Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

740.00119 Council/6–1049

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Member at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Acheson)¹

secret

Paris, June 10, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Bevin	Present:*
Mr. Schuman
Mr. Acheson

After the adjournment of the CFM this afternoon, Mr. Bevin asked Mr. Schuman and me to speak to him privately for a few moments. He then read us the following account of a conversation between Mangeot of Reuters and Zhukov, the Pravda correspondent:

“During the course of the conversation Zhukov made it dear that what he said represented the view of the Soviet Delegation to the CFM.

Zhukov started by saying that his Delegation were very astonished and surprised that the Western Powers ‘would not discuss the currency problem’. Their understanding during the Malik–Jessup talks² was that the lifting of the blockade on their part would be followed by a sympathetic discussion of currency on the part of the Western Powers. Mr. Acheson in refusing to discuss it was simply ‘double crossing’ them and it was as bad as ‘oriental carpet bagging.’

On the subject of the U.S. proposals for Berlin administration and the Kommandatura,³ Zhukov said that they amounted to asking Chuikov to leave Berlin. Such a suggestion was naive.

He then referred to a recent Times leading article which had mentioned Vyshinsky’s proposal for an economic council for Germany,⁴ and he was interested in this. He asked if it represented the British view.

Mangeot then asked whether he thought it was possible, in the absence of general agreement, to have an accommodation between the Powers. Zhukov made it emphatically clear that an accommodation was very much desired.

Mangeot asked whether a single currency for Berlin must be accepted in principle before such an accommodation could be discussed. Zhukov evaded the question by saying he was not an expert on currency but asked Mangeot what his view was on this point. Mangeot replied that speaking personally he felt that a limited agreement was still possible provided that first principles were not abandoned.

Zhukov then said that he feared that if we had another meeting like yesterday’s someone would suggest going home. ‘It is very near 12 o’clock’ he said. Neither Mr. Acheson nor Mr. Vishinsky had shown signs of really talking on such an accommodation, and he asked Mangeot whether he thought that either you or Mr. Schuman would be prepared to arrange some kind of ‘get together.’ Mangeot agreed that there was always difficulty in getting to grips at meetings between Delegations and quoted the Washington Agreement⁵ as an example of the advantages of less formal contact, and thought that it should be possible to exchange ideas without commitment. Zhukov agreed entirely but said that the recent secret sessions were useless for this purpose as the gist of them had been reported in the French Press. Was there no chance, Zhukov asked, of getting a really secret meeting? Since neither Mr. Vishinsky nor Mr. Acheson seemed likely to take the initiative it could only come from yourself or Mr. Schuman. He added ‘I think it would be a great pity if this opportunity were missed.’

Zhukov was serious and friendly throughout the conversation and a further interview is taking place tomorrow. Both interviews were arranged at Mangeot’s request.” (Signed—J. L. W. Price)

Mr. Bevin said that he did not know whether there was anything in it but he thought it was worth exploration. He wondered if it would be desirable for him to see Vishinsky and sound him out along the lines of the Modus Vivendi paper⁶ but without showing him the paper or going into too much detail.

Mr. Schuman said he had seen Vishinsky at lunch today at the Elysee Palace and that Vishinsky had taken the initiative in speaking to him. Vishinsky indicated that the Four Ministers must have the “possibility of continuing.” He referred to work on procedures on the peace treaty apparently as affording an opportunity of contact among the Four. Mr. Schuman indicated that Vishinsky was unwilling to carry the conversation much further and was somewhat evasive.

I told them that Vishinsky had invited me to dinner tomorrow night. After some further conversation in which it was apparent Mr. Bevin was anxious to try a conversation with Vishinsky, Mr. Schuman said he thought it was a good thing to do and I agreed. Mr. Bevin said he would go to see him at the Soviet Embassy tomorrow morning. I raised the question of press comment which such a visit would evoke, but it was decided that this was not a serious obstacle.

We agreed that we would meet at the Quai d’Qrsay at three o’clock tomorrow afternoon. At that time, Mr. Bevin will tell us about his conversation and we will discuss the Modus Vivendi paper.

Dean Acheson

1. The memorandum was prepared by Jessup.
2. M. Couve de Murville and two other members French Staff, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Mr. Patrick Dean and two other members British staff, Mr. Jessup. [Footnote in source text.]
2. For documentation relating to the Jessup–Malik talks, March 15–May 4, 1949, in New York, see pp. 694 ff.
3. For the texts of the United States proposals on Berlin and the Kommandatura see Delsec 1839, June 2, p. 943 and CFM/P/49/18 and 19, June 6, p. 1044.
4. For the text of the Soviet proposal for an economic Council for Germany, see CFM/P/49/2 (Revised), May 25, and footnotes thereto, p. 1040.
5. The reference here is to the Tripartite Agreements on Germany signed by the three Western Ministers in Washington, April 8, 1949. For documentation relating to these Agreements, see pp. 156 ff.
6. Bevin was referring to a paper then in the process of revision regarding the continuation of consultations on Germany. For the text of this paper, presented at the 19th meeting of the Council, June 12, see USDel Working Paper/32 Rev. 5, p. 1051.