Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

740.00119 Council/6–1149: Telegram

The Secretary of State to President Truman and the Acting Secretary of State

top secret
priority

Paris, June 11, 1949—9 p.m.

Actel 60. For President and Webb only. In as much as we have dealt with all points on the agenda relating to Germany, this would appear to be a good time to review indications of Soviet policy and attitude on question of Germany as reflected thus far at present session of CFM. In order to avoid any possible confusion between what is Soviet policy and what is Soviet presentation and tactics at meetings of this character, the two subjects will be separated.

1. Soviet Policy on Germany

With reference to Soviet policy in regard to Germany, this conference so far has produced no appreciable change on any question relating to Germany. On every subject discussed Soviet position has not departed in any important respect from positions adopted at previous meetings on Germany or Warsaw communiqué.¹ There has, however, given the different circumstances, been different emphasis which falls within field of presentation and tactics rather than policy. For example, on question on all-Germany government, Vishinsky while professing support for their previous proposals on this subject, introduced in fact his proposal for German state council in lieu of all-Germany government. The fact that at this conference, as distinct from others, question of unanimity and the veto in control mechanism for Germany has been a main topic for discussion does not represent any departure from Soviet policy. The principle of unanimity and the veto has been and continues to be a standard and major factor in Soviet attitude toward any international body. At previous CFM meetings question did not arise since the control mechanism on basis of unanimity was still in existence and, therefore, presented no problem for Soviet policy. It is therefore quite natural that when problem of restoring quadripartite mechanisms, which have collapsed in Germany, is under discussion that Soviet Union should place major emphasis on veto question particularly since West powers were suggesting a modification of that procedure.

In regard to Germany chief difference which has emerged at this conference has been extremely defensive nature of Soviet position in pursuit of same policies. This new element is, in our view, to be explained by changed circumstances which have forced Russians in defense of their existing position in Germany to stress their determination to retain absolute unilateral control over that which they hold in Germany. It is factor of control over Western [Eastern?] Germany and their sector rather than any expectation of ability to interfere with developments in West zones that appears to us to underlie the almost hysterical Russian insistence here upon “principle” of unanimity. Heretofore they evidently had hoped to use their secure position in Eastern Germany as springboard for extension of their influence into Germany as whole. Success in the West and visible anti-Soviet development of German opinion have forced them to fall back on protection of what they have. Extreme sterility of the Soviet propositions in regard to Germany appear to us to arise from this basic fact.

2. Soviet Policy Toward West Powers

Despite rigidity of their position on Germany and their determination to yield nothing which might impair their existing control, there is evident Soviet desire not to have failure of conference destroy possibility of maintenance of future contact on four power basis. Apart from its main purpose of propaganda Soviet proposals for preparation of peace treaty are in part at least motivated by this desire to keep four power mechanism and future meetings of CFM in being. They may be genuinely concerned at possibility of real international isolation of Soviet Union and its satellites. This desire may well lead them into some form of modus vivendi to deal with existing situation of relationship between two parts of a split Germany and a split Berlin. Although it does not appear that our bargaining position in regard to trade is as large as we may have thought it, this does not mean, however, that Soviets are indifferent to trade possibilities but simply that at this time it is difficult to see how trade can go much beyond level of 1948 trade agreement.²

3. Presentation and Tactics

It is in field of Soviet presentation and tactics that there has been contrast between this meeting and previous ones. At Moscow and London meetings Soviets were visibly playing up to German sympathies and posing as great champion of German unity, peace treaty.etc. Here on contrary in relation to question of German unity, Russian proposals dictated by, it would appear, policy considerations referred to above, have been to say least almost hopeless from German propaganda point of view. Return to Potsdam and the degree of control demanded over Berlin are hardly positions which would be attractive to any Germans. Soviets were not prepared to risk their position of control in Eastern Germany for sake of any propaganda angle under present circumstances. Therefore, positions which Vishinsky was forced to take by his government made it virtually impossible for him to develop any pro-German propaganda until the discussion reached German peace treaty, a completely theoretical subject which involved no risk to Soviet policy. Vishinsky, therefore, on third point of agenda, treated question of German peace treaty almost exclusively from propaganda point of view for German ears and for purposes of Soviet peace offensives.

On general propaganda line Vishinsky is obviously seeking to present Soviet Union as only country interested in peace which came to conference with genuine desire to reach agreement as contrasted with allegedly negative attitude of West powers who do not desire agreement and cooperation with Soviet Union. Should conference break down without any result whatsoever these themes will, of course, become standard Soviet propaganda to prove that West powers are embarked on an aggressive, warlike, policy.

Although there may be some shifts and even surprises in Soviet position, thus far it can be summarized as follows:

1. Fundamental determination not to be drawn into any agreement in regard to Germany which would involve a weakening in any respect of their absolute unilateral control over Eastern Germany and Eastern sector of Berlin.

2. An apparent desire, however, not to see collapse of four power association and contact.

3. Their continuing and visible concern over effect on developments in their zone of independent Western control of three sectors in Berlin.

Foregoing analysis does not attempt to deal with Soviet attitude on Austria, as up to present there have been no real indications.³

Acheson

1. For the text of the Warsaw Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary, June 24, 1948, see Ruhm von Oppen, Documents on Germany, pp. 300–307.
2. The reference here is to the 1948 Trade Agreement between Bizone and the Soviet Zone, November 25, 1947. An extract from the text of this Agreement is printed in Germany 1947–1949, pp. 483–485.
3. Another draft of this telegram, dated June 9, which reported the surprise of the United States delegation at the failure of the Russians to grasp the propaganda initiative, was attached to a memorandum from Bohlen to Acheson in file 740.00119 Council/6–949. In his memorandum, not printed, Bohlen expressed his surprise at the absence of Soviet propaganda, but also stated his belief that the Soviet tactics had not been very different from what was anticipated before the meeting of the Council.