Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

890F.248/11–1945: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)²⁹

Washington, November 19, 1945—6 p.m.

10103. Unless you perceive objection please inform the appropriate authorities of the Brit Govt substantially as follows:

Following termination of the war, American public opinion is insisting that in expending funds upon construction operations abroad, the American Govt should be in a position clearly to demonstrate that such operations are in the interest of the US. The President and Congress, after examining the situation with regard to the Dhahran airfield, have decided that the completion of this project could be justified to the American public only under the following conditions:

1. Conclusion between the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG) and the Govt of the US of the standard bilateral Air Transport Agreement, including full “Fifth Freedom” traffic rights.

2. Amendments of the existing Agreement for a United States Military Airbase at Dhahran to provide:

(a) That the US Army will retain title to the fixed installations of the airfield at Dhahran as well as to auxiliary facilities at Lauqa and Hafar al Batin until construction is completed.

(b) That the US Army will be granted the exclusive right to operate and maintain the above-mentioned installations and the right to make use of them for as long after completion as needed by the US Army up to a maximum of 3 years and that the US Army be granted the necessary air transit rights over routes agreed upon between the American and Saudi Arabian Govts for the same period.

(c) That upon termination of US Army control the US Govt will turn over these installations in sound condition to the SAG for operation, control and maintenance. However the SAG will agree not to turn such responsibilities over to a third national power nor its nationals without the prior concurrence of the US Govt.

(d) That upon termination of US Army control an American company approved by the US and the Saudi Arabian Govts will be permitted to operate the airfield for the SAG on terms to be agreed upon by the SAG and an American company, preferably prior to the date at which US Army control is relinquished. The American company will be permitted to operate the airfield until January 1, 1956, or until such earlier date as the SAG has available trained technicians who are, in the agreed opinion of the US and Saudi Arabian Govts, competent to operate the airfield according to minimum international standards.

(e) That it be understood that the SAG may grant, if it so desires, to planes of nationality other than US nationality transit and landing rights through Saudi Arabia similar to those accorded to American planes.

The American Govt intends to instruct the American Minister in Jidda and General Giles to present this matter to Ibn Saud and to inquire of the latter whether the SAG is willing to meet conditions necessary for the completion of the airfield. The Govt of the US earnestly hopes that the Brit Govt will find it possible to instruct the Brit Legation in Jidda to make it clear to the SAG that the American Govt has informed the Brit Govt of the nature of the proposals which it is making to the SAG and that the Brit Govt would have no objection to the completion of the airfield under the conditions prescribed.

The Govt of the US is particularly anxious that there should be in Saudi Arabia sincere cooperation between it and the Brit Govt on a basis that will prove beneficial to the US, to Great Britain, and to Saudi Arabia. The Brit Govt must be aware of the far-reaching implications on Near Eastern stability of the success or failure of such cooperation. While the Dhahran airport is only one item in the over-all problem of relations with Saudi Arabia this Govt considers its completion as of extreme importance. The advantages which might be derived from the existence of an efficiently managed modern airfield so strategically located should be apparent to the Brit Govt. As a civil airfield it would also serve our common interests. This Govt seeks no privileged position with regard to its use even though American funds are building it.

The attitude of the Brit Govt may well be the factor determining whether or not the airfield is to be built. If as a result of the attitude of the Brit Govt the airfield is not completed, it will be difficult to dispel from the minds of the American public and of the peoples of the Near East the idea that the Brit and American Govts are not able to cooperate with each other in that area.

It might be appropriate at this time to point out that it is the policy of this Govt:

1. To develop and protect American economic interests in a manner mutually satisfactory to the Saudi Arabian and American Govts but not on a basis prejudicial to the interests of any other friendly power.

2. To endeavor to provide, in cooperation with other friendly powers, such assistance, financial and otherwise, as may be necessary to assure the economic and political stability of Saudi Arabia and to make possible the elevation of the standards of living, agriculture, and health of its people.

3. Not to seek a preferred position in Saudi Arabia, but to consult with the Brit Govt in connection with important moves which it may take in that country, in the belief that the US and Great Britain have a common interest in securing prosperity and political stability in Saudi Arabia, and in working in harmony to that end.

It is hoped that the Brit Govt may find it possible to give us their ideas with regard to this matter in the immediate future.

Byrnes

29. In a memorandum of November 16, 1945, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) submitted a draft of this telegram to the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State (Acheson), and the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) for approval and stated: “A conversation on Tuesday, November 13 with Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington, has made it clear that the British will object to the granting to us of Fifth Freedom Rights in Saudi Arabia as requested in this cablegram unless steps are taken at a high level to effect a change in, or at least an exception to the over-all British policy of opposing our obtaining such rights anywhere.” (890F.248/11–1945)