two infantry divisions or training equipment for four infantry divisions.
Urgently request jour comments upon above thinking as regards timing or greater explanation of last sentence of ur 3215. [Byroade.]
- In telegram 3215 from Frankfort of October 18, not printed, McCloy summarized for Byroade his thoughts on West German organization for participation in a European defense force, based on nonofficial talks with German political and military personalities. The last paragraph of his telegram reads as follows: “Timing factor involves rate at which German Government could organize itself for its contribution. One estimate has placed time necessary to condition Germany for its contribution psychologically and to go through necessary political steps at approximately one year or fall of 1951. From that time, it would take approximately six months to train first German divisions. I feel that this estimate is very conservative and could probably be reduced by at least one-third, particularly that portion dealing with psychological and political preparations of government itself.” (740.5/10–4850)↩