Policy Planning Staff Files
Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)
Subject: NSC Senior Staff Consideration of NSC 791
The NSC Senior Staff considered NSC 79 this afternoon. Admiral Wooldridge explained what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind in submitting NSC 79. The Joint Chiefs appear to have had a more limited objective than we had arrived at in this morning’s meeting in S/P. Admiral Wooldridge addressed his remarks principally to the need for instilling in our own people in this country and among the people of our allies, as well as the dissident elements in Russia and the Satellite countries, some of the zeal and fanaticism that Nazis, Fascists and Communists display. He felt that a study should be undertaken to determine what it was that we lack and others had to make them fight for their objectives. He felt that we should have a program of concrete objectives to appeal to the man in the street at the outbreak of war which would cause him to rally to our side whether he was American or French, Czech or Indochinese. President Wilson’s Fourteen Points had such a definite appeal, he recalled. He also pointed out that our studies should enable us to avoid ad hoc decisions taken on short notice like the decision for unconditional surrender. Admiral Wooldridge gave the impression that he was thinking principally in terms of a propaganda appeal based largely on studies of mass psychology and historical precedents to be undertaken by psychologists and historians rather than in terms of the immediate and long-range problems with which we were concerned in our meeting this morning. Admiral Wooldridge indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were thinking of statements which could be used both on D-Day to inculcate zeal for victory and at the present time as a deterrent to war.
The ensuing discussion veered away from Admiral Wooldridge’s proposal for psychological studies and came closer to the lines of thinking expressed in this morning’s S/P meeting. It was recognized that we should emphasize the present need for steps to prevent the outbreak of war as well as the need for steps for winning the war. It was agreed that if war came we should be prepared in advance with our long-range war aims. All agreed that NSC 20/42 represented broad aims which were generally acceptable but which required spelling [Page 393] out. Mr. Finletter added that he could think of nothing more useful than stating the conditions upon which we would negotiate a peace settlement with the USSR. (Reference paragraph 36a(2) of NSC 73/4.3) He felt that this should be a preliminary step in any study that was to be undertaken and that these conditions for a negotiated settlement might be the same as the conditions which we would propose for a settlement after the outbreak of war but before partial or total defeat of the enemy.
We did not take up in detail the many problems connected with our war aims, nor did we consider the various stages of military progress to which specific war aims would have to be related. It was the consensus of the meeting, however, that thorough consideration of all these problems should be undertaken and that the first task of the group to be set up should be to consider the extent and purpose of the study to be made. It was agreed that the procedure followed in preparation of NSC 68 should be followed again and that a joint ad hoc group should be appointed by the Council. Mr. Lay is preparing a memorandum to the NSC reporting that NSC 79 is being considered by the senior staff, which has appointed an ad hoc group to make further studies and report to the staff. I believe that this procedure will leave the initiative with the Policy Planning Staff to undertake the study contemplated in this morning’s meeting in S/P.
- Supra.↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 662.↩
- Ante, p. 375.↩