740.00119 Council/6–1249: Telegram
The United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers to President Truman and the Acting Secretary of State
Delsec 1887. For President and Acting Secretary. Eighteenth meeting CFM Bevin in chair, continued general discussion third agenda item on preparation of German peace treaty, with Vishinsky replying to Western criticism of Soviet proposal submitted to seventeenth meeting1 and West Ministers again replying to Vishinsky. Ministers failed reach agreement to refer peace treaty question to deputies for study and report. Ministers agreed this exhausted item three on agenda, but Vishinsky refused agree move on to item four until it determined that no Minister had further remarks on first three items. Meeting adjourned until 3:30 Monday with subject of discussion left open.
Vishinsky said that all arguments raised against Soviet proposal were artificial, and that while Western powers proclaimed desire for peace treaty they actually worked toward development of split Germany. In his opinion work on preparation of peace treaty could parallel rather than follow consideration of question of German unity. USSR had submitted positive program in proposals for creation of All German states council and reestablishment of Allied Control Council, Berlin Kommandatura and Magistrat. These proposals had all been rejected. Soviet delegation still defended its proposal, but was willing refer matter of peace treaty to deputies. Vishinsky answered Acheson’s suggestion about troop withdrawal by asserting that USSR has only 200,000 troops in Eastern Germany while Western powers had over 400,000 occupation troops, which Acheson termed 50 percent over estimate of what we know to be true, and 50 percent under estimate of what we believed to be true.
Acheson stated that procedure for and substance of peace treaty must go hand in hand. It would be impossible prepare treaty drafts [Page 984] for Germany divided into separate states, founded on different concepts of democracy and individual rights, and with basic questions like reparations, economic potential and frontiers unanswered. Western powers had submitted to CFM constructive proposals which gave Germans large measure of authority develop self-government along democratic lines. These proposals would have brought Germany close to peace treaty, but they had been rejected by Soviets. Judging by deeds rather than words Western powers had shown themselves far readier than USSR to work toward German peace settlement. Soviet proposals were neither logical nor sound, though US willing to study them through deputies or some other mechanism, and they also contained element of cruelty in raising false and unrealistic hopes in Germany.
Schuman noted that Vishinsky’s implication that Western powers rejected entire Soviet approach not valid. Western states agreed to study proposals on peace treaty, though he adhered to position that peace settlement not possible without German unity and that no commitment on troop withdrawal possible before consulting allies and determining nature of final German state.
Bevin reaffirmed his statement of seventeenth meeting that he was willing refer Soviet proposals to UK Government, to study them carefully and exchange views through diplomatic channels in effort see if agreement could be reached at subsequent CFM session. Without any play for German opinion he wanted state categorically that UK would not agree: (1) submit treaty drafts in three months in view of present situation in Germany or (2) make any commitment about withdrawal of troops, in interests European security, without more knowledge about conditions in Germany. Bevin found that many things agreed to in London on treaty procedure must now be changed and therefore he did not believe deputies could reach much agreement in three days. However, he agreed without any implied commitment to four Ministers to refer entire question including his proposal for reference to governments to deputies for report by Tuesday morning.
Vishinsky refused accept this statement of proposal. He went [on] to review Soviet proposal, asking specific question as to why three points not acceptable to other Ministers. He reaffirmed Soviet support for principles involved in London agreement on procedure, stating that if Bevin desired changes in principles these changes should be raised in CFM and not in deputies. Bevin said UK insisted Soviet proposal be referred to governments for study. If Vishinsky refused accept his phraseology for referring question to deputies, matter was dead. Acheson added that he found much in Vishinsky’s statements designed solely for propaganda effect. He considered matter of peace [Page 985] treaty and troop withdrawal too serious to play with in propaganda terms. Four powers had serious responsibility in matter on which peace of world depended.
Sent Department Delsec 1887, repeated London 394, Berlin 249, Heidelberg 21, Moscow 127.