Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/8–150: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

Paris, August 1, 1950—7 p. m.

591. Pass Snyder, Harriman, Katz and Foster.¹

1. Katz and myself had meeting last night with Pleven, Moch, Petsche, Parodi,² Alphand, Guindey, Director of Foreign Financial Relations of Ministry of Finance, and Director of Exchange Controls Calvet. Calvet is also a member of Pleven’s personal cabinet.

2. Katz stressed the determination of the Administration, Congress and people of the US to develop as speedily as possible a system of Atlantic defense that would enable the western world to resist any Soviet aggression. We regard western Europe as the free world’s military priority. To this end we have embarked upon an ambitious program what will entail large sacrifices on the part of our citizens. We are ready and willing to share many of the fruits of this program with our European friends but we demand in return on their part the acceptance of a degree of sacrifice proportioned to our own sacrifices and to their resources.

3. Katz explained that yesterday afternoon or today President Truman was expected to ask Congress for an appropriation of $4 billion as an addition to European rearmament. (At the time of this meeting we had not yet received Department’s Todep 11.³) He said that he was familiar with the French desire to establish a common fund which would in effect constitute a pool of reserves to which the respective pact participants would contribute and from which they would draw financial provisions. He stated, however, that because of the legislative history of the MDAP Act it was exceedingly doubtful that this or preceding US appropriations of a like nature could be allocated in whole or in part to such a common fund. He added, however, that through offshore purchases, and other devices much of the financing contemplated in the common fund idea could probably be achieved.

4. Katz eloquently set forth the deep seriousness of purpose which animated our resistance to Soviet attempts to enlarge their conquest at the expense of free peoples. He also pointed out that Soviet subversion of the minds and spirits of western Europeans could only be countered by the fixed and definite will of Europeans to disregard such blandishments and to expose their falsity. He recognized that the security of Western Europe at the present time was negligible in comparison with Soviet military strength and therefore it was imperative for us all to concert our plans to place the Atlantic world in a posture calculated to preserve its peace against external aggression.

5. Pleven expressed his recognition of the sacrifices to which Americans were consenting and his admiration for the magnitude of our efforts. However he was deeply disappointed that the French desire for the establishment of a common fund could apparently not be met because of the legislative terms and history of the proposed US appropriation. This would make a real collective effort and common forces much more difficult. He said that his government did not consider this was purely a financial question, but was inclined as well to stress its psychological implications and its significance in facilitating real central direction of combined defense. The French had for long furnished the bulk of the infantry of Europe. During the first world war they had manned 700 of the 800 kilometers of battlefront. During the interval between wars they made great efforts and sacrifices to construct the Maginot line and maintain what they thought was the most powerful land army in the world. Nevertheless, they had been overwhelmed by the superiority of the Germans in equipment and numbers; they had vainly looked to their allies for any significant infantry assistance; one and a half million of their soldiers had been incarcerated for years in prison camps; and the people of France felt that they would not again be willing to support the major share of the burden of land war in Europe, unless they were assured that massive mutual support from their allies would be on the spot upon the outbreak of hostilities.

6. Pleven said that the NAT powers can never hope to attain necessary degree of efficiency in armament production merely through coordination of several national defense efforts. Real standardization of armaments, lowering of costs, and economic division of labor can be achieved only under a common program administered by a common defense authority. In support of this argument, Pleven pointed out that defense budget of USSR is certainly no greater than the combined total of defense budgets of the NAT powers. Yet because defense efforts of the USSR are concentrated under control of a single authority, it has been possible for Russians to create and maintain an effective military establishment, whereas with an equal amount of material and financial resources allocated to defense, the Western powers have dissipated their energies in maintenance of national military establishments with high overhead costs and duplication of activities.

In France, and indeed in all of Western Europe, the problem is to give peoples the feeling that the defense effort being undertaken is worth sacrifices which will be required because it is an efficient effort and one which will successfully forestall or resist Communist aggression. The French people will be more willing to accept the increased taxes and other sacrifices which are necessary if they know that proceeds of such taxes are going to benefit a common defense program. In fact a good approach psychologically to the problem would be for all the participants in NAT to levy a uniform tax (for example on postage) with express understanding that the proceeds would automatically go to the common authority.

A common authority would place US in better position to exercise preponderant role which it must play in the Atlantic defense effort. This approach would deprive Communists of opportunity urge sabotage of the defense effort by workers because it was being carried out on orders of American “imperialists.” As participants in a common authority, the European governments would be able to combat such propaganda more effectively.

The French people and even the French Government have no confidence in purely French ability create effective military establishment or to withstand aggression. Adoption of the common approach to the problem of defense would have salutary effects on French opinion in this respect. Furthermore it would be easier for French Government to force reorganization of French Army under orders from a common authority. Career military personnel in France have successfully resisted efforts for really effective reorganization until now and can undoubtedly continue to do so if the problem is kept on the national plane.

7. Petsche again outlined his views on necessity common efforts maintain financial and economic stability during period when stepped-up defense efforts will be placing constantly greater strains on economies of NAT powers. He supported Pleven wholeheartedly in view that “autarchy” of a purely national approach in defense was as wasteful for Europe as autarchy in economic policy. He said that for his part he was already prepared agree to the transfer of a substantial part of existing French military appropriations to a common defense budget of NAT powers. Funds so transferred would be spent by decision of the common authority without intervention of the French Government. He stressed power of the purse to enforce unpleasant decisions.

8. Moch mentioned that present plans for effective defense on either the Elbe or the Rhine required that NAT powers have available 18 divisions in continental Europe on a war footing, 16 additional which could become engaged in battle within three days of the outbreak of hostilities and 22 which could be mobilized within one month. He went on to say that he considered it absolutely essential for both military and psychological reasons that additional British and American troops be stationed in Germany or France.

Moch thinks that the common approach is the only formula under which the French people could be brought to accept participation of Western Germany in NAT defense effort. Memory of three German aggressions against France is still vivid and spectacle of recreation of the German military establishment as one unit of NAT defense effort carried out on a national basis would cause alarm and probably engender grave political consequences in France. Moch estimates that over a four-year period the military role to be played by France as suggested by the Brussels pact powers would cost equivalent of eight billion dollars in capital outlay, and a huge sum for annual pay, maintenance of forces, etc., representing amounts impossible for French to furnish.

9. Summing up Pleven and Moch both said that regardless of whether their suggestions were accepted by the other participants, they were proceeding to expand French military facilities by placing equipment orders in large amounts.

Sent Department 591, repeated info London 170, Frankfort 84, Brussels 48, The Hague 42, Luxembourg 28, Rome 69.

Bruce

1. U.S. Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder; Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman; Milton Katz, U.S. Special Representative in Europe (ECA) and U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic DFEC; and William C. Foster, ECA Deputy Administrator.
2. Alexandre Parodi. Secretary General, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
3. Telegram for Spofford sent July 27, 8 p. m., not printed, discussing President Truman’s tentative plans for submitting to Congress his request for $4 billion additional military assistance (740.5/7–2750).