310.5/10–1950: Telegram
Extract From Daily Secret Summary No. 80 From the United States Mission at the United Nations, New York, October 19, 1950, 1:57 a. m.
697. Security Council [October 18] …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Explaining his reasons for requesting this SC meeting, Malik (USSR) said he had learned of plans to schedule a plenary discussion on the SYG’s apppointment within the next few days, and considered such haste unjustified. It was the duty of members to seek an agreed and correct solution in accordance with the Charter and the rules. The impression had been created, he continued, that a deadlock had been reached. Such an impression was harmful to the UN’s prestige. In reality, he added, the fact that the Council had not agreed on the two candidates previously discussed did not mean that an attempt to agree on some other possible candidate was excluded.
The USSR was willing to consider other possibilities, Malik went on, indicating qualified candidates could be found among political [Page 142] leaders, former GA Presidents, Foreign Ministers or UN Delegations, “particularly from Latin America and Asia.” Efforts must be made to reach concerted action on this question, since “illegal extension” of Lie’s term might create the unfortunate impression that the UN could not even agree on such a question as SYG. In the light of these considerations, he had therefore asked for further SC discussion.
Indian Proposal Detailed
Rau (India) believed it desirable, if at all possible, to make a positive SC recommendation re the SYG post, exploring all possibilities to this end. Using the method of election to the ICJ as an analogy, he suggested that each of the Council members submit two names on a secret ballot, resulting in a list of a maximum of 22 candidates and probably considerably smaller.
Before the list was made known to the Council as a whole, Rau proposed, the Secretariat should submit it to the five permanent members, which would eliminate the names of any person that was unacceptable to any of the big five. This, he thought, would result in a very short list, would help to avoid use of the veto and would give maximum chance for agreement. If this plan ended in another deadlock, Rau said the SC would of course have to report this result to the GA.
Noting the need for at least 24 hours to obtain instructions from his government, Jebb (UK) stated that at first sight, the “ingenious” Indian scheme seemed a possible way out of the difficulty. However, he conceived the possibility that a deadlock also might result if a candidate so narrowed down for consideration failed to receive the required number of votes in the Council itself. Since no one seemed to want to put a name out into the open at this meeting, Jebb considered India’s secret ballot idea might provide the solution.
French, Chinese Support
Chauvel (France) also found Rau’s suggestion “ingenious” and a possible way out of the deadlock. Although there was no assurance that positive results would come about, he was prepared to agree to the plan. Tsiang (China) termed it a satisfactory and fair proposition, which he would like to see adopted.
Ecuador had already stated “sympathy” for the work of Lie, Quevedo (Ecuador)1 recalled, and was confident the SYG had the support of a large number of members. He agreed, however, that all possibilities should be explored toward achieving a positive recommendation. [Page 143] The Indian plan seemed ingenious to him, too, particularly the idea of each member submitting two names. Quevedo moved for 24- or 48-hour adjournment to permit instructions from governments, but he thought this delay might be utilized by the big five for preparatory consultations on the subject.
When President Austin indicated this motion required an immediate vote, Quevedo made clear that he did not intend to shut off comments at once, and suspended his proposal for a “while.” He mentioned the USSR views, particularly, would be interesting to have. Austin accepted this.
Quevedo’s reference to Lie apparently prompted Jebb to remark that he also was “not oblivious” of the fact that the UK and others had voted for Lie at the last meeting. If the Indian plan were adopted, he thought it probable the SC would subsequently find itself in the situation as now. He said he stood by his own previous position, but on the other hand the SC might be able to arrive at a name acceptable to the majority. If unanimity were possible, the Council should aim for it. However, a new candidate able to get seven favorable votes would have to be “very exceptional.” The only qualm he had, Jebb said, was that more delay in the matter would work hardship on Lie and the Secretariat.
Reference to Big Five Exchange of Views
The Cuban spokesman2 agreed that instructions were necessary on the “ingenious” Indian proposal. On details of Rau’s suggestion, Jebb wondered if it would be possible for the big five simply to strike off the names of any unacceptable candidates and put these back in the ballot box, without having consultations. Rau replied that he had thought of that originally, but on reflection decided that an actual meeting and exchange of views among the big five would have important benefits. Tsiang commented that at the big powers consultation those who wished could express views and those who felt otherwise could confine their participation to scratching off unacceptable names. Rau admitted there would be an opportunity for, but no guarantee of, exchange of opinions.
The Indian proposal, Malik declared, had merits and deserved serious consideration. Its advantages were that: 1) the SC was enabled to make another serious attempt at an agreed decision, “the basic SC task”; 2) each member could secretly nominate one or two candidates; 3) big five consultations would follow—an important point. The question arose, he said, when these consultations should occur. [Page 144] With reference to the Ecuadoran remark, Malik expressed preference for consultations after nominations had been submitted. He believed the Indian plan could be adopted.
Re the UK comment on the “inconveniences” to the SYG and Secretariat caused by further delay, Malik found no basis for such consideration. Lie, he believed, had full powers and rights until February 1951. Time was required on this important matter. Much time had been taken in selecting Lie in the first place, in 1946, he recalled.
