890F.20 Missions/7–845
The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 17.]
Sir: I have the honor to report on my visit to Riyadh, July 1–3, 1945, and to enclose52 (1) a translation of a Note from the Saudi Arabian Government, dated July 4, at Riyadh; (2) Summary of a statement made by the King, July 1, 1945; and (3) Summary of a second statement made by the King, July 2, 1945, the substance of which was reported to the Department in Dhahran’s telegram No. 35, July 4, midnight.
Before leaving Jidda, I was again assured by the Acting Foreign Minister that the summons from the King was for the purpose of [Page 924] giving his reply to the services offered by the U.S. Army (Legation’s telegram No. 245, June 24), and I repeated that I had no information to impart regarding 1945 subsidy or long range economic assistance, beyond that already communicated in Legation’s Note No. 221 of June 20, copy of which was sent to the Department as Enclosure to Despatch No. 144 of June 21. There proved, indeed, to be little to discuss: the audiences consisted of statements made by the King to me with little occasion for me to comment.
The substance of the King’s reply is a courteous but unqualified decision to decline the services of a Military Mission, a decision which he elaborated orally to apply, of course, to any foreign Military Mission, whether American or not. This generalization, however, does not appear in the official Note translated in Enclosure I.
The Acting Foreign Minister had also inquired of me whether there was any connection between the offers of the Military Mission and the construction of an army airfield at Dhahran. Did the U.S. Government consider one to be dependent upon the other? Did the U.S. Army have any interest of its own in the proposed Military Mission, or were the services of a Mission offered for the Saudi Government to accept or reject, in whole or in part, without prejudice? This question suggested a trap. I replied that the U.S. Government regarded its request for an airfield as separate and independent of its offer of a Military Mission which had been proposed only to provide certain services which we had been led to believe were desired by the Saudi Government.
The reply of the King is incorporated in a more general statement of the needs and special conditions in his Kingdom; partly this is oriental circumlocution—an effort to surround his rejection of a military mission with an affirmative framework; partly it is also an effort to set his needs in perspective, to furnish a background for future proposals for assistance cooperation, or public works in Saudi Arabia. There is little that is new in the statement; the priority given to internal telegraphic equipment is the most noteworthy. Training of Saudi pilots and mechanics, a subject of discussion for the past year, was not mentioned by the King in the audiences, but was apparently remembered later and included in the Note.
The King inquired whether equipment to renovate his domestic telegraph system could be provided in any way by the United States. When I replied that I would forward his inquiry, but that my personal opinion was that communications equipment on such a scale is at the disposition of the Army but is still in very short supply for civilian purposes, he asked whether it could be secured from the Army under military Lend-Lease “and delivered to Saudi Arabia for my personnel to install and operate”. I made no attempt to forecast the probabilities.
[Page 925]I am convinced the King is sincere and correct in anticipating violent criticism from reactionaries and fanatics if a substantial foreign military mission engaged in extensive services in the interior of his country. He is still criticized today for concessions he has made to foreigners residing in his country; recent events in Syria and Lebanon,53 foreshadowing a general Arab demand for evacuation of all foreign soldiers from Arab countries, makes the present time even more difficult for him. The airfield, he explains, is quite another matter: it is for the war effort of his own military Allies and can be justified thus, as well as by the fact that foreign military personnel will be restricted to the Dhahran–Ras Tanura area, furthest from the Holy Cities and from the more reactionary shaikhs to whom a foreigner soldier means a hostile intruder.
Most significant of all his statements, however, is the third argument that “the British would object”. I considered it unwise to question the King about this statement which he did not offer to elaborate. I do not know whether the British have been consulted and have objected, or whether the King is only predicting that they would have objected. I incline toward the former and more depressing view. This past winter there were plenty of signs that the King was prepared to free himself of British censorship and deal independently with us, provided, of course, that he would be assured of continued economic stability and supply of elemental needs. However, more recently, the King seems to be reverting to the belief that, however powerful and friendly the United States may be, Britain continues to dominate the Middle East, to act where others concur. Quite recently a confidential source reports the Saudi Acting Foreign Minister to have told his intimates in the Arab League Committee in Cairo: “The Americans are our friends and we like them; but Britain is the power with which to deal”. Whether under British tutelage or not, the Saudi Government seems to be presently persuaded of the return of regionalism, of a future British sphere of influence in the Middle East, similar to her past position and similar to our Monroe Doctrine. Britain’s intervention in Syria and Lebanon54 has capped the argument. Our failure to date to secure British concurrence in direct radiotelegraph communications between Saudi Arabia and the United States55 (which it has been humiliating to admit), our inability to provide dollars or to sell for local currencies, our statement that great care and more time must be taken to assure Congressional support for long range economic cooperation with Saudi Arabia have weighted the scales again in favor of Britain as the political and military power which can be counted on to act and not just to create expectations.
[Page 926]I do not believe I am exaggerating the abrupt revival of British prestige. To be sure, the King stated to me frankly that Britain would be bankrupt and vanquished without the United States, that Britain helps him and the Arab world with resources she has received from us, but he seems also to be convinced that the Britain which acts directly on his frontiers, which controls the approaches to his Kingdom and the sources of his subsistence, must be conciliated, even though he sacrifices benefits of a military mission from the more remote and benevolent United States of America from which he has received no assurances for the future, military or economic. Britain is not outbidding us in offers of economic assistance; quite the contrary. However, she does guarantee his political and national security from aggression, and she holds potential economic sanctions as we do not, by virtue of her control of commodities and foreign exchange.
On the other hand, I hope the King recognizes the unreasonableness of requesting the United States of America to supply the subsistence needs of his country and to cooperate in development of his national resources, if Britain is to exercise a veto at will over his development. Only when we find a way to match Britain as an effective guarantor of Saudi Arabian economy can we hope to eliminate, once and for all, this British veto on United States proposals in Saudi Arabia. Otherwise, for all our investments in the land, Britain, I believe, will enjoy a political advantage over the United States of America.
Respectfully yours,