Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

S/S Files: Lot 63D351: NSC 68 Series

Memorandum by the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (Symington) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

top secret

Washington, September 5, 1950.

For many years a group of determined men have been pushing with practical realism the religion of communism.

Over 30 years ago some of this group obtained control of one of the world’s great nations—Russia.

Since then the most outstanding characteristics of their actions have been:

1. The extermination of anything which stood in their way toward their often declared objective—a world communist state.

2. The rapid advancement they have made toward their ultimate goal, as characterized by such developments as:

a. In the past 10 years, the communist or communist controlled peoples of the world have increased from some 188 million people to over 800 million people.

b. In nearly every country of importance in the world the communists now have a well organized, well trained, and militant minority which takes maximum advantage of the tolerance of democratic governments; this to the extent that the United States and other countries might be sabotaged at the start of a general war to the point where successful continuance of the conflict would be impossible.

c. Through clever, consistent, and determined propaganda, more people in the world may now well believe that communism is a better form of government for them than is democracy.

The Soviets have, outside their own country, millions of well trained men organized to fight the battle of communism. As a result, they can continue to bleed the democracies without committing their own troops.

The Soviets are steadily increasing the power of their own army, navy and air force, as well as their stock of atomic bombs and the equipment to deliver the latter. With relatively minor exceptions, everything would now seem to be going according to their schedule for world conquest. Attainment of an adequate stock of atomic bombs appears the only remaining requirement in their plan for world conquest.

To those who have followed these developments over recent years, the grave danger of the current world situation is all too apparent.

If Korea has taught us anything, it is that the peace loving democracies cannot afford to wait for additional Soviet aggression before mobilizing to meet that aggression. We must build, now, a defense sufficient not only to cope with other Koreas, but also one which can form the basis for an ultimatum to the Soviets that we will hold them responsible for, and subject to retaliation in case of additional aggression.

An analysis of the scope and character of the current United States military build-up, however, indicates a contemplated build-up that is not adequate to meet the present world situation, particularly when the United States, supposedly the strongest nation, is now with difficulty maintaining its position against Russia’s weakest satellite.

Recently the Defense Department estimated that, for the next three fiscal years, the military elements of the national security program would require the following percentages of the country’s supply of three basic materials:

Military Requirements	FY 1951 % of Supply	FY 1952 % of Supply	FY 1953 % of Supply
Steel	2.34	4.47	5.46
Copper	12.44	19.41	19.64
Aluminum	7.36	12.21	12.31

Some time earlier, estimates of requirements in the event of full mobilization were calculated by the military departments. These latest available figures, as received from the Department of Defense, follow:

Military Requirements	FY 1950 % of Supply	FY 1951 % of Supply	FY 1952 % of Supply
Steel	58	59	46
Copper	68.7	125.2	124.5
Aluminum	100.4	154.1	139.8

On the basis of our own figures, therefore, we are now embarking upon a build-up amounting to around 9% of what our most recently circulated plan regarded as essential for true mobilization.

In the first full year of World War II, 1942, about 31% of the nation’s production was utilized for war purposes. Less than 8% of that production, including MDAP, is planned for 1951.

The Resources Board believes this current planning will result in a defense program that is inadequate to meet the current menace to the nation’s security.

We believe that the current communist aggression in Korea, plus possible aggression against such other localities as Formosa, Indo-China, Japan, Iran, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Germany, and the United States itself, add up to a danger that is not being recognized by such piecemeal plans for preparedness.

The Resources Board recommends, therefore, that the National Security Council review the current and contemplated defense programs from the standpoint of their adequacy to afford as soon as possible the military strength to support simultaneously:

1. A winning effort in Korea.

2. Adequate continental defense of the United States.

3. A force-in-being sufficient to notify the Soviets that further communist aggression, either overt or through satellites, will result in the use of that force against Russia itself.

W. Stuart Symington

1. This memorandum was circulated to the members of the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on September 6 for consideration in connection with the preparation of the response to NSC 68.