Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/9–850

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the President ¹

top secret

[Washington, September 8, 1950.]

My Dear Mr. President: In compliance with your letter of August 26th,² we have jointly considered the questions you raised regarding the strengthening of the defense of Europe and the nature of the contribution by Germany to this defense. We have reached the following conclusions and recommendations in regard to those questions:

1. Are we prepared to commit additional United States forces to the defense of Europe?

We are agreed that additional United States forces should be committed to the defense of Europe at the earliest feasible date in order that any doubts of American interest in the defense, rather than the liberation, of Europe will be removed, thus increasing the will of our Allies to resist. We agree that the overall strength of United States forces in Europe should be about 4 infantry divisions and the equivalent of 1½ armored divisions, 8 tactical air groups, and appropriate naval forces; and that these forces should be in place and combat ready as expeditiously as possible. In addition to the above, we agree that the United States should dispatch to Europe on the outbreak of hostilities, further forces, the size and composition of which should be discussed within NATO on the Chiefs of Staff level.

Plans to commit United States forces as discussed above are based upon the expectation that they will be met with similar efforts on the part of the other nations involved. The United States should make it clear that it is now squarely up to the European signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty to provide the balance of the forces required for the initial defense. Firm programs for the development of such forces should represent a prerequisite for the fulfillment of the above commitments on the part of the United States.

In view of the Korean situation, both Departments are agreed that it would be undesirable to announce publicly the tentative departure date of additional units to Europe. However, appropriate European representatives should be informed at the earliest practicable date of our intention to increase our strength in Europe, as outlined above. (The term European defense force as used herein expressed a concept and is not meant to rigidly fix the name of this force.)

2. Are we prepared to support, and in what manner, the concept of a European defense force, including German participation on other than a national basis?

3. Are we prepared to look forward to the eventuality of a Supreme Commander for the European defense forces?

4. Are we prepared to support the immediate creation of a Combined Staff for such an eventual Supreme Commander?

We are agreed that the above three questions must be considered together and that our recommendation on each of them is in the affirmative. In the interest of clarity of understanding, however, it is desired to set forth our understanding of the general concept we visualize. The creation of a European defense force within the North Atlantic Treaty framework seems to us to be the best means of obtaining the maximum contribution from European nations and to provide as well a framework in which German contribution of a significant nature could be realized. The objective should be the early creation of an integrated force adequate to insure the successful defense of Western Europe, including Western Germany, against possible Soviet invasion, commanded by a Supreme Commander at the earliest suitable date.

The details of the concept of the European defense force should be developed by the appropriate agencies of NATO. It is our present view that the plan should shape up as follows:

A. There should eventually be a Supreme Commander for the European Defense Force who would be provided with sufficient delegated authority to insure that the separate national forces are organized and trained into one effective force in time of peace and who would be prepared to exercise the full powers of the Supreme Allied Commander over that force in time of war.

B. The Supreme Commander described above should be provided with an international staff drawn from the nationals of all of the participating nations. This staff should perform the functions indicated below as well as serve the Commander with all necessary staff support.

C. Field forces of the European defense force should in general be composed of national contingents^* operating within overall NATO control and under immediate commanders of their own nationalities. The nations concerned should make firm commitments as to the forces that would pass immediately to the control of the Supreme Commander, when appointed, and additional commitments as to the forces which would be placed under his command in event of war.

It is our present thinking that German units larger than the balanced ground Division should not initially be authorized, although at a later stage as the force increases in size and strength there would probably be no objection to higher German echelons. These German Divisions, at least initially, would be integrated with non-German units in the corps and higher units but should be nationally generated and so integrated as not to impair their morale or effectiveness.

As an immediate step in the formation of the European defense force, we recommend the creation at the earliest possible date of a Combined Staff in Europe under the NATO Standing Group as outlined in sub-paragraph B above, and that it be clearly and publicly understood that such a step is in preparation for the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander. A priority mission of this staff would be to plan the organization of the European defense force. The Chief of Staff of the Combined European Staff should, if the other nations so request, be an American. Even though he shall not at this stage be designated a Commander, the Standing Group, with the consent of the North Atlantic Council, should endow him with certain powers of direction from the very outset. It should be clearly understood that he would have the authority, pending the arrival of the Commander, of directing the organization and training of the forces already in being into a unified force and of prescribing the specifications for and training of units in the process of being formed. He should in addition, to the extent that command would be necessary during this interim period, have the power of direction over German units. Under such a course, with sufficient public information that a European defense force was in the process of formation, we should proceed without delay with the formation of adequate West German units since they will require time for organization, training, and equipping during which time the appropriate framework for their integration into a European defense force both in peace and in war can be developed. For political and psychological reasons in Europe, as well as to provide a basis for acceptable German participation, it is considered most important that the concept of the European defense force should from the outset be heavily stressed through all forms of informational media.

5. Are we prepared to support supplementing the activities of the Military Production and Supply Board by a European War Production Board with centralized direction?

