740.5/10–950
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)
Participants: Secretary Acheson, General Marshall, Secretary Snyder, Ambassador Harriman, Messrs. Bissell,1 Martin and Nitze
Mr. Snyder said that he had requested today’s meeting on the assumption that the work over the week end would have provided more information than was available last Thursday. He said that he understood that the work had not progressed far enough, however, for anyone to have clearer ideas than were had before.
[Here follows a section covering French budgetary problems.]
Secretary Snyder asked whether real progress was being made toward the creation of balanced unified forces so as to eliminate any duplication or overlapping as between countries. General Marshall said that the pick and shovel work was going forward rapidly and that he anticipated that the work would be well along prior to the meeting of the Defense Ministers.
General Marshall then brought up the question of securing French agreement to the incorporation of German units in a unified defense force. He said that he had read the memorandum2 prepared in the Pentagon, in collaboration with Mr. Byroade and some of our other people, on the subject of the position which we should take with the French at the Defense Ministers’ meeting and that he had serious reservations with this approach. He said it seemed to him that the memorandum addressed itself only to the subject of what our ultimate objectives were; it did not give much light as to how we would approach this ultimate objective. He said that his information was that there had been some development of French public opinion along lines favorable to our position, but that French public opinion was still a problem. He did not think that what was frightening the [Page 365] French now would frighten them six months from now. He thought it important to attack the problem of the detailed practical arrangements which would be advisable in phasing the incorporation of German units into the European defense force, and to do this in the light of the negotiating problem he would face with the French. He did not feel that the memorandum, as originally prepared, provided him with any basis for successful negotiations with Mr. Moch. He said that unless we could do something about Germany, we would have to start on an entirely different line. He was not at all sure that another line could be found.
Secretary Acheson brought the discussion back to the French financial problem and suggested that, perhaps, we could work out a first step—an initial commitment—which would keep the program going.
Mr. Bissell said that a portion of the French request represented dollars which would be spent for actual purchases in dollar markets, but that the French also wanted dollar assistance which would go toward building up their dollar reserves.
Secretary Snyder said that if we were to make a commitment to the French along this basis we would be without footing when discussing similar problems with the other NAT countries.
Secretary Acheson suggested that we make an initial commitment which would cover direct added dollar outlays and, perhaps, some general assistance, but not go further than this now.
Mr. Bissell concurred, but said he thought that the amount of assistance we should contemplate should be computed on the assumption that the French gold and dollar reserves were not to increase. He said that the ECA computations indicated that the total amount of economic type of assistance for all NAT countries, including that made necessary by the rearmament program, would remain at approximately the rate contemplated for this year under the MDAP and ECA Acts. The ECA portion would be expected to decline by an amount approximately equivalent to the increase in the MDAP portion. In fact, if it were not for price increases, the overall total would probably be somewhat less in future years than at present.
Mr. Nitze said that, as he understood it, the successful defense of Europe was an integral part of the defense of the United States. In the event that it was not possible to maintain a beachhead on the continent of Europe, a successful outcome of a global war would be hard to foresee; that it would cost the United States less, both in terms of men and of money to cooperate with the Europeans in the development of a unified force for the defense of Europe than to increase the number of United States divisions stationed in Europe above those now contemplated. General Marshall said that that was correct, and [Page 366] stated that it was a very expensive proposition to maintain United States forces in Europe.
General Marshall referred to a memorandum being prepared by a group of prominent educators, including President Conant at Harvard. The memorandum suggested that we adopt compulsory military service in the United States with the objective of creating United States forces sufficient to permit our stationing 500,000 men in Europe. He said he was not wholly in agreement with the ideas of this group as he understood them, but he thought there was an element in their thinking which we should take seriously. In maintaining a large standing army, we would have problems not only with the Congress, but also with the soldiers themselves. We were even now running into problems in calling up reserve officers similar to those which we have always met in calling up men under the Selective Service Act. He said that he realized that the future was uncertain, but we must be realistic in appraising what we were undertaking. It was of great importance that the European countries play their full part and a way be found to utilize German units. Perhaps as an initial step, we might contemplate incorporating German platoons in American divisions. In this way, our divisions could very rapidly be brought to an over-strength condition. Secretary Byrnes3 had turned down a similar idea when it had arisen before, but, perhaps, we should reexamine it now.
It was agreed that the group would meet again prior to the initial discussions with Messrs. Moch and Petsche.