Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/8–1450

Memorandum of Conversation of August 10 Between the Secretary of State and Various Members of Congress¹

confidential

[Washington , August 10, 1950.]

Participants:

The Secretary	Senators	Kefauver	Representatives	Wadsworth
Mr. Harriman		Thye		Boggs (La.)
Mr. Dulles2		Sparkman		Sikes (Fla.)
Mr. Cooper3		Hendrickson		Hale (Me.)
Mr. McFall		Fulbright		Burke (Ohio)

The above-named Members of Congress called on me on the morning of August 10 by appointment at their request to discuss North Atlantic union and related matters.

Senator Kefauver opened the conversation by pointing out that all of the Members present had supported, in great measure, the foreign policies of the Government aimed at strengthening our position in world affairs. Particularly, he indicated, that support has been forthcoming in full measure for Marshall Plan assistance, Greek-Turkish Aid and the Korean imbroglio. He said that since the Korean episode he felt that there was a growing disposition on the part of Congress to want to move more quickly and more concretely in the way of developing forms of closer political organizations among the free nations of the world. He pointed to the fact that over half of the Senate and about 100 Members of the House of Representatives have endorsed one type of resolution or another designed to bring about various types of new political association of the free nations of the the world. He said he felt that the Department’s attitude that had been displayed on these resolutions up to date had been negative and that public opinion on this matter had consistently been moving ahead of the Departmental view. On the basis of these observations he, and the other Members present, had decided to call on me to present their fervent feelings that the Department should recast its thinking on this general subject and move affirmatively and courageously in endeavoring to bring about some type of greater political organization among the free nations that would insure the yearning for peace so deeply implanted in the hearts of all of the American people.

Following these opening remarks of Senator Kefauver, Senator Fulbright, Congressman Wadsworth, Senator Thye, Congressman Burke, Senator Hendrickson, Congressman Sikes and Senator Sparkman in turn proceeded to associate themselves with the thoughts expressed by Senator Kefauver and to offer additional observations designed to support the general suggestions made by Kefauver.

Among the most important of these observations were the following:

1. It is essential that some form of a bold plan be devised that will afford a new measure of hope to the American people. What is needed is the will to embark upon a “bold adventure” which will capture the imagination of the American people to a degree that they will realize that their Government is ingenuously pursuing every possible path to insure a peaceful world of the future.

2. The present organizational forms for the various types of financial assistance that we are rendering the world lend themselves to costly operations and compel the United States to bear a disproportionate part of the sum total effort needed to protect the position of the free nations in the world today. If closer political association or union could be brought about, it would mean that the burden of the effort for freedom would be distributed more evenly among those nations participating in the association.

3. Our foreign policies, in the way of meeting the issues of the world, have been a series of temporary expedients with no long-term, forward-looking design. We must, therefore, devise a program that will instill hope and enthusiasm in the minds of the American people, which, in turn, will permit the Government to move aggressively in corraling support of the other nations for closer political ties.

4. There is a growing disposition on the part of the American people to support the concept of a preventive war. This growing attitude is sired in fear and will continue to grow in volume unless some bold alternative course of action is presented by the Government.

5. Current developments at Strasbourg⁴ would indicate that there is a yearning on the part of the peoples of Europe for closer political affiliation with their neighbors and the peoples in Europe are ahead of their Governments in their groping and quest for answers to the encroachments of Russian imperialism.

6. The lack of enthusiasm in Congress to grant funds for some of the types of Government programming in foreign affairs (recent action on Point IV appropriations and Voice of America funds were cited as cases in point) is traceable to a sense of frustration and lack of understanding as to the purposes behind our policies. A bold new program involving Herculean efforts to achieve some form of closer political ties among the free nations would be enthusiastically received by Congress and would make foreign aid programs easier to sell.

