Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: US/A/2741

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Ross)

confidential

[New York,] October 25, 1950.

Subject: Choice of Secretary-General

Participants:	Dr. Charles Malik, Delegation of Lebanon
	Mr. John C. Ross, United States Delegation

I saw Malik at Lake Success in order to explain our position on this matter and had a very long conversation with him. I thanked him first for informing us over the weekend of his candidacy for this post. I told him that we fully appreciated his personal position in the matter, namely, that he had no personal interest in the post but that he had been put forward by the Arab States as their candidate. I told him that I thought since he had been so frank with us it was only fair and honest on our part to let him know at the earliest opportunity our own position. I told him that this matter had been discussed by the President and Secretary of State and Ambassador Austin on Monday¹ and that the definite decision had been reached to veto any candidate for this post other than Mr. Lie. In explanation of this decision I stressed that in our view the Russians had chosen to make a major political issue out of what might have seemed to be a rather simple matter. I said that the Russians, having suffered two very severe defeats in regard to Korea, the one military and the other political, were making a desperate last-ditch effort to snatch some semblance of victory out of defeat. They had accordingly been following a tactic of playing one individual against another and one geographic area off against another. It was quite obvious to us that the Russians were seeking by this method to break up the wonderful and inspiring free-world unity that had built up in connection with the Korean matter, as well as efforts to strengthen the United Nations. Their opposition to Mr. Lie and their veto of his name in the Security Council was viewed by us as a most serious attack on the peacemaking function of the United Nations. This attack, if it were allowed to succeed, would, we felt, closely affect our own national security. We viewed the matter, therefore, as one of very great importance transcending the question of the Secretary-General post or any individual, whether Mr. Lie himself, Charles Malik, Padilla Nervo, Romulo, Sir B. N. Rau, or anyone else. I stressed that our decision to use the veto if necessary was, of course, not in the slightest degree directed against Malik personally, nor against his country nor against the Arab States generally any more than it was directed against any individul or state from any other geographic area. Our decision was directed rather to the high principle and moral question involved.

Malik listened very attentively to what I said. He expressed no disagreement with any of it but, on the contrary, expressed understanding and agreement. He said, however, that looking at the matter broadly from the Arab point of view which he thought it was essential for us to understand, there were three considerations which we had perhaps not taken into account, as follows:

First, the decision of the Arab States to put forward his name was one of the rare occasions when it had been possible for the Arab States to achieve unanimity on any matter. Second, the apparent willingness of the Russians to accept any candidate as an alternative to Mr. Lie no matter how strongly anti-Communist or even anti-Soviet such alternative candidate might be, was a very rare phenomenon. Third, in the interest of strengthening the United Nations opportunity to exploit such rare phenomenon should not be passed over lightly.

I told Malik that I though we were not at all unaware of the considerations he advanced. I said they were, of course, considerations of great importance which we would not wish to lose sight of. I said, however, that in the present instance, namely, the question of choosing a Secretary-General, there was no doubt in my mind that the considerations which I had advanced outweighed those which he had put forward.

We then discussed at some length ways and means by which such considerations as he had advanced might be taken into consideration in the future. I stressed in a friendly but strong way some of the shortcomings of the Arab Delegations which made it very difficult for us to cooperate as fully with them as we always wanted to do. I think this discussion may prove useful.

Before concluding our discussion I analyzed the practical situation in the Security Council and the Assembly. I said it was certain that Padilla Nervo and Rau did not want their names put forward or voted upon. I said that I was not suggesting that he withdraw his name. This, I thought, was a matter which the Arab group would have to decide for themselves. I did want, however, to make sure that they considered the point.

I then said that I thought he and his own Delegation might wish to consider whether in the circumstances it would not be a generous and graceful gesture for the Lebanon to join in co-sponsoring an Assembly resolution extending Mr. Lie’s term of office. Malik asked whether we still insisted on a five-year extension. I told him that had been our position but that we would be prepared to accept in the interest of harmony a three-year extension. Malik seemed to have some thought that a two-year extension would be rather better in all the circumstances.

Both on the question of withdrawal of his candidacy and sponsorship of an Assembly resolution Malik said he would make strong recommendations to his Foreign Minister and to the other Arabs. He did not explicitly say so but it was my clear impression that he favored personally the courses I suggested.

1. October 23.