740.5/9–2350: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
Secto 41. Following is summary of eighth session, tripartite meeting of Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers, September 22, 1950, 3 p. m.
Shinwell stated that the west had sought but failed to build adequate defenses. Believe it fatal not to take advantage of US offer of troops. Military experts had stated that 56 divisions with adequate reserves, air force and equipment were absolutely essential. It was also essential to fight east of the Rhine and to get under way far in advance of the time schedule of the medium term plan. Pointed out necessity for organization capable of providing order in Germany in the event of attack. Noted psychological effect of justifying defense of Germany [Page 341] without Germans sharing in the burden of that defense. He indicated that the UK contribution by the middle of 1951 would be to add 1 division to the 2⅓ divisions in Europe and to strengthen the existing divisions to extent necessary for fighting. Noted that the French contribution of forces without equipment would merely be a skeleton force. The Benelux countries could not be counted upon for much in way of troops. Stressed the need for reserves. Issue was whether German forces should be used when western forces were built up. If the answer to this is yes, plans must begin immediately. If no, an alternative must be sought. It was necessary to make a declaration stating that the west will use all available means including consideration of participation of German units.
Marshall1 noted agreement with Bevin on psychological importance for maintaining initiative and with Shinwell on military situation and timing. Indicated that there would be no problem of priorities for NAT countries if the US can plan on participation of Germany now. Noted US as well as French have problem with their legislatures. If the US administration cannot assure Congress that all available means in Germany would be utilized to achieve an effective European force there would be a serious problem regarding the appropriations for western defense. Recognized problems of the French and asked for their solution of this problem.
Moch noted that the French Parliament would be unanimous against the use of German divisions and indicated it was necessary to obtain the answers to following questions before the French position could be made clear:
- 1.
- How many German divisions are contemplated?
- 2.
- How many US divisions will be sent to Europe?
- 3.
- When can the US send them?
Mr. Bevin suggested that these questions be answered in a private meeting between the three Defense Ministers.
Mr. Schuman asked what positive steps could be taken if agreement were reached and whether it were not enough to agree that Germany would assist in supplying labor, matériel and defense works. Noted that studies could be immediately initiated to find out how Germany might assist without use of military units. Secretary referred to point made by Shinwell that German manpower would have to be used at some time and that it was necessary to plan for equipment such units eventually or it was possible that a shortage might develop when Germany is brought in at a later time.
[Page 342]Mr. Schuman stated that it was not possible for him to agree even to the ultimate use of German units and noted that French Government would be ready in nine months to consider the problem. In the meantime the idea is not rejected. Moch noted that once production is begun it is possible to increase output and since NAT countries would have priority on all available arms no time would be lost by postponing decision on problem. With regard to the justification of defending Germany he noted that our intention was not to defend Germany as such but to preserve freedom in Europe and to take advantage of our occupation of Germany to fight further from the bulwarks of our own frontiers. Schuman explained that nine months’ time would allow for further discussions in the Cabinet and in Parliament and to sound out public opinion. Noted that authorization for HICOM to discuss issue with German Government did not imply acceptance of principles by French Government.
It was made clear that French did not wish to prohibit discussions of problem at this time. Secretary pointed out there must be meeting of minds on number of German divisions required, how they are to be commanded and other military matters. The problem for the US was whether it would be able to tell Congress that Germans were going to share the burden of fighting with US troops on German soil.
During a recess the Defense Ministers met in private and said they had reached agreement on ten intermediate measures to be taken in Germany which Marshall put before them. Ministers then agreed to work out through officials the following documents:
- 1.
- A statement of the agreement on intermediate points referred to above for use only by the Ministers of the three powers.2
- 2.
- A resolution to be proposed in the Council.
- 3.
- A draft communiqué for the Council.
It was agreed that the essence of the agreement should be communicated to Stikker and Van Zeeland. Ministers adjourned until 10 a. m., Saturday, September 23.
Department pass Paris, London, Defense.