Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 142: United States Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Minutes of the 19th (4th Restricted) Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris, June 12, 1949, 8 p.m.

Paris, June 12, 1949, 8 p.m.

secret

Present

United Kingdom

Mr. Bevin

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick

Lord Henderson

Interpreter

U.S.S.R.	France
Mr. Vishinsky	M. Schuman
Mr. Smirnov	M. Parodi
Interpreter	Interpreter

United States

Mr. Acheson

Mr. Jessup

Interpreter

(Mr. Vishinsky suggested that Mr. Bevin continue in the chair.)

Bevin : We have met here in private to see if between us we cannot mend some of the broken strands and come to some possible agreement. The audience is gone, the curtain is down. We are now in the dressing room behind the stage. It is our hope that we could look into a few detailed matters and see if we cannot try to fix things up for this. We will dispense with polemics. Perhaps it will be best if I ask Mr. Acheson to say a few words to open the discussion.

Acheson : This is my suggestion. Having gone through three items on our agenda, it appears to me quite clear that we will not reach any great decisions on the subject of Germany. It occurs to me that the best chance for progress for us would be to try to tackle some more modest problems. In this direction, there are possibilities, both as regards Germany and as regards Austria. I would like to speak on the German problem, and Mr. Schuman will speak with respect to Austria. First as to method. It would be better, if possible, for us to arrive at some common conclusions here on a quadripartite basis and to announce our decision on that basis rather than to say that agreement was reached on the basis of a proposal from one or the other of us subsequently modified or amended as agreed between us four. I think it would be better if we were to work the thing out among ourselves and merely announce it as a Four-Power agreement.

Now as to Germany, we could provide for continuing contact and cooperation on a Four-Power basis by setting up this Four-Power contact on a continuing, informal basis. Perhaps in this way our areas of agreement could grow and success in this work could lead to new conferences for consideration of broader questions, so that when we next have our meeting we would be much closer together on some of the basic problems which are before us. So it is my suggestion, in as much as we all agree that German unity is desirable, but that we so far have not been able to bring it about, that the four Occupying Authorities continue to meet and consult on a Four-Power basis. Our purpose, in fact all our purposes, would be to try to mitigate the difficulties which have resulted from the division of Germany and the division of Berlin. The first, and perhaps the biggest, problem for us would be to try to expand trade between the Eastern and Western Zones of Germany. Perhaps we could point out that when speaking of increased trade we do not only mean that it should be greater than it is now, for now it is very small, but that it should be greater than it was in 1947 and in 1948 and that, of course, there should be a better balance in this trade. Another purpose of our meetings could be to facilitate the movement of persons and information between East and West. Another important purpose would be to try to solve the questions which are common to an administration of Berlin divided into four sectors. Many questions will arise here; but if the four Commandants meet in a spirit of cooperation and goodwill, they could do a great deal towards facilitating such problems as transport, supplies, electric power, etc. Provided there is cooperation and goodwill, much progress seems possible. We might also provide that in order to assist the Occupation Authorities, the Germans themselves could be called on to help. We could get German experts, as well as German organizations existing in the Eastern and Western Zones, to meet together and to prepare proposals designed to facilitate trade between the Eastern and Western Zones. In other words, we could bring the Germans in to help the Occupation Authorities.

A fifth matter which the Occupation Authorities should work out under principles which would be laid down by the Foreign Ministers would be arrangements for facilities and communication between Berlin and the Western Zones of Germany.

Here is a matter susceptible of much serious trouble unless it is cleared away by action at higher levels, because, with the best will in the world, lacking such clearance, discussions for working out the New York Agreement in Berlin would necessarily be vague. The officials at the lower level on the spot may differ as to what was or was not the situation on March 1, 1948, or what authority existed. Some points were matters of practice and others were the subject of decisions; in such cases, it is necessary to decide whether to take the decision or the actual practice. If the situation is left to itself, it may become very inflammable.

We suggest that the Occupation Authorities work out a clear agreement as to facilities and that this should be worked out on the basis of principles to be agreed upon by the Ministers. The needs of Allied nationals in Berlin in respect to transportation of persons and goods should be met. Transportation needs between Berlin and the Western Zones of Germany of the population by rail, by road and by water should be facilitated by the Soviet Union. In order to solve the road transportation problem, we suggest that the Western Powers operate and maintain the Autobahn from Helmstedt to Berlin, which is one of the many roads. This would be one road on which their traffic would be concentrated. I understand that it is a fact that all crossroads pass either above or below it preventing interference with traffic on other roads. If the Western Powers operate this road, they would have to undertake to permit all Eastern Zone traffic wanting to use it to pass freely, but it would be their road to maintain so that no question or friction would arise.

(Mr. Vishinsky interrupted to ask that this part of the translation dealing with the Autobahn be repeated.)

