Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: SD/A/231

Department of State Position Paper, for the Instruction of the United States Delegation to the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly

confidential

[Washington,] August 31, 1950.

Appointment of the Secretary-General

the problem

On the recommendation of the Security Council, the General Assembly on February 1, 1946 appointed Mr. Trygve lie as first Secretary-General of the United Nations for a term of office of five years. Under the General Assembly resolution of January 24, 1946, on the terms of appointment of the Secretary-General (see Annex attached), it is necessary to arrange for the renewal of Mr. Lie’s term for another five years or for the appointment of his successor. Article 97 of the Charter provides for the appointment of the Secretary-General by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. (Such a Security Council recommendation is clearly subject to the veto.) The General Assembly acts upon the Security Council recommendation in this matter by a simple majority. In the event that the Security Council fails to agree upon a recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General, it is necessary to decide what action may be taken by the General Assembly in order not to allow the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to become vacant.

recommendations

1. The United States favors the renewal of Lie’s term for a further five-year period.

2. In the event that the Security Council fails to make an affirmative recommendation of a candidate for a full five-year term to the General Assembly, by reason of the exercise of the veto or the failure of a candidate to obtain seven affirmative votes, the United States believes that the General Assembly alone can take action to ensure that the office of the Secretary-General will not become vacant.

3. In these circumstances, depending upon the support each of the alternatives suggested below receives from other delegations, the United States Delegation in the General Assembly should propose or support the adoption of

(a) a resolution altering the 1946 resolution on the appointment of the Secretary-General to extend the term of the incumbent Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, for not less than two years, and, if agreement can be reached, for a period up to five years; or

(b) a resolution continuing the incumbent Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, in office until such time as formal action of appointment of his successor or renewal of Lie’s term becomes possible.

4. The foregoing recommendations are based on the assumption of continued Soviet participation in the United Nations. In the event that the Soviet Union should withdraw from the United Nations, the United States would desire to review its position on this matter.

comment

1. It appears probable that Mr. Lie is the only likely candidate on the horizon. His strong support of United Nations action in Korea has contributed appreciably to the work of the United Nations action in this crisis and has greatly increased his personal stature.

2. As of the end of August, it appeared likely that, as the result of conversations among the United Kingdom, France and the United States, the President of the Security Council for September (the United Kingdom representative) would informally seek the views of the USSR early in September and perhaps hold a private Security Council meeting to determine whether agreement on a new term for Lie could be reached in the Security Council. (China has stated that it would oppose Lie’s appointment for a full five-year term but would agree to a one-year extension.) In view of the intense Soviet criticism of Lie’s conduct in the Korean case, as well as the Chinese attitude, such an agreement seemed highly unlikely.

3. From the record of events at San Francisco in 1945, and prior to the election of Mr. Lie in 1946, it seems clear that the General Assembly intended that the appointment and re-appointment of the Secretary-General should be a matter which would require a substantive decision in the Security Council. However, the Assembly in 1946 apparently did not take into account the possibility that it might be impossible to secure agreement in the Security Council on any candidate for the office. In such an event, the problem arises as to the procedure to be followed. Two alternatives are suggested:

(a) The General Assembly could alter its 1946 resolution which fixes the term of the first Secretary-General at five years, and provides for his re-appointment for an additional five years or the appointment of a new Secretary-General, with the concurrent action of the Security Council. (This course of action would involve a departure from the observations of the Preparatory Commission¹ to the effect that the General Assembly and the Security Council are free to modify the terms of office of future Secretaries-General in the light of experience, and would mean in the future that the only function of the Security Council in respect of the appointment of the Secretary-General would be the recommendation of a candidate to the General Assembly.) In altering the 1946 resolution, the Assembly would extend Lie’s term at the minimum for an additional two years, and, if agreement can be reached, for a period up to five years.

