Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

740.00119 Council/9–2849: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

secret
priority

New York, September 28, 1949—7:30 p.m.

Delau 304. From the Secretary.

At the tripartite meeting this morning, Bevin again made a plea for early conclusion of the Austrian treaty, pointing out that the issues which were holding up the treaty did not involve any large additional amounts over and above the Paris agreement¹ and that Austria was prepared to accept even the Soviet claims in these respects. He stressed the strong desire both in the United Kingdom and in Europe generally to see Soviet troops withdrawn from Austria, not only because [of?] the resultant general improvement in Central Europe, but because of their removal from the immediate neighborhood of Yugoslavia. The British Government was most anxious to extend the jurisdiction of the Council of Europe as far east as possible. If Austria could be reestablished and admitted together with Western Germany, this would immeasurably strengthen the Council and bring it to the borders of Czechoslovakia. He concluded by urging that the wider issues should be weighed against the questions of oil and rolling stock which in themselves hardly seem a justification to hold up the treaty.

Schuman, who was less definite than in his conversation with me last night,² agreed with Bevin as to the urgency of an agreement on Austria. He had, however, some reservations with regard to the acceptance of all Soviet claims, pointing out they involve not only quantity of oil or number of locomotives but the question of the degree of Soviet influence and control. He felt that, to some extent, Westernpolicy was at stake and that too rapid concessions on our part might encourage Soviets in their demands in other respects. He felt, however, that all Europe was waiting for a settlement of this question and that every effort possible should be made to conclude it, since failure by the Ministers would be a serious setback. He, however, was not prepared, without further effort, to agree to all Soviet demands.

In summarizing our position, I pointed out that, although the aggregate amounts involved in the Soviet claims might not be large in themselves, these amounts nevertheless were large in relation to Austrian economy and we must therefore look at the situation not in terms of the number of hectares or of the quantity of oil but in terms of their effect on Austrian economy. Secondly, I felt strongly that it was most undesirable in terms of our general policy to permit the Soviets to repudiate the Paris Agreement and to be obliged to accept their terms within 2 weeks of the atomic explosion in USSR. This would give a false impression of our position and might indicate we were being stampeded into agreement. Finally, I stressed Austria’s inability to carry out even the terms of the Paris Agreement without large amounts of foreign assistance largely to be provided by the US. In Paris, we had gone a long way to meet the Soviet demands and any additional calls upon the US for assistance to Austria over and above those called for by Paris Agreement would make ratification extremely difficult and further funds hard to find. I knew of no source from which Austria could get the additional amounts required to replace rolling stock taken by the Soviets or to pay for imported oil which might be required subsequently if all good future prospects were transferred to the Soviet Union. In my opinion, the Russians were pressing us as far as they could for the purpose of weakening Austria so that eventually they can establish a permanent hold over the country through control of its economy.

After discussion of the application of the Paris Agreement to the Soviet claim for exploration areas, we agreed that the Soviets had been given no right in Paris to make their own selection of the properties.

Although Bevin was prepared at this stage to put forward further suggestion with regard to the division of the oil exploration lands, it was decided at Schuman’s and my prompting that before any further concrete proposals were made by the Western powers, we should review with Vishinsky the entire range of the unagreed issues on the basis of the Washington Agreement. When this was concluded, possibly tonight, we should be in better position to decide what points, if any, we might offer to bargain. In addition to the compromise suggested in the Washington Agreement, we agreed that if the Soviets were prepared to give satisfaction on rolling stock, including tank cars, question of pipeline would have less importance and might be conceded. Although every effort should be made to secure Soviet agreement to our previous position on Danube shipping, the question of duration of leases should not be allowed to become a sticking point and might be offered in the last resort. The same was decided with respect to the appointment of the third arbiter.³

Bevin and Schuman will remain in New York until Saturday and will be available for continued meetings.

[

Acheson

]

1. The communiqué of June 20, p. 1062.
2. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
3. The four Ministers subsequently met at the Waldorf-Astoria at 10:30 p. m. on September 28 and discussed Articles 35 and 35 bis, but there was no change in the Soviet position. The Ministers agreed to resume their discussions October 6 if United Nations business did not interfere. The telegraphic report of this meeting. Delau 305, September 29, is in file 740.00119 Council/9–2949. The minutes of the meeting are in CFM Files: Lot M–88, Box 144.