Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

740.00119 Council/6–1049: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers to President Truman and the Acting Secretary of State

confidential

Paris, June 10, 1949—midnight.

Delsec 1879. For President and Acting Secretary. Seventeenth meeting CFM Schuman in chair took up item 3 of agenda without reaching agreement on any proposal. Vishinsky in strong propaganda plea submitted specific proposals for conclusion of German treaty, and Acheson suggested these proposals be referred to Deputies with instructions report back in 3 days. At Vishinsky’s request Ministers agreed not to meet Saturday but to convene again Sunday 3:30 p. m.

Vishinsky opened discussion by pointing out that although Western Powers agreed place currency question on agenda they had failed submit any proposals. Bevin in reply stated that no proposals put forward because Ministers had been unable agree on preliminary arrangements which were conditional to any settlement of currency issue. When discussion moved to item 3 of agenda Bevin amplified this argument by stating there existed no basis for consideration of peace treaty until other aspects German question settled. London and Moscow discussions on peace settlement dealt with procedural questions, all of which antedated by situation which has since developed.

Vishinsky then made earnest propaganda plea for serious consideration by CFM of German peace treaty, stating that conclusion of treaty had been urged by third session of General Assembly¹ and was fundamental to world settlement which all democratic and peace-loving states desired. He said Germany important in system of world economy and cannot be left outside family of democratic nations. Western Powers instead of proceeding with preparation of peace treaty had saddled Germany with Washington occupation statute calling for indefinite occupation. He proposed that Ministers examine paragraph by paragraph CFM Document 47/L/20 of December 6, 1947² to see if differences could be resolved and tabled paper proposing that:

(1) Within period 3 months governments of US, UK, France and USSR shall present drafts of peace treaty with Germany to CFM.

(2) Draft peace treaty with Germany shall provide for withdrawal of occupation forces of all powers within one year from conclusion of peace treaty.

(3) Consideration of procedure for preparing peace treaty shall be concluded at current session of CFM.³

Acheson pointed out that peace treaty was set as agenda item 3 in order which implied logical progression through substance of German problem. Since no agreement reached on first two items, it difficult deal with third. Proposals previously made to study procedure for peace treaty assumed that simultaneously progress could be made toward creation of central German government. Instead four powers had failed agree on unification and it was therefore waste of time consider peace treaty which raised exactly same questions. US had always favored earliest possible conclusion of German peace settlement, but before considering treaty it was necessary determine kind of Germany we would have, extent of its area, reparations liability, and status of German-owned property in Eastern zone. Acheson said he felt Vishinsky’s statement largely for propaganda purposes. If Vishinsky wished make appeal to Germans he suggested unilateral withdrawal of Soviet occupying forces to bring their 340, 000 troops for area and population half that of Western Germany to level proportionate to 270,000 troops maintained by three Western states. He then proposed that Soviet proposals, which did not appear worth serious consideration of Ministers, be referred to Deputies with instructions to report back in 3 days. Meanwhile CFM might proceed with consideration of Austrian treaty.

Schuman said Western Powers perfectly willing discuss any aspect of question and so far had offered only constructive proposals. But peace treaty involved final states [status?] of German settlement, adding manifold to questions CFM already unable to settle. He further noted that USSR at London had insisted that peace conference not be called until central government established and that present Soviet proposals ignored proper consultation with other Allied Powers. He supported Acheson proposal to refer Soviet proposals to Deputies.

Bevin in strong final statement said that overabundance of ego and virtue demonstrated by Vishinsky in effort prove USSR alone sought peace treaty for Germany not quite proper. He challenged Soviet delegate to read record of Moscow and London conferences and reach conclusion but that USSR had always been stumbling block in Allied efforts achieve settlement. He quoted extensively from record of London discussions to demonstrate UK support for early conclusion of just and equitable settlement, stating that UK position remained same today as in fact did arguments of Vishinsky remain same as those of Molotov despite all practical experience of past. He said UK perfectly willing consider all proposals, continue negotiations and exchange of views through diplomatic channels and seek sound solution at subsequent CFM session but he was not willing sit through same tireless arguments day after day.

Vishinsky reserved what he called extensive remarks until next meeting and asked that CFM not meet on Saturday. Acheson protested this delay in view of understanding reached on time at New York,⁴ and Ministers agreed to meet Sunday.

Sent Department; repeated London 388, Berlin 242, Heidelberg 20, Moscow 125.

1. The reference here is to the Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, November 3, 1948, calling for “the final settlement of the war and the conclusion of all peace settlements”. Documentation relating to this resolution is in Foreign Relations, 1948, volume i .
2. Not printed; CFM/47/L/20 was a reproduction of CFM/D/L/47/G/78 Revised with the amendments made by the Ministers at the Fifth Session of the Council, which in turn was a revised version of CFM/47/M/125 submitted to the Fourth Session of the Council in Moscow, April 12, 1947. For the text of CFM/47/M/125, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. ii, pp. 452–460. The text of CFM/D/L/47/G/78 Revised is indicated in the footnotes to CFM/47/M/125.
3. The text of this proposal was circulated as CFM/P/49/29.
4. The reference is to the agreement recorded in the communiqué of May 5; see editorial note, p. 750.