330.1/7–2850: Telegram
The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
155. Reference urtel 54 of July 24,1 mytel 142 of July 27 and Sandifer’s2 instruction telephoned to Hyde3 to explore affirmatively with friendly delegates plan for having commission similar to UNCOK on duty to report immediately to SC outbreak aggression anywhere.
At meeting with Norwegian, UK and French delegates initial reaction was that this plan is so important that nothing more than preliminary reactions could be obtained by Monday. All three felt that wider discussion (except for discussion with Indians) would be most undesirable in meantime because of possibility of leakage. All wanted to see a text before hazarding views in any detail and felt that quickest way to get reactions of their governments would involve discussions their Ambassadors in Washington and our Ambassadors at their foreign offices.
Jebb4 viewed plan as raising very grave issues. He thought that it might involve war or peace and a cabinet decision by his government. He was certain that the Soviet Union would not recognize the validity [Page 309] of the resolution and wondered about political wisdom of allowing Malik to say on his return to SC that the day before that body had attempted to abolish veto. Jebb himself doubted whether the SC could delegate the power to appoint a commission of investigation because in his view such decision by SC requires the concurring vote of the permanent members and therefore may not be delegated to a subcommittee which would act by majority vote. While he recognized that this plan would not commit his government to take action similar to Korean in all parts of the world, he thought politically it has strong tendency in that direction and he referred particularly to Formosa, wondering whether India would not have same objection. Gross stressed that the plan is simply to have facts available to base action to maintain and preserve peace and is not a step in any political solution of the problems of an area. It simply builds on the experience of having facts in Korean case. Jebb further questioned whether commission could recruit and send sub-group to troubled area in time for effective factual report. Also, debate in commission, although leading to simple majority vote or decision by seven, would take time. Jebb would hope to have preliminary reaction by Sunday but it would be far simpler to get reaction to plan providing for commission limited to Yugoslavian problem. If commission itself could not send sub-group to troubled area but recommend that to SC, it would avoid delegation of power problem but would largely destroy reason for having commission at all. On the sponsorship question, Jebb very much doubted that India or Yugoslavia would act as sponsor and was certain Egypt would not.
Chauvel5 emphasized Jebb’s point that he doubted wisdom of bypassing SC by this delegation of power the day before the USSR returns. He feels that the commission would be a fully operating body that could take very import ant decisions without action by the SC itself. He raised particularly the political problems of such a commission, going to Formosa or Afghanistan. He thought it would be far simpler for his government to reach a decision on a commission for Yugoslavia.
Although Sunde6 did not comment, Stabell7 stressed the legal problem of delegation and read from part one of the Four Power Statement at San Francisco8 as indicating that the decision to create a [Page 310] commission of investigation is substantive and therefore not to be delegated. He also mentioned the difficulty for his government of using the machinery of the commission in the event of hostilities involving Formosa and the Chinese Communists. He stressed the importance of the political decisions that the commission might make. At the conclusion of the meeting, Sunde stated that he is to see Bebler9 at eleven on Saturday, July 29, and would discuss this with him if the others so desire. Decision on this point was reserved until Saturday, a. m.
In presenting the proposal, Gross summarized the views contained in our 142 and stressed the Department’s desire to press ahead with this. He indicated that we would make available at least the outline of a draft resolution as soon as available. He added, speaking personally, that he would like reactions to possible amendment which would limit a commission’s initiative by requiring commission to report to SC in advance before sending group to any area, thereby giving SC opportunity to instruct commission not to take such action. He explained this would put us on the right side of the veto.
Gross pointed out this would, however, be substantial modification. Since it would invite SC debate which might increase tensions in particular case. He argued that Department plan in fact involves very limited delegation of authority, and that SC always had the commission on a short string if it wished to modify the plan or procedure under the plan.
He recalled his conversation with Rau reported in mytel 90 [123?]10 which would limit this concept to a commission for Yugoslavia. He emphasized the fact that very often a state which is threatened might, in the early stages where the commission could be effective, fear to make a formal complaint to the SC. At the same time, he requested delegates to obtain governmental reactions to this alternative, stressing our strong preference for generalized plan.
Please relay to London 1, Paris 1, Oslo 1, New Delhi 1, Cairo 1, Taipeh 1, Habana 2, Quito 1, Belgrade 1, Moscow 1.
- For information regarding telegram 54, see footnote 1, p. 303.↩
- Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs.↩
- James N. Hyde, USUN staff.↩
- Sir H. M. Gladwyn Jebb, Permanent British Representative at the United Nations.↩
- Jean Chauvel, Permanent French Representative at the United Nations.↩
- Arne Sunde, Permanent Norwegian Representative at the United Nations.↩
- B. Stabell, Alternate Permanent Norwegian Representative.↩
- The Four-Power Statement on voting procedure in the Security Council was made on June 7, 1945, by the four sponsoring powers of the San Francisco Conference, namely, the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, and subscribed to by France; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, p. 1047. For documentation on the policy of the U.S. Government regarding the Four-Power Statement, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, pp. 251 ff.↩
- Ales Bebler, Permanent Yugoslav Representative at the United Nations.↩
- See footnote 3, p. 304.↩