Fawzi (Egypt)3 indicated agreement with previous points, and asked about the timing of the next meeting on this subject, since the SC was already scheduled to discuss the Palestine question Friday afternoon, Oct. 20. Jebb suggested a closed meeting prior to the open meeting Oct. 20, believing that if instructions had been received, the Indian-proposed nomination system would take only a short time.
Austin said he was not going to discuss merits or demerits of the Indian idea, but felt it should be submitted in writing and circulated. This was agreed to.
Austin’s Comments
It was quite important, Austin added, that everyone should consider the probable effects of the element of striking off names. Whatever the intention of the proposal, he asked the Council to consider which would be the first name stricken. Nine members had voted for Lie; did they now want to march downhill, he asked, and adopt a plan that would strike him off the list? Is the spoken word without value, he continued; is there no integrity?
Under the Indian plan, Austin pointed out, one of the big five could draw a pencil through all the names on the ballots, leaving just a blank. Was this correct? He was merely posing these questions, he said, wishing to see the proposal in writing. He reserved the right to make a strong plea to Lie’s previous supporters to adhere to their, position and not be swayed by the “one vote against nine.”
Norway Recalled “Background”
Associating wholeheartedly with Austin’s comments, Sunde (Norway)4 conceded the Indian plan was ingenious and would have been fair in normal circumstances. But, he felt the background in this case must be borne in mind. He recalled Tsiang’s opposition to Lie developed from the SYG’s position on Communist China, while the USSR objections were due to the Korean case.
[Page 145]Sunde reminded the Council that Lie was the USSR candidate in 1946 and had been persona grata in Moscow up to June 25 this year. He quoted excerpts from a radio interview with Katz-Suchy (Poland)5 Oct. 16 when the latter stated it would take too long to explain why Lie had forfeited the confidence of nations, but that it was “enough that he recognized the NK Government as an aggressor even before any decision” by a UN body.
Was it the USSR’s intention, Sunde asked, to punish Lie for taking correct action under the Charter? A SYG could never be “neutral” in regard to the Charter but must defend it as he had done on this occasion. He had acted in a perfectly legal way, on the basis of UNCOK’s information, Sunde declared.
Soviet “Victory” in Korea
Since Lie was being punished for backing up the majority viewpoint in the Korean case, Sunde indicated that a reversal of position on Lie now would be like a reversal of policy on Korea. “If the USSR succeeded in eliminating Lie under these circumstances,” he continued, “this would be tantamount to a Soviet victory in the Korean War.”
Chauvel replied that this was not the time for an impassioned debate. He also expressed surprise at Austin’s interpretation of the situation, and asked, “Are we in a deadlock or not?” Here, under the Indian plan, was an opportunity to verify whether a deadlock existed. Aside from consideration of personalities, Chauvel thought another effort at an agreed decision should be sought.
Since this was not a “pre-election” meeting, Malik asserted, there was no point in defending one candidate or another. He did not agree that any declaration had been made to the world re a particular candidate; the Council had merely reported inability to reach agreement.
Replies to Norway
Malik “understood” Sunde’s “fiery speech in behalf of a compatriot,” which was not “very modest,” but felt there were no grounds for such an attack on the USSR. The reference to the Polish statement was completely irrelevant, since the USSR was not responsible for such statements. Lie had served five years, he added, but this did not mean an incumbency for life.
In further reply to Sunde, Tsiang admitted that China objected to Lie’s re-election but had not carried its view so far as to prevent [Page 146] the UN from having any SYG. He hoped others would take as reasonable a position so that a new SYG, without any tinge of illegality or without shadow of passionate controversy, would be appointed. Korean policy devolved from the policy of the SC and GA, not from that of any one person, Tsiang declared. He could not see how a changed position re Lie would mean a reversal of UN policy on Korea.
Sunde expressed appreciation for Tsiang’s attitude on Lie, and repeated his statement to Malik that Lie had been persona grata in Russia up to June 25. Fawzi hoped no one wanted to “slam the door” in the face of conciliation efforts, and interpreted Rau’s suggestion as an effort merely to “open the door.” The Council should have more patience with conciliation ideas. Rau indicated that Fawzi had interpreted the Indian position precisely.
As Austin prepared to call a vote on the Ecuadoran motion for a 48–hour postponement on Rau’s suggestion, Quevedo pointed out that time itself had taken care of the adjournment factor. The next meeting might be scheduled by the President, he thought. Fawzi supported Jebb’s suggestion for a 2: 30 meeting Oct. 20, with the open meeting on Palestine to follow later. Several delegates suggested an hour would not be sufficient to reach a decision on the Indian plan, but Austin indicated the Council could always adjust its schedule.
- Antonio Quevedo, Permanent Representative of Ecuador at the United Nations.↩
- Probably Dr. Carlos Blanco, Alternate Representative of Cuba in the Security Council.↩
- Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, Permanent Representative of Egypt at the United Nations.↩
- Arne Sunde, Permanent Representative of Norway at the United Nations.↩
- Juliusz Katz-Suchy, Permanent Representative of Poland at the United Nations.↩