Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/8–1450: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London, August 14, 1950—2 p. m.

907. Eyes only for the President.

1. Mr. Churchill¹ has written you a letter to which there is attached an enclosure. This letter etc. is going forward via the pouch this afternoon. Pending the receipt of the letter and enclosure he asks that I cable you the letter addressed to you from him as follows:

“I dare say and certainly hope that you read my speech at the Strasbourg Assembly² and I trust you will have an account presented to you of the deeply interesting debate which led up to the great majority by which the resolution for a European army³ was carried. This is of course to me the fruition of what I have laboured for ever since my speech at Zurich⁴ four years ago. I enclose a marked copy of what I said at that time.

The ending of the quarrel between France and Germany by what is really a sublime act on the part of the French leaders, and a fine manifestation of the confidence which Western Germany have in our and your good faith and goodwill, is I feel an immense step forward towards the kind of world for which you and I are striving. It is also the best hope of avoiding a third world war.

The only alternative to a European army with a front against Russian aggression in Europe is, of course, a kind of neutrality arrangement by Germany, France and the smaller countries with the Soviets. This is what the Communists are striving for, and it could only mean the speedy absorption of the neutral European countries by the methods which have subjugated Czechoslovakia, as they would be in a sort of no-mans-land between Britain, with its American air-bombing base, and the Soviet armies. They and their cities and junctions might all become involved, especially if these countries were used for the rocket bombardment of Britain.

Although none of us can tell what the Soviet intentions are, I have no doubts that we ought, at this stage, to reject the strategy of holding the Channel and the Pyrenees and strive for the larger hope.

The point, however, on which I wish particularly to address you is, what will happen to the Germans if they send a substantial contingent—say five or six divisions—to the European army, in which British and, I trust, Americans will be strongly represented, and the Soviet retaliate by invading Western Germany? Would the United States treat a major aggression of this kind into Western Germany in the same way as it would treat a swift attack on France, the Benelux or Britain, or should we let these German people, whom we have disarmed and for whose safety we have accepted responsibility, be attacked without the shield of the atomic deterrent? I should indeed be grateful if I could have your views on this.

You will note that I said at Strasbourg that if the Germans threw in their lot with us, we should hold their safety and freedom as sacred as our own. Of course I have no official right to speak to anyone, yet after the firm stand you have successfully made about Berlin, I think that the deterrent should be made to apply to all countries represented in the European army. I do not see how this would risk or cost any more than what is now morally guaranteed by the United States.

Perhaps you will consider whether you can give any indication of your views. A public indication would be of the utmost value and is, in my opinion, indispensable to the conception of a European front against Communism. Perhaps it may be the case that Mr. Acheson, or your representative in Germany, has already given an assurance in this respect.

You may perhaps have noted the unexpected and fortunate fact that the view of the German delegation, who represent all parties in the German Government, is that Germany should send a contingent to the European army (say of five or six divisions), but should not have a national army of her own. I have feared they might take the opposite view, namely, ‘Let us have a national army with its own munitions, supplies, and the right to re-arm, and we will then give a contingent to the European army.’ I need not say what an enormous difference this had made to the French view. They and we can get it both ways.

With kind regards.”

2. Reference to his Zurich speech is to be found on page 201 of Sinews of Peace by Winston S. Churchill, “A Collection of Postwar Speeches” published in book form by Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, the Riverside Press Cambridge, 1949.

Douglas

1. Winston Churchill, leader of the Conservative Party in Great Britain.
2. For text of speech presented on August 11 at the second session of the Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg, see Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950, pp. 326–331.
3. The resolution, adopted by the Assembly on August 11, reads as follows: “The Assembly, in order to express its devotion to the maintenance of peace and its resolve to sustain the action of the Security Council of the United Nations in defence of peaceful peoples against aggression, calls for the immediate creation of a unified European Army, under the authority of a European Minister of Defense, subject to proper European democratic control and acting in full cooperation with the United States and Canada.”
4. Churchill, speaking at the University of Zurich on September 19, 1946, called for a “partnership” between France and Germany as the first step in the creation of a “United States of Europe” with Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union as sponsors.