We are agreed that greater central direction should be provided in the fields of military production and procurement of major items of supply. This should be done within the framework of the present NATO Military Production and Supply Board by necessary changes in its terms of reference and by setting up an executive, directing a group highly qualified in the production field, and supported by an integrated staff so as to be able to provide the necessary guidance for military production and supply.

While the maximum contribution would be expected from Germany in the production field, we believe that German forces should be dependent upon other nations for certain vital military equipment which should not be produced by German industry.

6. Are we prepared to consider full United States participation in European defense organs, i.e., would we be prepared to accept the responsibility of having an American Supreme Commander and an American Chairman of the European War Production Board?

We are agreed that United States participation in European defense organs appears necessary to obtain the timely and effective use of European resources for increased defense and for the most effective utilization of American assistance. In view of the tremendous United States security interest outside Europe, we agree that a full and common pooling of all United States and European resources is impractical.

We recommend that an American national be appointed now as Chief of Staff and eventually as a Supreme Commander for the European defense force but only upon the request of the European nations and upon their assurance that they will provide sufficient forces, including adequate German units, to constitute a command reasonably capable of fulfilling its responsibilities. We also recommend that, upon request, an American national assume the position of Chairman of an executive group of the revamped Military Production and Supply Board.

It is our objective to assist the European nations to provide a defense capable of deterring or meeting an attack. When this objective is achieved it is hoped that the United States will be able to leave to the European nation-members the primary responsibility, with the collaboration of the United States, of maintaining and commanding such force.

7. Are we prepared to support the transformation of the Standing Group into a Combined Chiefs of Staff organization?

We are agreed that the European defense force should be subject to political and strategic guidance under NATO. This of course implies eventual German participation in this Treaty Organization. From a military viewpoint, it would be desirable that this be done as soon as possible.

We are also agreed that the terms of reference of the Standing Group should be amended to confer upon it greater authority and that it should be gradually transformed into an Allied military organization for higher strategic direction of war in areas where combined NATO forces are operating. As such it would be the superior military body to which the Supreme Commander, and, pending his appointment, the Chief of Staff of the Combined Staff would be responsible.

With the eventual establishment of a Supreme Commander, the necessary supplementary Standing Group reorganization, and the framework of a European defense force, it becomes clear that the major military planning and direction in Western Europe would be the responsibility of this organization. Since the only reason for providing German security forces is to permit them to participate in this defense, the formation of a German General Staff would merely duplicate the functions of the Combined European Staff and is, therefore, unnecessary and undesirable.

8. Are there any other ways through which we should attempt to invigorate NATO at this time?

The question of invigorating the NAT Organization through means other than those described in this paper is a matter which is receiving joint consideration by our Departments. In view of the urgency attached to the matters contained in your letter, we have not desired to delay our recommendations for completion of studies on other measures.

If the above recommendations meet with your approval, we are in agreement that the Secretary of State should be authorized to undertake at the earliest possible date preliminary negotiations with the other governments involved, and the Secretary of Defense should be prepared to further these principles by coordinate action. While initial discussions by the Secretary of State should be oh the general political concept of the establishment of the European defense force, it is realized that it may be necessary for the Secretary of State to develop the plan in some detail in order to get agreement to maximum national contributions and to the participation of Germany in the substantial form suggested herein. The Secretary of State should, therefore, be authorized in his negotiations to utilize such of the substance of this letter as is necessary in order to reach the desired agreement. It is anticipated that at the time of such discussions, military advisers would be available to assist the Secretary of State. At a later stage, assuming the necessary governmental agreements in principle have been reached, it is anticipated that the plans mentioned herein would be formulated in greater detail and put into effect (through normal State and Defense mechanisms and procedures) at subsequent NATO meetings, including the Defense and Military Committee meetings in October.³

Faithfully yours,

• Louis Johnson
• Dean Acheson

1. President Truman received this joint communication on the morning of September 8. He shortly thereafter referred it for urgent consideration by the other members of the National Security Council and by the Acting Secretary of the Treasury who concurred in it (NSC Action No. 359), subject to the comment by the Chairman, National Security Resources Board, that, in the limited time available for study, he was convinced that the forces proposed herein were inadequate. On September 11 the President, after consideration of the views of the National Security Council and the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, approved this communication. The approved joint communication was circulated to the National Security Council under cover of a brief explanatory note by “Council Executive Secretary James S. Lay, Jr. as document NSC 82, September 11, Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Position Regarding Strengthening the Defense of Europe and the Nature of Germany’s Contribution Thereto.” (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 82 Series)
2. Ante, p. 250.
3. It may be necessary to nave some flexibility in this provision in order to secure the maximum contribution to the defense of Europe, e.g., Italy, in view of the limitations of the Italian Peace Treaty. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. In a letter dated September 12, not printed, Matthews informed General Burns that the recommendations agreed upon in this letter to President Truman made unnecessary the comment or concurrence he had requested of Bums in his letter of August 16 concerning the Department of State’s paper on the establishment of a European defense force (740.5/9–1250).