Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

330.1/7–2750: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

New York , July 27, 1950—7:02 p. m.

142. Reference Department’s 54, July 24,¹ we feel arguments set forth would apply with equal force to other possible conflict areas. In particular we agree, of course, with statement Deptel re desirability having Commissions similar UNCOK on duty in order to report immediately to SC outbreak aggression anywhere.

We are, however, inclined to feel any action such as proposed in reftel limited to one specific area of world such as Yugoslavia, Iran, Indochina or Formosa, would have two unfortunate effects:

First, impression would be created that particular area selected was believed to present most serious risk new outbreak aggression. Result would probably be jitters in area and increased political tensions, even among our friends, in regard to particular area.

Second, differences and complexities of political attitudes held by friendly nation with regard to particular areas would be highlighted and difficulties achieving purposes envisaged greatly increased if each possible conflict area were dealt with separately by SC.

Accordingly we feel that a general rather than a piecemeal approach in SC would deal more effectively with problem of preventing spread of conflict by new outbreaks of aggression by Soviet-inspired Communist forces in tender areas (such as Berlin, Yugoslavia, Iran, Burma, Indochina, Formosa).

We assume Department’s objectives as follows:

1. Promptest possible halting of Korean aggression and, as minimum, restoration status quo without prejudice to military necessities or expediency or achievement political objectives Korea by peaceful means after termination hostilities.²

2. Prevention spread elsewhere of conflict as a result new aggression or breach of peace.

3. In event objective number two not achieved, assurance that collective moral, political and material weight of UN can be brought breach of peace wherever it may occur.

promptly and effectively to bear in dealing with new aggression or

Since we cannot be sure where new Soviet-inspired thrust might take place we feel we must make every effort immediately (a) to deter by UN as well as by other practicable means any new Soviet adventures, and (b) to have UN prepared to deal as promptly and effectively as possible with outbreak of aggression anywhere.

Having in mind (a) foregoing assumptions and observations, (b) indication in last paragraph Deptel under reference that Department considering desirability establishing commissions other sensitive spots, and (c) SC’s continuing responsibility for dealing effectively with any situation if any part of world which might in Charter terms be considered “likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security” (Article 34) or lead to a new “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (Article 39), we recommend for Department’s consideration desirability having SC at earliest possible date establish SC commission with observation and visitorial authority (please refer Gross conversation with Rau, Usun 123, July).³

Such commission or committees thereof would be authorized by SC to visit or station observer groups in any area threatened with aggression or military hostilities.

Advantages, as we see it, of such commission are:

1. Because of broad terms of reference we would be able to avoid or at least minimize SC discussion or attempt to deal formally with any specific situation such as Yugoslavia or Formosa.

In this way we feel we would be able to avoid or minimize showing our hand or creating unwarranted apprehensions in regard to any particular area.

2. At same time we feel that by this approach we might finesse political differences and complexities which would cause difficult and probably protracted negotiations with such governments as India, UK, France, etc., particularly with regard to Formosa.⁴

3. Finally, we feel that through finessing matter as indicated we would have better chance of broad SC support.

Creation of commission with broad terms of reference as envisaged would help serve admirably objective number three stated above as in case UNCOK.

In connection with establishing such commission we favor having SC in the resolution establishing commission call upon all governments and authorities concerned to refrain from any action which might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security or lead to new threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression

Such action SC on behalf of UN would accomplish two purposes:

1. Clear notice would be served on Soviet Union, its satellites and Chinese Communists without getting involved at this stage in problem of formal action, naming or implying that Soviet Union, etc. are guilty of aggression or intend aggression.

2. Basis would be laid for future SC action in event new outbreak of aggression without at this time committing either US or other government’s (India, UK) to any specific commitment at this time as to nature or extent of any such future SC action with regard to any particular area.

In conjunction with foregoing it might be desirable to include in SC resolution a self-denying ordinance along lines suggested by Tsiang (Usun 29, July 6).⁵

Following are lines along which we envisage SC resolution might be formulated:

1. Reference to fact that SC on behalf of UN and in accordance with its responsibilities under chapter VII of Charter is acting to halt aggression against ROK.

2. Denial of any design for political, economic or territorial advantage from participation in UN effort in Korea (Tsiang’s self-denying ordinance idea).

3. Strong statement UN policy that political issues and differences, regardless of their character or geographic location, should be settled by pacific methods of settlement as provided in Charter.

4. Reference to primary and continuing responsibility of SC on behalf of UN for maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24–1).

5. Statement of determination to take appropriate steps to prevent spreading of conflict to other areas through development any situation anywhere in world likely to endanger maintenance of international peace and security or lead to new threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.

6. To these ends and as first step, establishment of SC commission composed of members of SC approving resolution.

7. Authorize commission or committees thereof appointed by it to visit or station observers in any area where in opinion commission or SC a situation exists which is likely to endanger maintenance of international peace and security or lead to new threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.

8. Request commission to report to SC from time to time and to make such recommendations to SC as it may deem appropriate in interest maintaining peace and security and preventing spread of conflict or new act of aggression or breach of peace.

9. Authorization to SYG to provide necessary staff for commission and its committees, incur necessary expenses, etc.

10. Call upon all governments and authorities to cooperate with commission or committees thereof and to refrain from any action in any area of world which might endanger maintenance of international peace and security or lead to new threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.

We have in mind most desirable sponsorship resolution might be Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia.

In view information that Malik,⁶ exercising function as President SC August, has called meeting August 1, 3 p. m., we believe there would be constructive benefit from timing foregoing proposal ahead of any initiative by Malik.⁷ If proposal introduced before August 1 we and friendly governments SC would have this positive proposal to talk from rather than being in merely defensive position vis-à-vis Malik whatever his line may turn out to be. Also if such specific proposal were on table it would be best antidote to any phoney proposal Malik might make. The tabling of such a resolution would pose the issue squarely with USSR and confront them with necessity of showing world by their reaction to such resolution whether they really want peace.

Austin

1. This telegram is scheduled for publication in the compilation on Yugoslavia in volume iv. It said in part: “Impact of UNCOK report on Korean invasion in SC and subsequent benefits to UN action from presence Comm on spot have caused Dept to consider desirability of having similar commissions on duty in event aggression elsewhere. Possibility of aggression on Yugo border indicates desirability for SC to send fact-finding and observation group to area provided Yugo consent obtained. … While Yugo situation appears most critical at moment, Dept also considering similar action certain other sensitive spots, including possible SC or GA action to make Commissions available on short notice.” (768.00/7–2050)
2. For documentation on Korea, see volume vii .
3. Not printed. The Deputy U.S. Representative at the United Nations (Gross) reported a conversation with Sir B. N. Rau, Permanent Representative of India at the United Nations, on July 25, in which the two discussed on a personal basis the possible merits of having such a commission in certain danger areas. (330/7–2650)
4. For documentation on Formosa, see vol. vi, pp. 256 ff.
5. This telegram is scheduled for publication in volume vii. Tsiang was the Permanent Representative of China at the United Nations.
6. Y. A. Malik, Soviet Representative on the Security Council.
7. The Soviet Union had been absent from the Security Council since January 13, when Malik walked out over the issue of Chinese representation; for documentation regarding these matters, see pp. 186 ff.