890F.248/12–2045
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
I telephoned Lord Halifax51 this afternoon and discussed with him the question of the Dairen [Dhahran] airfield. I said that we had sent off a cable to Ambassador Winant in London asking him to see Mr. McNeil, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to raise this question urgently with him. I stated that General Giles and Mr. Eddy were expecting to be in Jidda on the 22nd and 23rd of this month and that it was necessary that we reach some conclusion about this airfield.
I told Lord Halifax that under our arrangement, of which the Embassy was informed, we had started building this field on the supposition [Page 980] that the King would enter into a bilateral agreement with us which would have the five freedoms in it. I said it was my understanding that the King was willing to do this but that he wanted to be sure that it was not objected to by the British Government, since he had to get along both with the British and with us. So far, the British Government had objected. I stated that if the King did not enter into such an agreement we would have to discontinue building the field and bring the people home even though the work had been going on for some time and several millions of dollars had been spent. Therefore, I said, we had urged that Mr. McNeil send word that the British Government did not object to it. We felt particularly bad about holding the thing up because we thought the airfield was as important to British aviation as it was to American aviation. Also, a great deal of trouble would be caused since the idea that our two Governments could not work out a thing as simple as this would be very unfortunate.
Lord Halifax stated that he thought his Government’s position, rightly or wrongly, was that they did not want to prejudice the general position about the fifth freedom in advance of argument [agreement?] in one part of the world only, nor did they wish to see it prejudiced. If it were prejudiced in one part of the Middle East it might be in other parts and then the whole thing would be a little bit prejudged. The Ambassador said that he would look into the matter at once.
Lord Halifax telephoned me about 30 minutes later and said that he had before him the last telegram the Embassy had received from London on the subject stating that their man in Jidda had reported the text of the proposals which the United States had submitted to King Ibn Saud and which Ibn Saud had shown him, one of the clauses of which said that the TWA was to have a thirty-year monopoly charter from the King to do all transport of persons, property and mail between points inside Arabia and points outside Arabia. The telegram continued that a United States General coming from the Middle East and Africa, accompanied by General Wilson, Chairman of TWA, was expected at Jidda the next day (December 21) for discussions. King Ibn Saud had inquired whether the British had any comments.
I told Lord Halifax that I had heard nothing at all about this, but that I would look into it at once and call him back.
After discussing the question with Mr. Henderson, I telephoned Lord Halifax and said that we had never heard of this in any way. I said we had called the TWA people here in Washington and they knew nothing of it. We had understood that TWA was having some discussions with the Saudi Arabian Government looking toward the furnishing to them of technicians, training people, et cetera, in the [Page 981] event the Saudi Arabian Government wanted that sort of technical advice in setting up their own airlines. However, that was the only thing we knew about. I continued that our policy is dead against the sort of thing the Ambassador had read to me over the telephone, and we would not permit any American company to do that. I said we were sending off a telegram tonight to ask what this is all about. If General Giles or anyone else had allowed himself to be placed in that position we would tell him he had to stop it. I said I hoped the Ambassador understood that this had nothing whatever to do with our contract with the King. Apparently, if the report should prove to be true, TWA was trying to deal on the side directly with the King and we would tell them they could not do that. I said that we not only did not question the Ambassador’s objection to this, but we shared it.
The Ambassador replied that he had thought I would feel that way. He said he would telegraph London this evening and he had no doubt that my emphatic condemnation of this report would have a strong bearing on his Government’s decision in the matter.
- The British Ambassador.↩