(b) Alternatively, the General Assembly could adopt a simple declaratory resolution to the effect that the incumbent Secretary-General should continue to serve until his successor was appointed or his term renewed, on the ground that, for organizational reasons, the post could not be allowed to become vacant. In this event, it is unlikely that Mr. Lie would wish to continue in office unless he received some assurance as to the minimum period during which he might be expected to serve. However, it is felt that, with such an assurance, individual Members of the United Nations could effectively appeal to Mr. Lie to continue to serve as a matter of public duty. The importance of not permitting the post of the Secretary-General to become vacant and the contribution which Mr. Lie is making to the program of the United Nations would be stressed in this connection. In fairness to Mr. Lie, the United States should undertake informally to ensure him of our support for a minimum term of two years, with the provision that he should continue thereafter until agreement is reached on his successor or his re-appointment. While a stipulation for a minimum term of two years need not be included in the resolution the United States should seek its inclusion unless Members object to such a provision on the basis of a strict interpretation of Article 97 of the Charter.

4. Both alternatives involve action by the General Assembly which it might be contended appears to go beyond a strict interpretation of Article 97 of the Charter providing for the appointment of the Secretary-General by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. However, it was certainly not intended that the failure of the Security Council to make a positive recommendation in this regard should prevent the Organization from having an administrative head. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the General Assembly must, for organizational reasons, take action in order that the post of Secretary-General not be allowed to become vacant. The form which this action should take should be determined after a canvass of the support which the alternatives seem likely to obtain from the Members of the United Nations. In particular, the first alternative may be opposed on the ground that it is contrary to the recommendations of the Preparatory Commission on this matter, as well as to the terms of the 1946 Assembly resolution on the appointment of the Secretary-General. These arguments, however, may be met by the fact that the Assembly resolution, in adopting the observations of the Preparatory Commission on this subject, foresaw reconsideration of this matter at the end of ten years, and by the conclusion that the present situation justifies reconsideration of the Assembly’s 1946 resolution at this time. The second alternative, on the other hand, simply constitutes a practical approach to the problem of keeping the office filled. It does not purport to alter the 1946 resolution or to reinterpret Article 97 of the Charter. However, it is less satisfactory from the administrative standpoint because it places the Secretary-General in the position of serving from day to day, a condition unlikely to result in forthright and courageous executive action. There appears also to be considerable question as to Mr. Lie’s willingness to continue in the office under the latter circumstance, although an informal two-year assurance, as suggested above, may be helpful in this regard.

[Attachment]

Annex Incorporating General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 19146, on Terms of Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

The General Assembly resolves that, in view of the heavy responsibilities which rest upon the Secretary-General in fulfilling his obligations under the Charter:

1. The terms of the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be such as to enable a man of eminence and high attainment to accept and maintain the position.

2. The Secretary-General shall receive a salary of an amount sufficient to bring him in a net sum of $20,000 (U.S.), together with representation allowance of $20,000 (U.S.), per annum. In addition, he shall be provided with a furnished residence, the repairs and maintenance of which, excluding provision of household staff, shall be borne by the organization.

3. The first Secretary-General shall be appointed for five years, the appointment being open at the end of that period for a further five-year term.

4. The following observations contained in paragraphs 18–21 of section 2, chapter VIII of the preparatory Commission’s Report be noted and approved:

(a) There being no stipulation on the subject in the Charter, the General Assembly and the Security Council are free to modify the term of office of future Secretaries-General in the light of experience.

(b) Because a Secretary-General is a confidant of many governments, it is desirable that no Member should offer him, at any rate immediately on retirement, any governmental position in which his confidential information might be a source of embarrassment to other Members, and on his part a Secretary-General should refrain from (accepting any such position.

(c) From the provisions of Articles 18 ‘and 27 of the Charter, it is clear that, for the nomination of the Secretary-General by the Security Council, an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent Members, is required; and that for his appointment by the General Assembly, a simple majority of the members of that body present and voting is sufficient, unless the General Assembly itself decides that a two-thirds majority is called for. The same rules apply to a renewal of appointment as to an original appointment; this should be made clear when the original appointment is made.

(d) It would be desirable for the Security Council to proffer one candidate only for the consideration of the General Assembly, and for debate on the nomination in the General Assembly to be avoided. Both nomination and appointment should be discussed at private meetings, and a vote in either the Security Council or the General Assembly, if taken, should be by secret ballot.

1. For documentation on the work of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, June–December 1945, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. i, pp. 1433 ff.