These proposals are modest. They are designed to decrease the possibilities of friction and to increase the possibilities of cooperation. All of us feel very fortunate for having been relieved of the tense and unfortunate situation which existed prior to the New York Agreement and we all look with apprehension to any slipping back to those conditions. If we can avoid that and if we can provide for cooperation in the trade matters which I spoke of and in the conduct of the city of Berlin, I am sure we will have made a good start towards facilitating the discussion of various subjects which will come up at our next meeting. This suggestion is a whole. The parts of it are interdependent. It is a kind of a whole which should be extremely helpful to us in our future work. I have a memorandum here which embodies all I have spoken of just now,¹ and I, will be glad to give a copy to Mr. Vishinsky. We have a Russian translation. If these ideas, as well as those on Austria, commend themselves to Mr. Vishinsky, we might perhaps issue a common, joint communiqué and not put them forward as the plan of either side.

Vyshinsky : We must, of course, look over very carefully the English and Russian texts. The questions are of great importance and especially as we have no agreement on the more fundamental problems, I must ask for time to look over and study the suggestions made, and I will then be in a position to give you my answer. Of course, the aim of the memorandum and of Mr. Acheson’s words represents a desire common to us all. For me, it is only a question of evaluating the practicability of the suggestions which have been made.

Bevin : I hope it offers a basis for what we can do at this session. We must begin on a modest scale, and if we do we can develop it on proper lines.

Schuman : First of all, I would like to state my agreement with my two colleagues. After all, perhaps the experimental basis rather than anything definitive is the best basis for Germany at present. The Austrian question is, of course, different and in some respects it is simpler. Austria is a liberated, not vanquished, country. It has a government, which is recognized by the Four Powers. Furthermore, our Deputies have done much work on the Austrian Treaty. They have held a total of 163 meetings; and as a result, the points of view are now much closer. A total of only 18 questions have been left in disagreement, but in fact only 3 large problems remain to be solved; and if we can find a solution for them, I am almost certain that all of the problems can be easily solved. What are these 3 questions?

First, we have the frontiers between Austria and Yugoslavia. We believe that there is no reason to change the frontiers of Austria as they were fixed before the war without any objection. The second question is that of the Yugoslav reparation demand on Austria. But in accordance with our obligations under Potsdam, we do not believe it possible to accept these claims. Finally, there is the problem of German assets in Eastern Austria. Under Potsdam, these were given to the Soviet Union. Now we agree to surrender these, but the question remains to fix the sum total. The Soviet Union thinks it should receive a total of 150 million dollars. We wish to declare that, if all of the questions can be solved, there will be no difficulty with respect to this sum. I will not go into the details of this question. These details are embodied in a memorandum which I hereby pass on to Mr. Vishinsky.²

In conclusion, if we can agree on the three major questions, we can then pass the entire matter to our Deputies, who should finish their work by September 1. I believe the four of us should particularly desire a solution of the Austrian question; first, because Austria is rightfully impatient and sees no reason why it should be kept in its present state, and second, because meeting here in private, we are trying to find a solution which we can present to the public opinions of our nations and the world. I believe that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Austria would convince the peoples of the world of our peaceful and constructive intentions. Here is the memorandum, Mr. Vishinsky. I have no English translation.

(Mr. Vishinsky indicated that the Russian and French texts are sufficient for him. Mr. Schuman indicated that he had no final French text …³ After the meeting, Mr. Parodi told Mr. Vishinsky he would send him a French text.)

Vyshinsky : I should first like to ask Mr. Schuman a question. He spoke of the three major problems and, in particular, of the problem of the German assets in Austria in connection with which he mentioned a global sum of 150 million dollars. But Austrian assets include other things besides that global sum. There are 8 other questions not mentioned by Mr. Schuman and which are mentioned in Article 35. Must these also be regulated, or am I to understand that there are no difficulties in that connection?

Schuman : I have a memorandum on that question.⁴ I have consulted the Deputies and they say that they are almost certain of arriving at an agreement on the 8 questions if there is agreement on the global sum. As I said, there are 18 outstanding questions, all of which with the exception of the 3 major problems I mentioned, are relatively unimportant. That is why we suggest that after an agreement on these 3 major problems, we pass the whole question back to the Deputies who will settle the entire matter.

Acheson : Did Mr. Vishinsky’s questions relate to oil property and shipping on the Danube?

Vyshinsky : Yes.

Schuman : These questions are expressly reserved.

Acheson : May I explain? I understand that, under the French proposal,⁵ certain Danube shipping properties and rights to oil properties are to be ceded to the Soviet Union in addition to a sum of money. These two transfers, plus the sum of money, are to be considered as a final release on the part of the Soviet Union to all reparation claims on Austria. I also understand that the Deputies are so close to an agreement on the Danube shipping and the oil rights that, if we are able to decide the question of boundaries and the question of reparations, they can come to a rapid agreement.

Schuman : The proposal was made by France in 1947 and the Soviet Delegation agreed to take it as a basis for discussion, and there was disagreement only on the sum additional to the Danube shipping and oil rights.