7. Discussions with scores of farmers on the farm sites in the Scandinavian countries have proved that we have not sold ourselves, our purposes, ideals and aspirations to the man of the soil in Scandinavia. It is important, therefore, that we devise a program that will capture the minds and the hearts of the European peoples. The fight must be with men’s minds not with bullets.

8. The world knows what the United States is against but not what it is for. In the last war unity came about as a result of opposition to a common enemy. With the liquidation of the common enemy that unity disappeared and the type of unity we must now have cannot be found in negative ideals. We must unite affirmatively to carry out programs to sell the concept of our priceless heritage of freedom. To do this we must work on the lower levels as well as on the universal levels. We must let the world know just exactly what we are for in terms of a world society. The world only knows what we are against. The Congress does not demand of the State Department that it “carry the ball” in efforts for closer world political ties of one type or another but it does expect not to have the active opposition of the Department.

9. The people want a system of world law with force to back it up and will go to most any extreme in the direction of achieving that end result.

10. The labor movements in this country are militantly in favor of looking ahead in this quest for closer political ties and will give great assistance to the Government in the fulfillment of any move designed to achieve that purpose.

After permitting all of those present to have their individual say, I then proceeded to express my own views. I made it pointed that I was confident that all of those present were trying to reach the same end result—that is, the insuring of peace and security for the free world—but that the difficulty lay in the differences that exist in the appraisals of the means to the end. I stated that I had invited Messrs. Harriman, Cooper and Dulles to come to the meeting as I relied on all of them for helpful counsel in matters of major policy consideration.

I stated that I was confident that neither the people of the United States nor those in the Administration would look with any favor whatever on the idea of a preventive war and that I fully cast aside any suggestions looking toward that type of approach. Any nation embarking upon a preventive war would, in my opinion, find itself immediately without any Allies and would ultimately find itself in the unenviable position of having the world against it. The results would be too terrifying to contemplate. I informed them that I felt that today the United States Government was in the greatest danger in its history, more so even than the crucial days marked by the battle of Gettysburg and the debacle at Pearl Harbor. I observed that it was important to maintain the distinction and difference between power and potentiality. While today the advantages of power lie in the hands of the Soviet Union, nonetheless the potentialities of power are measurably on the side of the free peoples. As we approach the power in being of the Russian Government through the various programs that we now have afoot, we must realize that the hazards of the Kremlin taking unexpected action to put their power to use is ever heightened. I called attention to the fact that our estimates show that the European Military Assistance Program countries now possess about 25% of our economic and military potential while the OEEC countries together show a potential of about 50% of our own economic and military might. Europe does not have much fat to draw on in girding herself for future eventualities. If by bur pressures to bring about the maximum rearming of Europe, we place an undue strain on the economy of these European nations, we subject them to the grave danger of opening the back door to Communist inroads and expansions that might serve to defeat, through political forces, the military ends we are seeking. I stated that it was important continually to bear in mind that the spirit of the European people to fight will be proportionate to the arms available to them to insure their defense. We cannot expect our European friends to show any enthusiasm for placing men in uniform if they are not fully conscious of the fact that they will have the tools and implements of defense to carry through with the job. Following the outbreak of the Korean hostilities there was a great surge of support in Europe for the principles enunciated in the Security Council resolutions. The response was heartening. Shortly, however, this enthusiasm began to wane and a chill overtook the peoples of Europe. The question is thus drawn: “Do we have the capabilities and the military means to meet the issues that are now before us and which will continue to confront us in the future as a result of this clash in apparently irreconcilable interests?”

I next pointed up the thought that in the non-European areas of the world the consideration of which side, Russian or the United States, would be the winner in a world conflagration often plays an important part in the determination of individual national policies. In the Far East the fear of Russia and the fear of Russian imperialism is real but there is no deep-seated antipathy toward Communism as such. Nationalism in the Far East areas is a concept most fervently desired by the multitudes and it thus becomes all-important that we make crystal clear our lack of desire for imperialist or colonial control.

