IO Files: US/A/2752, US/S/1521
Memorandum of Conversations, by David H. Popper, Principal Executive Officer, United States Delegation
| Participants: | H. E. Nasrollah Entezam, President of the Assembly |
| Mr. David Blickenstaff, U.N. Secretariat | |
| Secretary-General Trygve Lie (separately) | |
| Mr. John C. Ross, United States Delegation | |
| Mr. David Popper, United States Delegation |
Mr. Ross discussed with Ambassador Entezam the various possibilities with regard to the scheduling of a Plenary Session of the General Assembly to deal with the question of the appointment of the Secretary-General. Ambassador Austin’s position was explained fully to President Entezam.
After consultation with Ambassador Austin by telephone, it was agreed that the Saturday Journal (October 28) would schedule a Plenary Session for Tuesday, October 31, in which the appointment of the Secretary-General would be listed at or near the top of the list. Our resolution on “Uniting for Peace” would be scheduled at a lower point in the list; this was believed to be the only item coming from a committee which would occasion lengthy discussion.
President Entezam hopes by this procedure to give the Soviets every opportunity to request another Security Council meeting, if they desire one. For this reason, the Saturday Journal will schedule the items “Appointment of the Secretary-General” without listing as accompanying documents the lists sent by Ambassador Austin to Mr. Entezam reporting on the failure of the Security Council to reach agreement. In later issues of the Journal these documents and the joint draft resolution, when submitted, will be listed. If the Soviets do protest and indicate an interest in a Security Council meeting, the order of items on the list will be revised so that the appointment of the Secretary-General comes near the end of the list. This will provide an opportunity for further Security Council consideration before the matter arises in the Plenary Session.
With regard to tactics in the Assembly, Mr. Entezam stated that he hoped to hold debate to a minimum, especially on points of order which might be raised by the Soviet Delegation. It was explained to the President that the United States statement would be brief and dispassionate, resting on grounds of principle and not seeking to provoke an acrimonious reply. President Entezam also stated that it was his feeling that a secret ballot would be preferable to an open ballot on this question, and that the Secretary-General felt the same [Page 177] way. He would therefore propose a secret ballot, but since this in effect amounted to a suspension of the Assembly’s rules, he would agree to an open vote if any member of the General Assembly objected to his proposal. With regard to the majority required for a decision, the President believes that a two-thirds majority is necessary, both by analogy with other long term elections in the Assembly and because this is clearly an important question. He does not believe this issue will arise, since he feels that the voting will disclose more than a two-thirds majority in favor of Mr. Lie. Thus, he will avoid a ruling if it is at all possible. The President also hopes that we will get as many sponsors as possible for our joint resolution and that we will submit it for documentation on Saturday, October 28, in order that it may be circulated in time for the Tuesday Plenary.
Immediately thereafter, Secretary-General Lie informed Mr. Ross that there were now a good many states who wished to become cosponsors and thus get on the band wagon. He mentioned specifically Greece, the four Nordic countries, Honduras and other Latin Americans. He spoke half seriously of getting fifty-three co-sponsors and urged us not to offend countries which wished to sponsor by failing to ask them to do so. Mr. Ross said that we would do what we could to get a good number of sponsors.1
- There were 14 sponsors of the resolution, the draft text of which is printed infra.↩