762.00/6–1149
Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Member at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Acheson)1
| Participants: | USSR—A. Vishinsky |
| V. V. Pastoyev, interpreter | |
| US—Dean Acheson | |
| Philip C. Jessup |
After dinner at the Soviet Embassy last night I asked Vishinsky’s interpreter to inquire whether I would be abusing the privileges of a guest if I discussed some business questions. With the utmost alacrity, Vishinsky moved his chair so as to permit a conversation apart from the other members of our staffs who were at the dinner.
I began by telling him that Mr. Bevin had reported to me his talk with Vishinsky yesterday.2 I had discussed this with Mr. Bevin and had thought it over. As a result I had wanted to talk frankly with Mr. Vishinsky. I said I had come to the conclusion that it would not be possible for us at this meeting to reach agreement on the main underlying questions. On the other hand, people everywhere were expecting us to get some results from this conference and I considered it very desirable that we should do so. It seemed to me there were certain specific things which we might agree on. They would be small steps but they could be useful.
I then proceeded to outline the points covered by our “Modus Vivendi” paper.3 I said that among the points upon which we might reach some agreement was first the question of trade. We might be able to improve the trade between the Western and Eastern parts of Germany. If the goods coming from the West into East Germany went on beyond the Eastern Zone, that was not a matter which need cause us any difficulty. Vishinsky interrupted at this point to obtain clarification and I repeated my statement. Further in regard to trade, it seemed to me that it might be possible to take some elements of Vishinsky’s suggestion about an organization composed of representatives of German bodies in the West and East. It seemed to me it might be done in some other way but that we could arrange for the Germans themselves to have talks with each other in trade matters. Meanwhile our representatives in Germany at the highest level could discuss these matters.
[Page 981]The second point which I had in mind was the possibility of agreeing on some procedure which would enable our representatives to talk together in Berlin about matters affecting the administration of the affairs of the city. Again I emphasized that I had in mind nothing elaborate.
The third point I mentioned was that we needed to have assurance regarding access to Berlin. I said the New York Agreement was very good as far as it went but it did not go far enough. I pointed out that the minor officials on the spot would undoubtedly get into quarrels about details and that this could again result in friction between the governments. I therefore thought it necessary that we should agree here on something which would avoid these difficulties, which might well create a most serious situation.
In the fourth place, I suggested that we should agree on some arrangement for continuing the contacts among the Four. I thought we should be able to maintain the continuity of our discussions. I again indicated that I did not have in mind any elaborate organization but something which would be a first step even though small.
Finally, I said there is the question of the Austrian Treaty and that it seemed to me the differences there were not very great and that we ought to be able to settle them here at this meeting in Paris. I mentioned specifically that the Soviet claims could be discussed.
I then said that, if Mr. Vishinsky agreed, it seemed to me that the most useful thing would be for the four of us to have a small private meeting tomorrow. I suggested that it should be just the Four Ministers with one interpreter each. Vishinsky interrupted to say that he thought each Minister could also bring one adviser. I said anything he wished was satisfactory to me. I said that I thought that in this private meeting we should have a very frank discussion and explain our views to each other. If we meet in the way I indicated it could be done without attracting too much attention. The procedure I anticipated was that no paper should be tabled by either side so that the other party would have to either accept it or reject it. Thus we would avoid putting in a Western proposal which the Soviets would have to accept [reject?] and on the other hand we would have to accept. If we could agree on the general lines, we could work out a joint paper together. If we were unable to agree in our private conversation then we would need to go back into our plenary sessions and fight it out vigorously and honorably. Vishinsky expressed full agreement with this point of view.
Vishinsky then said that there was one other matter which he felt we should discuss in our private talk and that was the question of the procedures for the Peace Treaty. He said he was not suggesting that [Page 982] we should discuss the substance of the Treaty but merely the procedures for working it out. I told him very frankly that I simply was not in a position to reach a final agreement in Paris on the Peace Treaty procedures. I said that I had concentrated in preparing on the basic substantive questions which we were discussing here and that I frankly was not thoroughly informed on all of the details of procedure. In my opinion the London CFM document4 contemplated an extremely involved and difficult procedure with all sorts of committees and reviews and that I thought something simpler could be done. However, I was not in a position to do it myself. I reminded him that I had just recently come into the consideration of these matters whereas he was what we call an old master. (Vishinsky interrupted to say in Russia they called it an “old wolf.”) I said that before I could make any contributions on this subject I would need to talk to the President and with my associates in the State Department in Washington. Vishinsky said that he recognized what I had said and that of course he had been involved in this for a long time. He had in mind only taking some steps on this subject just as I had indicated that some steps could be taken on the other matters. I told him that I would have no objection to having somebody study this question of procedures before we meet again in order that when we did meet they could present something to us. I said that this might be done through the diplomatic channel or in some other way. In any case, I agreed that if Mr. Vishinsky wanted to talk about this also at our private meeting tomorrow, I was entirely willing to do so.
Vishinsky then spoke of the Austrian Treaty. He said that the Yugoslav claims are different from the Soviet claims. He said “they are not our claims”. He said we should be able to reach some agreement on the Soviet claims. He said after all there were only three points of major difference between us. He had no desire to delay the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty.
On the general point Vishinsky said that it was also clear to him that we were not yet ready to settle among ourselves the basic questions. I thought that we might be able to agree on methods for continuing our consideration of them. He accepted fully my suggestion of our private conversation. He then noted that of course in the plenary sessions we must all state our positions. With this I agreed.
[Page 983]We then touched very briefly on the question of the conclusion of this session and Vishinsky agreed that there was no reason why we could not conclude our work during the coming week.5
- The memorandum was prepared by Jessup.↩
- No record of Bevin’s report on his conversation with Vyshinsky has been found in Department of State Files.↩
- The reference here is to USDel Working Paper/32 Rev. 5, June 12, 1949, p. 1051.↩
- Acheson was referring to CFM/47/L/20, not printed, which is a reproduction of CFM/D/L/47/G/78 Revised with the amendments made by the ministers at the Fifth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The latter document is in turn a revision of CFM/47/M/125 submitted to the Fourth Session of the Council in Moscow, April 12, 1947. For the text of CFM/47/M/125, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. ii, pp. 452–460: the text of CFM/D/L/47/G/78 Revised Is indicated in the footnotes to CFM/47/M/125.↩
- Acheson described his conversation with Vyshinsky to Bevin and Schuman in separate conversations on June 12, before the eighteenth meeting of the Council. (Memorandum of Conversation, June 12, CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 140: Tripartite Meetings of the Ministers)↩