IO Files: US/S/1503, US/A/2729
Memorandum of Conversation
| Participants: | Ambassador Jacob Malik, Soviet Delegation |
| Mr. Startsev, Soviet Delegation | |
| Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. Delegation | |
| Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, U.S. Delegation |
At 12:30, at his own request, Malik called upon Amb. Austin to discuss the question of the UNSYG. Malik began by referring to [Page 139] the call he had made upon Mr. Dulles the preceding midnight (“Russian working hours”) to outline the Soviet position regarding the SYG. He said the Soviet Union was opposed to Lie, whom they considered “two-faced” in his dealings with the United States and with the U.S.S.R. According to Malik, Lie “said bad things about the United States to the Soviet Government”, and, according to their information, said “bad things” about the U.S.S.R. to the United States Government. Lie’s continuance in office would not help in improving the relations between the two governments and therefore “would not help the cause of peace”. It was important to the UN to have an SYG acceptable to everyone, and Malik “firmly believed” that further consultations would produce someone mutually satisfactory. He felt there was “mutual fault” in not having consulted earlier.
Ambassador Austin outlined the U.S. position, making the following points: (a) We believed that Lie had done as good a job as could be done under very difficult circumstances. Anyone in his position had to maintain access to all U.N. members, and by doing so was inevitably vulnerable to criticism sometime or other. We had not always agreed with him, and indeed in some instances He had made it extremely difficult for us. But, continued Amb. Austin, Lie had tried to be honest and had won the personal respect and confidence of Amb. Austin. (b) Time and events had gone by and it was extremely difficult to take up this question again at this late date. We had publicly made our position clear regarding Lie, and had openly committed ourselves to his support. In order to justify a change in our position, we would have to be in a position to demonstrate some good reason for such a change. Our position was clear and honest and we intended to keep it so. Malik had lived in the U.S. long enough to realize the force of American public opinion and the necessity for justifying to the people actions taken by the government. Nothing that Malik had said furnished any such justification. If the Soviet Union were suggesting some concrete proposals which might in fact demonstrate their will or intention to strengthen peace, then arguments might be made for our considering a change of position. But nothing of the sort was being suggested by Malik, (c) The Security Council had considered the matter, and after voting down the only suggestion offered by Malik, had voted 9 to 1, with one abstention, in favor of extending Lie’s term. This fact gave great strength and prestige to the matter. The Soviet Union stood alone in the Security Council, and was in effect thwarting the will of the majority.
Malik asked what Amb. Austin had in mind in referring to “proposals to strengthen peace”. Amb. Austin said he meant, for example, the failure of the Soviet Union to take action within its power to halt the aggression in Korea. This aggression was continuing and was [Page 140] costing lives every day, but the Soviet Union stood by and did nothing to urge the aggressors to comply with U.N. decisions.
Malik repeated his earlier statement that the “cause of peace” would be helped if an SYG could be found who was acceptable. He said it was bad for the U.N. to have an “illegal or half-legal” Secretary-General and that if Lie were appointed by the G.A. without S.C. recommendation, this would violate the Charter and the G.A. Resolution of 1946.
Amb. Austin pointed out that it would have been helpful if the Soviet Union had consulted with us about this question in a more timely manner.
Malik replied that the Soviet Delegation had not realized the question was going to be taken up so soon or acted upon so quickly. He repeated that there had been “mutual fault” in not having consulted earlier. He said he just found out the preceding afternoon that there was to be a plenary session of the Assembly on Wednesday.1 (He had heard since that it was to be held Thursday instead.)
Amb. Gross reminded Malik of the efforts which in fact had been made to develop consultations in September and early October. In September, Sir Gladwyn Jebb had sought an interview with Vishinsky to discuss the matter, but had not received the courtesy of a reply. In the last week of September, Amb. Gross had mentioned this to Malik, who had replied that “there was plenty of time”. When Gross demurred, saying that the question should be settled early in the Assembly and that we would be glad to have Soviet views, Malik had replied that Vishinsky was handling the question and “that there was no hurry”. The same response had been given by Malik to Gross a week later, when the latter raised the question.
Malik did not deny the foregoing, saying only “perhaps we were at fault”.
Amb. Austin commented that although it seemed too late to reopen the question of the SYG at this stage, perhaps some good might come out of the incident since it showed again the desirability of the Soviet Union being willing to consult in advance. Austin reminded Malik of the former’s belief in the value of consultation and hoped there would be more of it.
Malik professed strong agreement with these comments and said he was always ready to consult about anything.
Returning to the question of the SYG, Malik repeated his “firm belief” that agreement could be reached upon another candidate and that this would strengthen the U.N. and the cause of peace.
[Page 141]Amb. Austin suggested the matter might be solved by the Soviet Union agreeing to the reappointment of Lie, thereby achieving unanimity and giving effect to the will of the majority.
Malik replied that this was “impossible”. But he felt that further efforts to find someone else would be successful. He did not believe the matter had been exhausted. He had suggested one candidate, Modzelewski. “Another candidate, Lie, had been proposed”. This was not a sufficient effort to find agreement. The Soviet Government could not justify to their people or to themselves such an inadequate attempt to reach an agreement.
Gross asked whether Malik could explain more fully what their objections to Lie were based upon. Malik replied he had already stated their objection—that Lie was “two-faced” in his dealings with our two governments.
Amb. Austin indicated there was not much more to be said on the subject at this conference.
Malik said: “It seems I have received a firm ‘niet’”. He thereupon requested Amb. Austin to call a private meeting of the S.C. either this afternoon or Wednesday morning so that Malik “could explain his position”.
Amb. Austin expressed the view that it would not be possible to arrange for a meeting this afternoon. However, he said he would consult his colleagues on the Council and advise Malik during the afternoon regarding a private meeting of the Council Wednesday morning.
- October 18.↩