Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

320/8–2550: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, August 25, 1950—7 p. m.

1215. UN Department, Foreign Office today orally advised Embassy nature of instructions being sent to Washington and New York re suggested GA resolution to provide calling an emergency session GA in cases of aggression. Substance British views as follows:

1. UK agrees with US that Soviet use of veto must not be permitted to stalemate UN in cases of aggression.

2. British feel, however, safeguards provided by veto are useful since at some future date UK might need veto to protect own basic interests.

3. In addition UK hesitant to give initiative to GA to act as contemplated in US resolution because of size of and occasional irresponsibility of GA.

4. UK view is that GA’s powers are implicit, therefore, it is not necessary and perhaps not desirable to spell out GA powers by such resolution.

5. UK would suggest, instead of suggested resolution, an amendment of GA rules of procedure to make possible summoning assembly on immediate notice when majority of members concur assembly meeting necessary. When Embassy pointed out that physical difficulties of getting immediate action among so large a group would be great Foreign Office added that probably there would be no serious objection to some sort of provision in suggested amendment of rules which would make it possible for summoning Assembly at request from any seven members of SC. (This idea is not mentioned in British telegram to New York and Washington.) As for idea of having IC summon Assembly, to get a majority of IC would require getting concurrence of almost as many members as to get a majority of GA and Foreign Office does not think there would be much practical advantage in using IC.

6. British do not like idea of additional paragraph appointing ad hoc committee to study and report to IC on measures and methods of collective action which GA might recommend to members in given situation.

7. British still considering suggested additional provision (Deptel 1001) concerning GA recommendation to members to designate within national armed forces UN unit to be available for prompt service on behalf of UN. This provision requires consultation with top military authorities.

Embassy pointed out to Foreign Office that reply would disappoint Department and outlined consideration given in Deptel 1001. Foreign Office amplified own views as follows:

On points 2 and 3, real points of substance, the Foreign Office does not feel it wise to let the initiative slip into the hands of GA since if GA were to pass “some fire-eating resolution” at later date the great powers who would bear major responsibility for implementing such resolution might not have the freedom of action they felt their national interests dictated. Examples used were Yugoslavia and Formosa. In Foreign Office view the UK suggested amendment of rules of procedure will make emergency action “permissive” whereas suggested US resolution will tend to make it “mandatory”. Foreign Office in drafting suggested amendment to rules of procedure would feel it necessary to put in some sort of definition of types of action for which such session might be called—aim here appeared not so much to limit GA’s action as to make sure that assembly not called together for reasons which were not good and sufficient.

Foreign Office also thinks that simple amendment rules of procedure would be less directly provocative to UK aim than suggested US resolution and would be less open to possible Russian charges of “attempting to amend” the charter.¹

Douglas

1. Simultaneously on August 25 Mr. Gerald Meade of the British Embassy handed to Assistant Secretary Hickerson the paraphrase of a telegram from the Foreign Office setting forth the British position. The record of conversation reads in part: “[Mr. Hickerson] reiterated the importance we attach to GA action along this line. He pointed out that the risks of undesirable GA recommendations which the UK appeared to see in the proposal are all risks inherent in the GA as an organ under the Charter and that, since the proposal would not alter or increase the powers of the GA, it would in no way increase those risks. … Mr. Hickerson emphasized that the proposal merely seeks in a dramatic way to do nothing more than to change the rules of procedure. Mr. Hickerson indicated that, of course, we do not want to drive the Russians out of the UN nor give them a good excuse for leaving and that in his view this proposal would do neither. He added, however, that it is clear that so long as they are in the UN an amendment to the Charter is impossible and we must therefore operate within it in making the machinery as effective as possible. We dissented strongly from the point of view that the proposal would weaken the power of the veto. We argued against the suggestion … that an undramatic amendment of the rules of procedure would be as satisfactory. … Mr. Hickerson urged Mr. Meade that in the light of these general considerations, of the strong US feeling on the matter and of the relatively mild nature of the proposal the UK should reconsider its position.” (Memorandum of conversation by Ward P. Allen, Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, August 25, 320/8–2550)