310.5/10–2650: Telegram
Extract From Daily Secret Summary No. 86 From the United States Mission at the United Nations, New York, October 26, 1950, 3:41 a. m.
731. Security Council [October 25] …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
President Austin began by reporting to the non-permanent members on the five-power discussions. He noted that, in addition to Lie, the names of Padilla Nervo (Mexico), Rau (India), Malik (Lebanon) and Romulo (Philippines) had been put forward, but as a result of the discussion, it had been found that none had received the required unanimity.
Malik (USSR) felt it was not a normal situation where the five powers could not agree even on the form of their report to the SC. From Austin’s statement, it was difficult to get an impression of the course of the two private meetings;1 more complete information was necessary. He recalled that Rau, Malik (Lebanon) and Padilla Nervo had been nominated at the first five-power session, and Romulo had also been named, but some delegates needed time to get instructions.
[Page 166]As Malik saw it, the following situation had emerged: the picture was clearest in regard to Lie, as three of the five had favored him, one was opposed and one abstained—the same situation as before the meeting. On Romulo, Padilla Nervo and Malik (Lebanon), two were in favor, one opposed and two would abstain, although one of the latter might change his position if the others agreed. On Rau, one was in favor, one categorically against, one was against but with the possibility of changing his vote, and the other two would abstain. He said this analysis was subject to correction, if necessary.
USSR Wanted Names Voted
Because of the existing circumstances, Malik continued, the SC should continue its discussions of the candidates and take a vote on each name advanced in order to give the GA a clear picture. In his report, the SC President could explain the situation in detail, giving the various names, votes cast for each, etc. If no agreement were reached in the SC on any name, the letter to the GA would have to say that the SC was unable to get a decision and could not make a recommendation.
Chauvel (France) considered it a peculiar situation for one member to report on the others’ positions. He believed the five had agreed to send a general report to the SC that no agreement had been reached, and each could speak in his own name. His own position had not changed, and he was authorized to confirm his previous vote for Lie, but could support another candidate which achieved agreement, Chauvel added. Since none of those named had attained unanimity, he noted, France would continue to support Lie. He believed reference to other candidates would intensify the disagreement and crystallize the dissonance in the SC, thus it was best to report to the GA on the existing situation.
In the absence of the necessary unanimity, Blanco (Cuba) observed, it would be futile to continue discussions. He supported Chauvel’s suggestion and opposed Malik’s move to continue consideration of the candidates.
Tsiang (China) wanted it understood that China’s attitude concerning the five-power talks was that the five had consulted, five names had been discussed, but no agreement had been reached. He realized each delegation had its own preference, but he hoped none would insist on his candidate to such a degree as to prevent a unanimous recommendation. Tsiang had no objection to any of the candidates on a personal basis, but of the five names, he would like to see either Romulo, Malik, or Padilla Nervo in the post.
[Page 167]UK Position Specified
Jebb (UK) made it clear that he fully favored recommending Lie in such a way that his exact term could be extended by the GA itself. Because of this he was not prepared to vote positively for anybody else and he would therefore abstain on the other four, this to be without prejudice to any action on these four. Jebb considered them to be eminently respectable, and he was particularly sympathetic to Rau. He stressed that he did not wish to impede by a veto the election of any, and hoped his attitude would be generally understood.
Because there was no unanimity, further debate was futile, Bebler (Yugoslavia) held. He agreed with Chauvel and Blanco that further votes were unnecessary and that a report should be made to the GA. Bebler said he would abstain on all but Lie, not because he was opposed to the others but because he was so much in favor of Lie, who had played a considerable, positive role in this year of crisis. Lie’s attempts to get world peace had been upset by the Korean situation, but this was not Lie’s fault, and the present SYG’s efforts should not now be interrupted.
Quevedo (Ecuador) endorsed Lie once more, but explained he had supported a five-power consultation in the hope that new moves would be successful. As none of the other candidates had achieved even a majority of the five powers, it was useless to vote on them as this would submit these eminent men to the unpleasantness of being rejected.
Quevedo remarked that if the five powers had agreed on Padilla Nervo, he would have supported this move, but he did not think Padilla Nervo would accept the post if he did not receive the five powers’ unanimous support. He had no definite stand on Eau, Malik or Romulo, and he did not know if the last two would accept. Therefore, he would abstain on these nominations and would favor a report to the GA that the SC could not agree.
Soviets Wanted Equal Treatment
Correcting Chauvel’s view, Malik explained he had just given his impression of previous events which, unfortunately, had not been crowned by a vote. He felt a vote would make everyone’s position clear, and said the USSR had nothing to conceal. Malik contended the US had indicated it would abandon its “widely advertised position” of not using the veto and had said it would veto anyone but Lie. He urged that the SC, as usual, vote on proposals before it.
As for the idea of “embarrassing” candidates, Malik believed the nominees should not take a negative vote as a personal offense as there had been no attempt to put the question on a personal basis. He maintained that voting on lie but not on the other four would put the [Page 168] former in a privileged position; Lie was “just another candidate” as far as the next five-year term was concerned and anything otherwise would be discriminating against the other nominees.