Vyshinsky : Referring to Yugoslavia. We had an earlier agreement that all Austrian assets in Yugoslavia should go to Yugoslavia. How about that?

Schuman : I am afraid I could not answer that question without consulting the Deputies.

Bevin : I understood that it was proposed in Moscow that, if all the Austrian properties in Yugoslavia were to be ceded to Yugoslavia, this would end all claims of Yugoslavia on reparations from Austria.

Vyshinsky : Does this agreement remain in force?

Bevin : I believe it was an offer.

Vyshinsky : Does this offer remain?

Bevin : Yes. It was an offer, not an agreement.

Vyshinsky : This is right.

Bevin : The main point was that there would be no change in frontiers and that Yugoslavia and Austria would cooperate in the joint development of the waters, and Austrian property in Yugoslavia should satisfy Yugoslav claims on the reparations from Austria. That still stands. If the main points are settled, the main points are: what areas the Soviets would exploit, what properties would be theirs in the Danube shipping, and third, the amount.

Vyshinsky : Oil refineries? Oh, yes, that is agreed. There is also a question of the rights of the Slovene and Croat minorities in Austria. It is a question of interest to us.

Schuman : That question is subject to direct settlement between the Austrian and Yugoslav Governments, and the Austrian Government is ready to come to an agreement on this, but that is not part of the Peace Treaty. All these questions will be for the Deputies to solve. Our memorandum does not list the 18 questions; but, as I said before, the Deputies are convinced that, if the 3 major problems are settled, there will be agreement on all.

Vyshinsky : Here is my answer. The Soviet Government feels that the Yugoslav demands as regards frontiers and reparations are just. We, the Soviet Union, are not demanding any reparations from Austria. This was agreed to in Potsdam. But we could not, there, make an agreement on behalf of Yugoslavia, because Yugoslavia was not present. We feel that Austria has caused Yugoslavia much damage, and that it would be just for Austria to compensate Yugoslavia for this damage. We also feel that the Slovenes and Croats should be allowed to join Yugoslavia. We cannot, however, postpone the Austrian Treaty indefinitely, and problems which present difficulties cannot be a permanent obstacle to a settlement. So we must find a way to shunt the obstacles aside, in order to prevent further delays in the conclusion of a peace treaty with Austria. The Soviet Union is ready to work on this and to seek means to do away with obstacles.

If the three Powers, USA, UK and France, are ready to come to an agreement with us on all disagreed questions, I think this will help a general agreement and make possible the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Austria, in spite of the outstanding differences on Yugoslav claims.

Bevin : Now, how shall we deal with these problems? You, Mr. Vyshinsky, will probably want to study what has been said and the memorandum on Germany. At the same time, we have an open meeting scheduled for tomorrow, at which the Austrian question is slated to come up. How shall we deal with it, and how shall we meet again? I am in your hands. I am quite willing to have another meeting like this, or perhaps say something in a public session on Austria and then go into a private session. As you wish.

Vyshinsky : My difficulty is that we must study the memorandums and, as the questions raised are of importance, I must get instructions from my Government. My examination of the documents will take time. I cannot send a telegram to Moscow before tomorrow morning. Then I must wait for an answer. Perhaps the public meeting scheduled for tomorrow will be of little help, and we could settle all outstanding questions in a secret meeting such as this on the day after tomorrow.

Schuman : What would be the topic of discussion at our next public session?

Bevin : Oh, Mr. Vyshinsky can find some quotations.

Vyshinsky : I give the floor to Mr. Acheson on such matters now. Incidentally, in respect to Item One of our Agenda, I have a similar proposal to make, consisting of providing for contact between the Eastern and Western Zones, but I am waiting for further instructions on this and will then be ready to discuss it.

Bevin : In an open or a closed session?

Vyshinsky : It makes no difference.

Bevin : We could have an open session tomorrow. The question is, when do we meet like this again?

Vyshinsky : As soon as I have my answer I can tell you.

Bevin : Would it be in the afternoon?

Vyshinsky : Yes. Should we meet at all tomorrow? Why do we not postpone our meeting until Tuesday? We may meet here first and then in open session.

Bevin : Then tomorrow we will take a day off. On Tuesday we will await a call from Mr. Vyshinsky and then meet here privately before the session and announce the open session later.

Acheson : May I bring up just one other question? It is now 9:20 and when we go out from here the newspaper men will be wondering what we have been doing. I suggest that we might tell them that we have been discussing future meetings and that we decided we would make more progress by taking a day off tomorrow. I would say no more than that.

Bevin : We could say that we are taking Monday off instead of Sunday.

Vyshinsky : Agree.

Schuman : Agree.

1. For the text of this memorandum (USDel Working Paper/32 Rev. 5), see p. 1051.
2. Post, p. 1053.
3. Omission in the source text.
4. The memorandum under reference has not been further identified.
5. Acheson was referring to CFM (47) (L)8, November 27, 1947. For the text of this document, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. ii, p. 799.