I assented to the thought that had been previously expressed that a mere combination of national programs designed to solve our present world problems was not enough to meet the issues with which we are confronted. Certainly one unified program of coordinated collective force is most fervently to be desired, but it is most difficult of attainment. It cannot be brought into being by a mere want. It must evolve. Today time is short. It is running out on us. In a very short time we will come to a period of extreme peril. Is it not better therefore for us to plunge all of our energies into hammering on the concept of a unity of our military and economic forces—the free countries of Europe and the United States—rather than to broaden the approach by dedicating ourselves to a mission designed to bring about, essentially on a long-term basis, the political unities which have been discussed this morning. If the answer to this should be yes would we not be scattering our energies by trying to bring about a consummation of a policy that is essentially of a longer term nature that the perils of the immediate future will permit us to indulge? I cited in this connection the highly difficult situation in which Great Britain finds itself. It is essential, of course, that Great Britain become a part of any successful political union in Europe and yet any such arrangement would have to be worked out within the realities of the responsibilities of England to the British Commonwealth. While these difficulties might not be insuperable of accomplishment, it would seem that the end could be attained only by a reasonably long evolutionary process.

Next, I questioned whether the American people themselves have thought through what any such plan of union would mean to them. Would they be willing to make the surrenders of sovereignty essential to the fulfillment of any such plan? Would they be willing to share the sovereign attribute of taxation with other peoples? If we were to start on such a project as this and then weaken in our approach because of domestic political pressures, would we not then be in a more dangerous position than if we had not started? I concluded my observations by again emphasizing the fact that I considered time so much of the essence in the present world situation that I could not help but feel that our policy should lie in concentrating on the all-compelling essentials of common defense and to let the other evolutionary developments of political forms come at a later date.

Mr. Harriman next took up the conversation. He said that he wanted to announce at the inception that he had not read the resolution or resolutions under discussion but that he understood that they all looked to some form of closer political union of Europe and the United States. He stated that it was his feeling that some reorganization of the NAT treaty mechanism was most essential in order that we might realize the utmost of the potentialities in that organization. He pointed out that he would be alarmed, however, if we were to plunge into a new type of enterprise looking toward closer political organization with Europe, which move might well militate against our present program of urgent military assistance. He pointed out that the OEEC development with the United States and Canada participating⁵ held out great promise for closer economic ties. He reverted to the fact that the Point IV program had served to electrify many of the areas of the world that would be the beneficiary of such a program but in spite of that fact Congress had to be prodded to the utmost to accept the program and did not seem to place any real significance on the idea.

At this point Mr. Harriman dilated on the general military picture in Europe by pointing out that all evidence points to the fact that the Norwegians and Turks will fight regardless of the measure of assistance on our part. In other areas, such as Denmark and the Middle East, he opined that the peoples of those sections would fight if we were to give them the necessary tools of war. He made point of the general situation of weakness in the Far East, with a great measure of fear prevailing throughout the area, which calls for us to put a real measure of strength in building up the will of these people to resist. He said that potential strength is now on the side of the free nations but that that strength requires mobilization. At this point Mr. Harriman repeated his statement that he neither approves nor disapproves of the resolutions but that he did feel that the urgency of our present situation does not permit going into ambitious programs that would tend to divert attention from the immediate needs of the moment.

Mr. Dulles next entered the discussion. He made point of the fact that his observations were essentially personal. He commented that the West is our civilization and it is therefore easier for us to devise programs of understanding with the nations of the West. The West has fallen into evil days because of its own divisions which permit the non-western powers to take advantage of us. He stated, as his opinion, that the Forth Atlantic Pact does not in itself create sufficient unity, particularly in terms of common defense. He said that in order to insure the maximum result from our efforts to prepare militarily for possible days of judgment in the West, some form of a federal principle of union is needed. He amplified this point by discussing the participation of the State of New York in the over-all national defense effort, calling attention to the fact that each State of the Union gives its contribution to the total national defense effort in terms of what was needed to make the most effective and complete system of total armed forces. He felt that some such principle as we applied in the United States must be brought into being among the free nations of Europe. It was his opinion that there is a marked feeling among our citizens that we are not moving fast enough in the direction of providing both the most effective forms and the substance for a common defense with the European nations.

