IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/163
Minutes of the Twenty-eighth Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, October 27, 1950, 9:15 a. m.
[Here follow list of persons present (46) and discussion of a prior agenda item. Before consideration of the formal agenda and before Ambassador Austin’s arrival, Mr. Dulles explained that he had sent a memorandum to Ambassador Austin stating that it would be helpful for the Delegation to have an exchange of views with respect to the implications of the Ambassador’s statement in the Security Council regarding the use of the veto on the appointment of the Secretary General. “He personally felt some guidance was needed on this issue in view of our other statements from time to time respecting United States policy on the use of the veto. He had been surprised to read the statement that we were going to use the veto.…” The Delegation then proceeded to address itself to agenda item one, which discussion was broken off when Ambassador Austin arrived.]
2. Developments on Appointment of the Secretary-General.
Mr. Dulles explained that some of the delegates had wanted more light on our position respecting the use of the veto on the appointment of the Secretary-General because the United States had rather consistently taken the view that, if and when we had a strong moral case, we could rely on the majority to go along with us, and we trusted to the moral weight of our position rather than to the use of the veto, particularly when the majority was made up of our good friends. He referred to the fact that the First Committee had just passed the “Uniting for Peace” resolution,1 which asked the great powers to exercise restraint in the use of the veto. Personally, he was a little concerned at the threat to use the veto and not to rely on our strong moral position in this case. Many questions had been put to him by other delegations.
Ambassador Austin said he was glad to give the delegates the background of the development of the United States position regarding the use of our veto on the appointment of the Secretary-General. It was our position that the aggression in Korea was an attack upon the peace and security of the Far East, the Middle East, the Western Hemisphere, Europe and upon the United States. Therefore, every resource should be used by members of the Security Council to halt this aggression. We considered that the unity of the free countries in the United Nations, in contending against this aggression, must [Page 173] be preserved, and that whatever resources were required for this purpose, had to be used. Until October 24, we had adhered to measures in the Security Council which had been, up to that time, effective, and had not announced that we would use the veto. For days we had fought the Soviets with the old weapons without result. We expressly had stated at the last Council meeting before October 24 that this issue was so vital that it justified our using all our resources. Up to this time we had not decided to go so far as to use the veto; we hoped we would not be obliged to pass on that question. After that the representative of France had made a speech in which the United States understood him to say he would cast the seventh vote in the Security Council to support any candidate other than Mr. Lie, for whom seven votes could be obtained. We were in some doubt about the exact implications of his remarks, although others believed him to have said what we interpreted him as saying. That was where the Council stood October 24. This brought us immediately to the question of what to do in this extremity. All our fears, all our attempts to defend the free world against aggression, and our success in preserving the unity of the free countries, were at stake. The situation was discouraging to the Koreans, to our boys fighting over there, and to their mothers and fathers. We faced the possibility of jeopardizing the whole future rehabilitation of Korea. The action here might make other Members slow to come to the assistance of other countries, if the United Nations could be split up by an enemy of the United Nations in this case. The Soviets were really leading the free countries around by the nose.
At this point Ambassador Austin described the Soviet tactics. He adverted to the fact that Soviet representatives had approached such persons as Padilla Nervo, Charles Malik, and Romulo, and had indicated to each that the USSR would be glad to support him for Secretary-General of the United Nations. Even as near to victory in Korea as the United Nations were, these delegates seemed to forget the necessity for maintaining our unity and strength. The name of Mr. Lie meant nothing except insofar as it symbolized the tremendous battle for the United Nations.
Ambassador Austin said that the real issue was whether we should risk the complete defeat of our position in Korea on this matter. The devastation in the Security Council was among representatives who had stood shoulder to shoulder with us against one abstention and one veto. Only the position of the French Ambassador was known, but there were two Latin American delegates who appeared somewhat beguiled by the Soviet position and Egypt was not very stable. In this weak situation something was required to bring together the members of the Council. At this point, the matter had been discussed [Page 174] with the President and the Secretary of State, and what Ambassador Austin had said in the Council had been under their express authorization.
Ambassador Austin referred to Tom Hamilton’s article on this subject in today’s New York Times, which he termed a completely false statement. Hamilton’s fundamental premise was that in any event the veto had been unnecessary because of an alleged French remark to Padilla Nervo to the effect that France would abstain. The Ambassador observed that the important question was whether the French statement came before or after the announcement of our position on the veto. The chronology was vital. Personally Ambassador Austin did not know when the French representative had gone to Padilla, but he did know that the last word the United States had received from France regarding its position was before we had made any announcement of our position; when we had made that announcement, it was on the understanding that France’s position was that it would join with any seven members in favor of the candidate on which they agreed. In other words, it looked as if France, the two Latin American states, and others would form part of a new unity under enemy leadership.
Going on with his story, Ambassador Austin recounted that during the celebration of United Nations Day on October 24, at the special reception after the plenary, the Secretary of State had gone to Ambassador Chauvel and said he wanted him to know that, if necessary, the United States was going to use the veto but that we hoped we would not be put in that position. During the party, many Latin American representatives had come to Ambassador Austin to say that they had learned of this position and how strongly we felt on the principle and to give us assurances that they would stand by our position. Before that, they had been as soft as putty. After Padilla Nervo had come to him to request that the United States withdraw his name on his behalf, if he were nominated, Ambassador Austin said he had asked Padilla if he thought it would look well for the United States to make such an announcement since he had two Latin American colleagues on the Council, to whom he suggested he should give this information.
Ambassador Austin said that the time at which he had first mentioned the use of the veto was important. The significance of these events was best shown in that light. There had been a Big Five secret meeting on the morning of October 25 before the Council met. In that meeting the field of candidates was discussed, and the French representative was apparently maintaining the position already described to the Delegation, although the former had not made an open statement [Page 175] of his position until the Security Council meeting. Ambassador Austin admitted, however, that he had perhaps not understood the French representative correctly.
In the Big Five meeting, Ambassador Austin said he had referred to a previous question some delegate had asked as to whether the United States would use the veto, at which time he had said he was not authorized in this sense, and had then informed the others that the United States now felt so deeply on moral principle, recognizing that this cause was vital to the preservation of the United Nations that the other members should not be surprised if we changed our position. He had thus told them that our position was now different; we did not want to use the veto, but we were prepared to use all the resources we had to maintain these important principles. Thus, the matter had first arisen only in the private Big Five meeting.
The next question, the Ambassador continued was why this statement should have been repeated, outside this group to all the world. He had not repeated his statement until Malik had referred indirectly to it. At that moment it was clear that this subject could not be concealed from the public, and therefore it was entirely proper, and he felt necessary, for the United States to make a statement covering the point. That statement he admitted, was erroneous in one regard: it referred to the Delegation. For that reference, he was very sorry. He had not noticed it, and he had not intended to refer to the Delegation. That was why a copy of his speech had been included in the Delegation’s papers.2
Ambassador Austin believed he had stood upon his duty as the United States representative in the Security Council under the mandate of the Statute setting up his office, and by direction from the President of the United States personally and the Secretary of State, who had cooperated with him in the whole matter. That was the story, and it had led to our victory on a great principle. He believed the world would know hereafter that when we set out to support the United Nations in the exercise of its peace-making functions, even if it took armed force, we would remain faithful to our obligations. That was the big lesson which we wanted the world to get, and he believed it would. In his opinion, the United Nations had been strengthened by this experience.
[Here follows further discussion of the Secretary-General question and United States policy relating thereto.]