Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

740.0011EW (Peace)/9–2849: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at New York¹

secret
priority
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Washington, September 28, 1949—1 a.m.

Audel 184. Personal for the Secretary from Webb.

(Deliver to the Secretary before 9 a. m. Wednesday.)

Memorandum of conversation with Berthelot and Mallet on tactics² and issues regarding Austrian Treaty raises serious questions which in our view should be pressed on Bevin and Schuman if they remain adamant on the views of their Deputies. Our views of the situation following your meeting Monday night and the British and French suggestions are as follows:

Bevin and Schuman both agreed with you on September 15 that we would stick to our positions on the remaining unagreed issues, except for a commission [concession?] on refineries for which we would ask an equitable distribution of the oil exploration areas. You will recall that each issue was discussed in detail and the implications affecting Austria’s future were weighed. Both Ministers agreed with you that any further concessions to meet the Soviet demands would endanger our basic objective of creating in Austria a state capable of independent existence after Treaty comes into force.

We consider present Russian demands unjustified and far in excess of what was agreed in Paris. Vishinsky’s position indicates to us that Soviet Union does not want a Treaty at this time which requires military withdrawal from Austria, Hungary and Rumania unless such a Treaty creates conditions that would subsequently permit Soviet penetration and repossession of all Austria. Acceptance of Soviet demands without further negotiation would in our view defeat the purpose of the treaty and all our efforts and expenditures since 1945 toward enabling Austria to maintain an independent existence.

We recognize that Austria would derive many specific benefits from the treaty, but consider that appeasement of the Soviets only to get a peace at any price at this time involves for the US larger and longer range problems which outweigh the benefits of a quick and easy settlement. Even if our terms are accepted, Austria will be saddled with a grave burden and all the resources and hard work of the Austrians for years to come will be centered on discharging the obligation to the Soviet Union. Conclusion of the treaty on basis of our present terms is a calculated risk. To make further concessions on oil exploration, shipping leases, and rolling stock would not only provide the Russians with a permanent foothold in Austria, but would deprive the Austrian economy of key resources which it will require in discharging the lump-sum and all other obligations of the Treaty.

Accepting the Russian demands to achieve a quick settlement after the atomic announcement³ would in our view have more serious general repercussions in Europe than failure to conclude Austrian treaty immediately and would give the Soviets a misleading and possibly dangerous impression of our general attitude at this time. We do recognize that Russian withdrawal from Austria, and possibly Hungary and Rumania, would ease the situation with respect to Yugoslavia, but emphasize that Vishinsky also probably realizes this fact.

Trade of three key points of oil exploration, shipping and rolling stock, for UN property rights, foreign technicians and refugees would be of no value to Austria and would satisfy only secondary issues raised by Western states. It is not an equal trade, such as the lump-sum and frontiers at Paris, and would not insure conclusion of treaty unless Russians desired to conclude treaty at this time. Therefore, I submit the following as the considered opinion of the staff including Rusk, Kennan and Murphy for your consideration for the meeting with Bevin and Schuman and Four-power discussions on Wednesday night:

1. To point out to Bevin and Schuman that there are certain limits in US position made necessary both by fact that US is only Western country which has contributed direct aid to Austria and by the fact that treaties must be ratified by Senate. We would have no intention of asking Senate to ratify a treaty which increased Austria’s need for direct aid since the Senate correctly would not agree to any settlement which involved appropriations for payments to the Russians. Secondly, we can not ask Congress to appropriate money to equip Austrian Army if Austria is to be constituted a definite security risk by the very terms of the Treaty. You may wish to point out that without direct aid from the US, Austria has no chances whatsoever of continued independent existence.

2. If tripartite acceptance of the agreement of September 15⁴ is assured you may wish in the four-power meeting to attempt to get Vishinsky’s views on the unagreed issues as a whole and elicit from him how he proposes to conclude the treaty and on what terms. If specific issues are discussed we feel they should be discussed only in terms of their relation to framework of the Paris Agreement.⁵ We accepted Paris Agreement in good faith as a settlement of Austrian question which has been delayed by progressive increase in Soviet demands which in our view are a violation of Moscow Declaration. Vishinsky should be required to make concrete proposals for future procedure and agree to basic principles contained in tripartite note to Soviet Government of September 18.⁶ Unless Vishinsky changes his position we do not feel that further meetings of Ministers would produce any results, but that Ministers will meet at any time to conclude Austrian Treaty when Soviets decide to honor their international commitments. If adjournment results, provision should be made for further Deputies meetings either by fixing date for future meeting, directing Deputies to continue for present or providing means for setting future discussions through diplomatic channels.

For your personal information we may eventually be faced by the British and French determination to yield to the Soviet demands. In that case it may be necessary for yon to say that since we do not wish to dictate terms of settlement of European issues, we will refrain from further discussions on the treaty, but will maintain our troops in Austria and our High Commissioner in the Allied Council until the Treaty is settled by UK, France and the Soviets. We consider that tripartite unity is necessary if a satisfactory settlement is to be reached. Failing tripartite unity, we should not wish to stand in the way of the European nations settling the issue on terms agreeable to them, but we must make plain that we cannot continue direct aid and would not ratify the treaty. In this event, it is doubtful whether the Russians would either ratify the treaty or withdraw their troops.

Webb

1. Secretary Acheson was in New York attending the fourth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly.
2. Transmitted in Delau 303, supra.
3. Under reference here is President Truman’s announcement on September 23 that an atomic explosion had taken place in the Soviet Union. For documentation relating to this announcement, see volume i
4. Printed as an enclosure to the message from Acheson to Schuman, September 17, p. 1154.
5. The communiqué of June 20, p. 1062.
6. Transmitted in telegram 654, September 15, p. 1146.