He next stated that he could see no conflict between the various ideas which had been previously discussed by Members of Congress and myself. Admitting that unity is sorely needed, why could we not start on the immediate thing, namely unity for purpose of common defense, and then proceed from that concept to the development of other political principles of unity? Mr. Dulles stated that he does not like the Atlantic Union Resolution⁶ because it involves the President, and he could not help but feel that it would interfere in our present efforts. What we must do is start on the first things and then work down the scale to those of secondary importance. History has repeatedly shown that military alliances alone are not enough to insure the security we all seek. The time calls for great creative thought. The pull of communism lies in its forwardness and aggressive design. The unity and strength in the formative period of our Republic was traceable to the fact that new vistas were opened for the development of man’s mind and the regeneration of his spirit. Something more than the cohesion based on military self-protection is urgently needed.

In conclusion Mr. Dulles felt that there would be a good opportunity to harness the two major ideas that had been expressed in the course of the discussion with the thought of applying the federal principle to problems of our common defense with further situations of union flowing from our progress made in the primary approach. He felt it most necessary that whatever be devised be something of a less formal nature than provided in the resolution, with the plan to be brought about without the Government taking an official part.

Senator Kefauver again entered the discussion by stating that my attitude and that of Mr. Harriman were, to him, most disillusioning. He stated that he could find nothing in the statements of either of us that would give any element of hope that we could meet the challenge confronting us. He said that North Atlantic Union was not intended in any way to be in substitution for present policies but rather as a supplement to existing programs. We want our friends to be with us as a matter of law. The Senator also took occasion to dispute my observation on the lack of sentiment for a preventive war. He said that he felt sentiment throughout the country was building up in that direction and that bold ideas were required to supply satisfactory alternative courses of action. In confirmation of this view he cited the recent speech of Sergeant York in Tennessee asking that we march on the Kremlin at once.

Mr. Harriman then stated that he wished to be associated with Mr. Dulles’ observation and that “we must all stick together as much as possible.”

Mr. John Cooper next asked to be put on record as being in favor of the Kefauver objectives too. He stated that in his opinion the greatest concern in Europe today is one of security and that that security can be brought about only by our unflagging and speedy assistance. We must do something immediate to reassure the European people on the security problem and not confuse the issue by diverting our energies to ideals of undoubted desirability but of considerably less urgency. He stated that the paramount question in Europe today is “Will the United States actually come to our aid militarily in the event of invasion?”

Congressman Herter interjected at this point and asked if it might be possible to have a portion of the Congressional group attending the meeting meet with a designated group from the State Department, to see if it would be possible to work out some solution that would not have the active opposition of the State Department and at the same time would satisfy those Members of Congress who are searching for answers to the questions on European Union that have been raised.

I thereupon thanked the group for calling on me and giving me the benefit of their attitude on these them that I would give consideration to the suggestion that had been made for some type of further meeting to explore further the general problem.

1. Memorandum dated August 14, prepared for the Secretary by Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.
2. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State.
3. John Sherman Cooper, member of the U.S. Senate, 1946–1948, 1952–1954, and special adviser to Acheson at the May meetings of the North Atlantic Council. Cooper also was senior adviser to Spofford at the first meetings of the Council Deputies in July.
4. See telegram 907, August 14, p. 207.
5. For documentation, see pp. 611 ff.
6. Senate Concurrent Resolution 57, which proposed that the President invite the governments of the North Atlantic (Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to send delegates from their principal political bodies to a convention “to explore how far their peoples; … can apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union.” It stipulated that “other democracies” might be invited to participate. Nonsupport of the concurrent resolution was expressed by the Department of State, and it was not brought to a vote in the Senate.