740.00119 Council/9–2749: Telegram
The United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Reber) to the Acting Secretary of State
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Delau 303. For Rusk and Murphy from Reber. The following memorandum of conversation between Messrs. Berthelot, Mallet and Reber is transmitted for your information.
I had a long meeting with the British and French deputies this morning, the upshot of which was that both British and French argue that a treaty, even on Soviet terms, at the present time, is better than none at all.
If the negotiations break down now they believe the treaty will be indefinitely postponed and Soviet occupation prolonged, as there would be no point in continuing negotiations if the Ministers are unable to reach agreement. Prolonged Soviet occupation in their opinion will more effectively wreck the Austrian economy than the higher price now demanded. They also point out that the Soviets now have 100 percent of all the oil properties and exploration areas, as well as the industrial plants due to be returned to Austria under the treaty, all of which will operate under Soviet control to the detriment of Austria.
Furthermore, a setback now would have very serious repercussions on the general political situation in Europe and be an evidence of our failure to limit Soviet demands. They regard the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria as of such importance as to warrant further concessions. Although they would prefer to limit these concessions to the Soviet terms for Article 35, they might even consider acceptance of the Soviet claims in respect to the other articles, particularly as in their opinion it would be possible to make arrangements with Austria outside the treaty safeguarding UN property Article 42 and payment of the obligations due under Article 48.
[Page 1160]I argued that in Washington the Ministers had agreed upon minimum concessions1 to be given to the Soviets and that acceptance of all of the Soviet demands now might weaken the Western position in Europe. Furthermore the increased burden placed upon Austria might mean, because of the difficulties for Austria to meet the treaty obligations, that the treaty would bring about what British and French feel would be the results of no treaty, namely, complete Soviet control of Austrian economy.
I also pointed out that the increased cost would fall upon the US and might seriously endanger ratification, particularly since there was a large section of public opinion in this country which felt that any treaty with Austria now which called for the withdrawal of Allied troops would endanger Austria’s independence.
We agreed because of this apparent basic difference in approach that we should recommend to our respective Ministers to consult among themselves to determine a common approach for the next meeting.
We further agreed that it would be desirable if possible to ascertain Soviet intentions with respect to issues other than those discussed last night2 before offering any specific concession on the oil exploration areas. I expressed the belief that a concession on any single point would probably not prove conclusive, and that a decision on the future course of action should be taken by the Western Ministers before taking any such step.
- Under reference here is the position agreed by the three Western Ministers in “Washington, September 15, which is printed as an enclosure to the message from Acheson to Schuman, September 17, p. 1154.↩
- The reference here is to a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers, September 26 at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, at which Vyshinsky maintained that the Soviet terms for the Austrian Treaty must be met. The minutes of this informal meeting, are in CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 144.↩