890F.24/4–2045: Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State

179. ReDept’s 117, April 18, 7 p.m. Relieved to learn that British Government will not stand in way of United States economic assistance in 1945 greater than British proposed subsidy. However road construction and cultural assistance are irrelevant to problem of subsidized supplies now being delivered at approximately 1944 quantity level all of which must be paid for. Saudi Government cannot offer prospect of improved roads to UKCC81 in payment for cereals or spare parts.

King Abdul Aziz has heard nothing definite about 1945 supplies or subsidy. Troubled, indignant, convinced delay is unnecessary, he is entitled now to statement of our intentions re his normal supply and budgetary needs. I recommend this be done without delaying to include extra cereals needed to offset locust ravages which can be estimated only after survey.

Any joint communication to King proposing inadequate subsidy such as proposed British figure would terminate confidence in United States and confirm Saudi fears that United States follows British lead to the detriment of Saudi Arabia as they believe we did in 1944. If however such communication is preceeded or accompanied by assurance United States will make funds available to purchase balance of supplies on 1944 level then it matters not how much the joint program is reduced.

Financing of entire program by FEA would solve most of the problems provided we assure purchasing power as well as deliveries in kind. Portions of current supply program are now held up because UKCC requires assurance by some one of payment in cash. Profit from riyals and seigniorage on gold might suffice if means can [Page 879] be found to permit SAG to pay now for items in supply program which would be excluded from subsidy under British proposal.

I agree that SAG requires in 1945 supply program comparable to 1944 including monthly stipends for foreign missions and 10 million lend lease riyals plus 17 million conversion-plan riyals plus additional cereals to be determined by survey. I feel certain this last emergency item need not delay present decision as British later will hardly dare to refuse to share cost of addition[al] cereals needed to prevent certain starvation.

British Minister, FEA representative Await and I agree:

  • “1. Destruction of crops by locusts in the Nejd is serious and extensive. Estimates are being requested from Locust Mission,82 Al Kharj Mission83 and traveling observers. Infestation continues and damage not yet complete therefore cannot furnish Department with estimates for at least a fortnight.
  • 2. So far no evidence of serious infestation of Asir or Ulhasa or Hejaz.
  • 3. Quantities of cereals (wheat flour, millet, and rice) required to be imported into Saudi Arabia in 1945 agreed by both Ministers and MESC Jidda and reported fully in MESC Jidda’s savingram to Cairo No. 23, December 14, 1944.”

Cereals delivered to west coast on 1945 program to date total 8996 tons out of 1945 total program of 33,000 tons for west coast which includes 3415 tons over delivered in 1944.

Cereals delivered to east coast to date total 180 tons out of 17,000 tons total program for east coast. From 1944 program for east coast 3522 tons cereals remain still undelivered.

This message sent to Department and repeated to Cairo as 93.

Eddy
  1. United Kingdom Commercial Corporation.
  2. The Middle East Anti-Locust Unit (MEALU), theoretically a joint mission of the United Kingdom and the United States but with only nominal American participation, which approached the problem of locust control in the Near East on a regional basis. In airgram A–404, August 8, 1945, to Cairo, the Department stated: “For the present at least anti-locust work in Saudi Arabia should continue as a purely British project.” (890F.612/4–845) A copy of this airgram was sent to the Minister in Saudi Arabia.
  3. The United States Agricultural Mission in Saudi Arabia. The Mission, whose Chief was David A. Rogers, was staffed by seven American experts in dry farming who were sent to Al Kharj by the Foreign Economic Administration in December 1944.