890F.248/6–2645

Memorandum by The Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

Reference is made to the Department of State’s memorandum of May 23, 1945, regarding financial assistance to Saudi Arabia which you have approved in principle with the suggestion that the details should be worked out later. There is also a proposal to construct a United States military airfield at Dhahran which might well be considered in connection with this program, although not a part of it.

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In March 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that there was a military necessity for the construction of a United States military airfield at Dhahran (J.C.S. 1277/1, 12 March 1945). It was planned to utilize this field as a base between Cairo and Karachi in the projected plan of operations, thereby shortening the air route by approximately 200 miles and producing a substantial saving in fuel and airplane hours. In accordance with this conclusion King Ibn Saud’s consent for the construction of the field was obtained by our Minister in Jidda and representatives of the War Department. The King expressed a willingness for the field to be used by United States military forces for a period of three years after the end of hostilities, and for United States commercial airlines to enjoy most-favored-nation terms when the airfield is made available for use by civil airlines. The condition is imposed that the airfield and its fixed installations pass to the Saudi Arabian Government at the end of the war.

Events subsequent to the above conclusion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including changes in redeployment planning, have resulted in a substantial diminution of the military requirement for the Dhahran airfield. The War Department now reports that while early availability of the field would still be of value in increasing the operational efficiency of the Cairo–Karachi route, the extent of this value is in direct ratio to the rapidity of its completion and it believes may not justify the large commitment of United States funds and resources from a military standpoint alone. It is, of course, possible that a change in situation in the Pacific war might substantially increase the military value of the project. Notwithstanding the fact that present planning indicates a diminished military requirement, the War Department is prepared to proceed with the construction of the field if it is determined to be in the over-all American national interest to do so.

It is believed to be in the American national interest to construct this field together with certain related facilities. Among the reasons responsible for this belief are the following:

1.
The Saudi Arabian oil fields, which promise to be among the most valuable in the world, are now under concession to an American company. The continuance of that concession in American hands holds out the best prospect that the oil of Saudi Arabia will be developed commercially with the greatest rapidity and upon the largest scale, producing the revenues which will contribute to the betterment of the economic condition of Saudi Arabia and, in consequence, to its political stability. The manifestation of American interests in Saudi Arabia in addition to oil will tend to strengthen the political integrity of Saudi Arabia externally and, hence, to provide conditions under which an early expansion of the costly development of the oil concession can be proceeded with. The immediate construction by this [Page 917] country of an airfield at Dhahran, to be used for military purposes initially but destined for an ultimate civil utilization, would be a strong showing of American interest.
2.
Subsequent to the utilization of such an airfield for military purposes it would be a major asset to American postwar civil aviation as the most feasible intermediate stop on the route to India and as a means of air traffic to and from American-owned or controlled oil fields in Saudi Arabia and Bahrein. It would greatly facilitate the further developments of close relations between this Government and that of Saudi Arabia.
3.
If, after having conducted successful negotiations with King Ibn Saud to obtain his permission to construct the field, this Government would be compelled to inform him that it had decided not to build it, King Ibn Saud would be likely to gain the impression that our policies with regard to Saudi Arabia are of a wavering character. This would contribute to his existing uncertainty as to the extent to which he may rely upon the United States.

The Secretaries of War and the Navy concur in the view that the construction of a United States military airfield at Dhahran is in the national interest for the aforementioned reasons and recommend that you authorize the Secretary of War to proceed with the construction of the field and related facilities at the expense of the War Department.43

Joseph C. Grew
  1. Presidential approval was conveyed to the Secretary of State in a memorandum of June 28, 1945, by Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy (890F.7962/6–2845).