Chauvel repeated his earlier objections to Malik’s “report,” and maintained that any number of votes could not change the situation. He felt the SC should now confirm its previous position, as expressed in the Oct. 12 letter to the GA President. Chauvel doubted if votes could be taken since several of the candidates did not wish to be named; Padilla Nervo had authorized him, Chauvel added, to state to the SC that he was not a candidate.
US Attitude Clarified
In order to put the US position fully on the record, Austin stressed that silence in relation to Malik’s remarks was not significant or evidence of agreement with them. Reviewing the situation, Austin noted that a large majority favored continuing Lie in office, but that the USSR had become extremely active for other candidates. He reminded the SC that the same day the SC had reported to the GA on its inability to recommend a candidate, Moscow radio had broadcast Stalin’s encouragement to the “enemies of the peace-making functions of the UN.”
Malik, Austin continued, now came forward with various devices, all aiming to divide and conquer; representatives of different regions had been solicited for the SYG post and supported simultaneously, in the hope of dividing the 53 nations which were attempting to make the UN’s peace-making functions work. In the US view, this matter was one of high principle and involved the security of the FE, the ME and the Western Hemisphere. Austin wondered if Lie should be made to answer to “the enemy,” the country in the UN which had been representing the aggressors.
Austin considered this situation extremely serious because it might affect the position of anyone else who might be named. He indicated that the office of SYG could have little strength or independence if it were subject to the veto of a power opposed to the UN’s policy. Austin wondered what answer he could be expected to give to the parents of those who had died in Korea when they asked why he had not done everything in his power to prevent the majority vote in favor of Lie from being “torn all to pieces by the country which has aided and abetted those who exploited us.”
Challenge to SC Detailed
In this instance, Austin maintained, the SC was faced with an assault on a moral principle and the US would not fail to use every weapon at its disposal to counter that threat. He observed that all [Page 169] countries had heavy burdens and were called upon to furnish more money, technology and supplies. Because of this, he wondered if they would think it a good thing to shift from a trusted, experienced administrator, and warned of the moral effect on these countries “whose legislative bodies will re-examine this question and without whose appropriations we could not do this task which will make Korea a constructive effort.”
The US was convinced it stood on moral ground in this matter, Austin concluded, because it knew its own security and that of the rest of the world was at stake. He believed the US probably would not use the veto; it did not want to do so and hoped it would not have to, but it was determined to use all resources at its command, including the veto, to prevent the division of the UN, or to forestall any repudiation and punishment.
Indian Candidate Withdrew Name
Rau (India) opened the afternoon meeting by noting that his name had been “bandied about” for some time. He considered it would be embarrassing to some of his friends on the SC if any vote were taken on his name, therefore he wished his name withdrawn. When Austin indicated that the French motion would be voted on first, Malik objected that his own move had priority.
Replying to Austin’s “dramatic” statement, Malik said he was accustomed to such slander and wondered what the US would do in the various UN organs if there were no Soviet Representative to attack and to whom the US could shift the blame for its own failures. He maintained the Stalin cable to North Korea had no relation to the question under discussion and was a matter of diplomatic relations between two governments. Austin’s reference to morals could not help its position, because American soldiers were dying not for UN principles but for US monopolists; these soldiers knew about Mac Arthur; but nothing of Lie, who played a secondary role in the Korean events.
Peace and security in the Far East were threatened, Malik continued, but by MacArthur and US monopolists; Lie was “just a pawn” of these expansionists and no “pillar of peace.” It was false to state in the SC that the USSR was the aggressor, as the Soviet Union always stood for self-determination of peoples and against foreign occupation or intervention.
Lie’s behavior in the Korean question, although he had abjectly and unreservedly espoused the US cause, was not the influencing factor for the Soviet position: Lie was hypocritical and a prisoner of American dollars. In mentioning Lie’s honest administration of money, Austin was apparently approaching the SYG appointment with a [Page 170] commercial attitude, like a business man hiring a manager for his firm, Malik observed.
There was no need to single Lie out for special praise for honesty, Malik argued. During the past two years, Lie had shown little desire to accommodate views opposing those of the US, Malik added, recalling that after his recent Moscow visit with Stalin and Molotov, Lie had failed to take into account certain amendments suggested by them to Lie’s 20–year peace program. In addition, Lie had proved his incapacity by supporting the plans and purposes of the NAT.
Malik concluded with an analysis of the US voting position, and held this was “curious” and “illogical.” He noted that Austin felt Lie could be appointed by a simple GA decision but that any other candidates could be vetoed; the US also believed any other nominee’s appointment by the GA would be illegal while Lie’s would not, This was an “amoral” position hiding under the cloak of morality, he stated, urging that the SC vote immediately on Romulo and Charles Malik, the two remaining names.
[After some procedural difficulties the Security Council in separate votes rejected the nominations of Charles Malik (Lebanon) and Romulo (Philippines) by 4 votes (Egypt, India, China, the Soviet Union) to 0, with 7 abstentions in each case. The Council then approved by 7 votes to 1 (Soviet Union), with 3 abstentions (China, India, Egypt) a letter from the President of the Security Council (Austin) to the President of the General Assembly (Entezam) reporting that the Council remained unable to agree on a recommendation (UN Doc. A/1460).]