Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

700.5 MAP/9–150

Notes of the Secretary of State for Congressional Hearings: on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program¹

secret

[Washington, undated.]

Formal statement filed. My own informal views.

Doubt whether we have ever really had a belly understanding of effect on Europe of World War II after World War I.

It was a devastation in all fields which amounted to a vast disappearance of power.

Plus disappearance of Germany and Japan.

—USSR & USA—

Too often Europe’s trouble regarded here as mere excuse for asking for more than we found convenient to supply.

Not that, in sense of our world position. Something far more somber.

It meant the removal of the barriers which through all our history from Queen Anne’s Wars and French and Indian Wars, through Napoleon, Bismarck, World War I and II had stood between us and the immediate impact of whatever predatory force was loose in the world.

We are in the position of the individual who, for the first time, on the death of a parent, hears in a new way the roaring of the cataract.

At any rate, and make no mistake about it, we are now exposed without opportunity for time to teach us or shield us to the blows of fate.

In the past we were the reluctant ally to be wooed and won.

Today we either stand alone or we stand with friends. But in either case we stand together from the very first shot.

If that is not made clear now and clinched with unmistakable action, the somber truth is that we stand alone—outnumbered—outresourced—with an unmanageable problem.

There is no need for this unless some blind folly possesses us. The free world wants us, trusts us, looks for leadership. Will fall in shoulder to shoulder as free and equal in the face of appalling danger.

But leadership requires understanding, responsibility, discipline. The flatulent bombast of our public utterances will lead no one but fools.

Very well—where do we start? From vast weakness in Europe, the Near East and Asia. I leave the USA out.

We have built greatly in Europe where our efforts were rightly centered. As strength grows there, it grows everywhere. Without it any other growth will wither.

When it became clear that the economic course would not and could not go forward without rebuilding military power before the foundations were laid, we resolved to

• Greek-Turkish Aid
• NATO
• MDAP

We have held the line. Used money, arms, diplomacy, organization—all to gain time for the underlying strength.

It seemed sound to believe on what we could know and deduce that there was time to carry out a military rearmament program over enough years to keep the economic underpinning sound and not give entrance to communists by the back door.

It did not need too much time and the parties were eager and willing.

Then came Korea.

The profound lesson of Korea was not that we did not know about the attack before it came. No sensible person could expect that. (General analysis, if necessary, if intelligent.)

The profound lesson of Korea is that, contrary to every action preceding, the USSR took a step which risked—however remotely—general war.

No other action has done this—not even the Berlin Blockade.

There was no suggestion of an overt act anywhere.

Suppose, if you wish, and I do, that the Kremlin’s best guess was that we would not pick up the glove.

Nevertheless, the risk was there. Neither the Kremlin nor any other Foreign Office acts without understanding that the off chance may occur.

Still they acted.

What this means in terms of programs.

What this means in MDAP.

How the Administration has responded to this all important new fact.

The basic relationships of military power. (Churchill’s speech 7–8–9–10 to 1.)²

No need for panic, but many steps needed.

Among these a vast step up of [notes end at this point].

1. On August 30, Secretary Acheson testified before the Senate Committee on Appropriations regarding supplemental appropriations for MDAP (see editorial note, p. 352).
2. Reference is to an address on defense policy by former Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill in the House of Commons on July 27. Churchill contrasted the military weakness of the West with the strength of Soviet forces. For text, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 478, cols. 699–714.