Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

320/8–2350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

secret

Washington, August 23, 1950—7 p. m.

1001. I. Certain major problems re forthcoming GA discussed at tripartite mtg US–UK–Fr dels Aug 21.² US presented fol tentative proposals for strengthening UN machinery:

1) Special emergency session GA (Deptel 732 rptd Paris 725).

2) Fol additional provision in above res with appropriate modifications paras 4 and 5: “GA recommends to its Members they designate within their natl armed forces UN Unit which cld be so trained and equipped as to be available for prompt service on behalf of UN upon decision of SC or recommendation of GA.

“In order assist Member States in establishment, training and equipping such UN Units, GA hereby appoints coordinator to act on its behalf in order consult with Member States who wish to establish such units and to coordinate their planning. Salary of Coordinator shall be paid from regular budget of UN and he shall be provided by SYG with staff and assistance necessary for effective accomplishment of his tasks.” (This presented on very tentative basis and precise language is being developed.)

3) Fact-Finding and Observation Comm. (Deptel 785 rptd Paris 769).

We also raised possibility creation UN Legion but stated that in view practical difficulties we did not think GA shld at this session take final action establish permanent Legion. Moreover, above suggestion for designation UN Units natl forces might be said offer more simple method fulfilling same purpose. However we continuing study possibility GA planning for some type of legion that might be used in post hostilities phase Korea with question expressly left for later decision whether such force shld be made permanent part of UN machinery.

We made clear that notwithstanding emphasis on Korean situation and on above program of defense against aggression we did not think we shld abandon, nor give impression in GA that we are abandoning long-term constructive UN efforts on improvement economic and social conditions, etc. UK and Fr heartily agreed.

Although without instructions, attitude UK and Fr dels above program more favorable than preliminary reactions from FonOff as reported London 997 rptd Paris 249 and Paris tel 799 rptd London 232. They did not raise legal points reported reftels, although they were inclined interpret proposals as more farreaching than we had in mind.

UK and Fr dels seeking instructions and we agreed meet again Mon Aug 28.

II. In discussion these matters with FonOff you shld emphasize we feel strongly opportunity this GA shld not pass without taking some action along foregoing lines. Suggest fol genl points be stressed in order seek promote broader, more constructive attitude on part UK and Fr.

1) In our view UN Charter was conceived in broad terms as framework to be filled in by precedents and practice and we regard UN Machinery created by it as flexible and capable of adaptation to changing realities without altering letter or spirit of Charter.

2) Inability SC to act in face of aggression because of veto does not of course relieve members of their obligations under Charter and in sense imposes an obligation to seek means through GA or other machinery of coping with situation where SC has failed. Thus in present circumstances it is clear GA will be required to play greater role in maintenance international peace and security than heretofor. Obvious SC was able act in Korean crisis only because of Sov absence.

3) As indicated Deptel 732 repeated Paris 725 we believe 5th GA offers unique opportunity capitalize psychological impact Korea crisis in order better equip GA to carry out this task.

4) Steps to strengthen ability UN meet possible future aggression are as much a part of basic approach of building situation of strength throughout world as is strengthening West Eur mil defenses on which we now jointly devoting so much effort.³ Possible deterrent effect on potential aggressor is factor not to be overlooked.

5) Specific proposals outlined above represent minimum steps which in our view shld be taken. They do not increase powers GA, nor seek supplant SC by GA nor increase obligations of members to take any particular action in any particular case. Suggested improvements in procedures do not operate automatically.

6) We convinced, despite UK and Fr initial doubts at this point, proposals along above lines will receive broad support in GA and desire submit them jointly with UK and Fr perhaps others.

Comments re specific points raised by Fr (Paris 799 rptd London 232) and by UK (London 977 rptd Paris 249) contained separate tel.

Acheson

1. Repeated for action to Paris as 933 and for information to USUN as 180.
2. Documentation on these and related meetings is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
3. Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume iii.