Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/7–3150: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council ( Spofford ) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London , July 31, 1950—7 p. m.

Depto 27. No distribution except as directed by Secretary’s office. Following is translation Alphand’s paper:

1. It must be recognized that defense of Continental Europe in accordance with a plan and methods to be determined in common constitutes a basic element of defense of West. Organization of this defense is indispensable to maintenance of peace, supreme objective of free world.

2. Defense of Western Europe will require that aggressor be contained as long as necessary to permit mobilization of war potential of democracies. It is therefore necessary to have on Continent an air and land force adequate to meet initial shock. This force, if it is to be established within a few months cannot be set up by efforts of Continental states alone. US and UK must participate in initial battle with a certain number of units whose equipment would be stored on Continent and whose personnel would in part be on spot and in part ready to proceed to Continent with very brief delay.

It is also necessary to provide in advance for infrastructure and means of transport as well as arrangements in depth for movement of mass formations and supplies (articulation en profondeur pour la manouvre des masses et des ravitaillements).

Finally, Atlantic mobilization plans must assure rapid constitution of strategic reserve force to relieve covering force.

3. To achieve these goals, it is essential to determine without delay:

(a) Nature and quantity of matériel necessary. It is advisable to study and select without delay most modern equipment actually in existence in participating countries and to assure maximum standardization possible without delaying rearmament. In immediate future, provisional list of equipment to be produced in any case should be drawn up and production undertaken without delay.

(b) Allocation of production, taking into account available production capacity, location of factories, and possibilities of transportation in time of war of raw materials and end items.

(c) Equitable allocation among participating countries of financial burdens inherent in these tasks.

4. Allocation of burdens could be assured by establishment of common fund in which each country would participate in accordance with its capacity and particular situation. This fund would be intended to cover such expenses in common interest as would be determined (including, for example, accumulation of stocks).

5. Special position of France must be emphasized. She is ready to take part in supplementary effort required by recent international events, but it must be considered that France is fighting in Indochina, in common interest, that she must assure security of French union and that she must meet at home menace of an important fifth column. Her financial effort must not provoke monetary economic and social situation leading to internal disintegration, thus accomplishing enemy designs without his having to act directly.

6. In order not to delay certain expenditures of extremely urgent character (for example those for operational infrastructure) during negotiation of common fund, it is suggested first contribution be agreed to by all states in position to make one immediately, especially US. This initial contribution would subsequently be adjusted in conformity with rules adopted on definitive allocation of burdens.

7. At present, France alone is carrying in Indochina considerable burdens in common cause. Expenditures from 1945 to date for Indo-Chinese campaign have exceeded Marshall aid counterpart. These expenses will be increased in establishing armies of Associated States. Accordingly, financial assistance from US is necessary in addition to material assistance already requested. In order to pursue our effort and especially to equip local armies in Indochina, we think amount of indispensable financial assistance can be estimated at approximately 200,000,000,000 for next two years.

8. NAT defense organization itself should be quickly adapted to general policy thus defined. Existing organization must be simplified and reinforced and duplication eliminated. We must work toward strong and compact organization which could act with speed and authority necessary, particularly in managing common fund. This problem of organization should be studied immediately.

9. The terms of a general agreement covering determination of common policy and strategy and problems of armament production and finance should be taken up without delay. Such an accord undoubtedly will require a meeting between US, British and French Governments. It would be useless to hold such a meeting without serious preparation and assurance of success. To this end, the French deputy is ready to hold necessary preparatory conversations either in London or in Washington.

Sent Department Depto 27; repeated information Paris 174 Ambassador’s eyes only.

[Spofford]