890.00/11–1345
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near
Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to
the Secretary of State
[Washington,] November 13, 1945.
Pursuant to your suggestion of November 12, I attach a secret office
memorandum, entitled “Replies of the President,”3 recording
[Page 12]
the substance of remarks and
comments made by the President, the Ministers and Consul General and
myself during this half-hour visit.
Appended to the memorandum is a substantially verbatim transcript of the
statement read to the President by Minister Wadsworth,4 as spokesman for
the group, outlining their common problems in the area.
This statement concludes with four specific basic questions in the policy
field with respect to which the Ministers and Consul General would
greatly appreciate your directives in elaboration of the general
guidance given them by the President.
In brief, the President:
- 1)
- Recognized the importance of the Arab countries “in our
positive postwar foreign-policy thinking” and the desire of each
“to run its own show” applying freely “the principle of equality
of opportunity and the Open Door.”
- 2)
- Indicated his agreement as to the existence of parallelism
between our policies and those of Russia in the area.
- 3)
- Approved, in principle, the signature with the Arab countries
of “the same sort of standard treaty of friendship and commerce
as we have signed with other American and European
countries.”
- 4)
- Agreed, in principle, that Arab Governments’ requests for
“competent American technical experts—be they financial,
technical or military—will be sympathetically received.”
- 5)
- Confirmed his willingness to receive the King of Egypt so soon
as mutually agreeable arrangements therefor be concluded.5
- 6)
- Commented that, for his part, he would be happy to receive
during the coming year official visits from the Presidents of
Syria and Lebanon.
- 7)
- Gave the Ministers and Consul General considerable helpful
comment on the thorny problem of Palestine.
I venture, in concluding this memorandum, to ask your special guidance as
to whether the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers in Washington may now be
told that they may inform their respective Chiefs of State of the
President’s comment (paragraph 6 above) and ask them respectively to
suggest one or two dates on which they might find it convenient to make
these visits. Mr. Wadsworth confirms my assumption that each of the two
Presidents would wish to make his visit independently of the other but
that they would no doubt consult together before suggesting possible
dates therefor.6
I should also appreciate receiving your approval to my sending to
interested offices in the Department and in the field a copy of the
[Page 13]
group’s prepared statement
together with a résumé of the ensuing conversation along the lines of
the seven numbered paragraphs above.7
In the circumstances I venture to suggest that you read the two attached
relatively short but important papers. The Ministers and Consul General
ask me to say that they would appreciate highly your finding the time to
do so at your convenience.
[Annex 1]
Summary of Remarks Made by Mr. Wadsworth to President Truman on November 10 on Behalf of Himself and of Mr
Tuck, Colonel Eddy
and Mr. Pinkerton
“Mr. President, there are three things we want most to say and four
matters on which we want and most need your guidance.
“Of the three things we wish to say, one is quite simple. The second
is a relatively short review of Arab policies, and the third is a
bit personal.
“The first is that each one of us appreciates this opportunity to
meet and talk with you and to tell you something of our common
problems.
“The second is that we believe the countries of the Arab world,
especially if taken as a whole, well warrant a more important place
in our positive postwar foreign-policy thinking than is normally
given to them as a simple counterpoise to Zionist ambitions or
because they lie at the strategic center of the British Empire or of
the great world air routes of the future, or because they happen to
contain the two cradles of civilization and the greatest known
undeveloped oil reserves of the world.
“All these we feel are important, but to us it seems vital to
recognize that the whole Arab world is in ferment, that its peoples
are on the threshold of a new renaissance, that each one of them
wants forth-rightly to run its own show, as the countries of the
Western Hemisphere run theirs, without imperialistic interference,
be it British or French, in their internal affairs.
“They say: ‘You have your Pan-American Union; we want our Arab
Unity.8 Relations
between your countries are based on respect for the principles of
sovereign equality; that is the principle upon which we wish to base
our relations with each other and with all other nations. We need
foreign skills and capital and technical experts,
[Page 14]
but not foreign dictation. We want
treaties of friendship with all countries, treaties of alliance and
special privilege with none. In our dealings with foreign
governments and interests, we want to be free to apply freely the
principle of equality of opportunity and the open door’.
“That, Mr. President, we, your representatives, believe is the basic
picture. In it the United States can play a leading role. Our moral
leadership is recognized today. The governments to which we are
accredited want most of all to know whether we are going to
implement that leadership, whether we are going to follow through
after our great victory or leave the field, as we did at the end of
the last war, to others.
“In the latter event, the governments to which we are accredited know
from bitter experience and present trends that Britain and France
will make every effort to consolidate their pre-war spheres of
influence; they look especially to us to support them in their
efforts to block any such development. If the United States fails
them, they will turn to Russia and will be lost to our civilization;
of that we feel certain.
“On the other hand, there need be no conflict between us and Russia
in that area. On the contrary, Russian policy has thus far closely
paralleled our own. Like ourselves, the Kremlin has accorded
unconditional recognition of the full independence of Syria and
Lebanon and seeks equality of treatment, now denied us both, in
Egypt and in Iraq.9 We venture to suggest
that if you are looking for a field in which our policy and that of
Russia can be made to dovetail with minimum friction, there is none
better.
“So much for major Arab policies. The third thing we wish to say is,
as I mentioned, on the personal side. In each of the countries to
which we are accredited our relations with the Chiefs of State are
peculiarly intimate and cordial. It is not that Wadsworth, Eddy,
Tuck, or Pinkerton, as an individual, is the personal intimate of
the King, President, or Amir, but that the Chief of State in each
case has made an intimate of the representative of the United
States. They look to us for honest, politically disinterested
advice, information and good counsel. It is that which makes us want
very especially your personal guidance on four questions.
“First, we should like to be able to tell the governments to which we
are accredited that we are prepared to sign with them the same sort
[Page 15]
of standard treaty of
friendship and commerce as we have signed with other American and
European countries.
“Second, we should like to say that we have your personal assurance
that their requests for fully competent American technical
experts—be they financial, agricultural or military—will be
sympathetically received.
“Third, we have already received here the Prince Regent of Iraq and
the Prince-Viceroy of Saudi Arabia as official guests of this
government.10 The
other three independent Arab Chiefs of State, that is the young King
of Egypt and the Presidents of Syria and Lebanon, hope keenly that
you will find it convenient to receive them here during the coming
year.
“Finally, we want on our return to be able to reply frankly to their
questions as to what American policy is toward political
Zionism.11
[Annex 2]
Replies of the President
General Vaughan received the group in the President’s office and they
were presented to the President. Mr. Henderson stated that the
Ministers realized that the President’s time was extremely limited
and they had decided, if it was agreeable to him, that it might be
advantageous for one of their number, as spokesman for the group, to
make a brief statement to him outlining their common problems.
Mr. Wadsworth, the Minister to Syria and Lebanon, would speak on
behalf of his colleagues.
The President expressed his approval of this procedure, whereupon Mr.
Wadsworth read to him the attached statement.12
During the reading of the statement, the President made a number of
comments. For instance, when Mr. Wadsworth stated: “The countries of
the Arab world, especially if taken as a whole, well warrant a more
important place in our positive postwar foreign policy thinking,”
the President interrupted with the remark that he entirely agreed
with that statement.
When Mr. Wadsworth said: “The whole Arab world is in ferment, its
peoples are on the threshold of a new renaissance, each one of them
wants forthrightly to run its own show,” the President said: “I know
that.”
When Mr. Wadsworth concluded his paragraph on Arab policies by saying
that the Arab governments “wanted to be free to apply
[Page 16]
freely the principles of
equality of opportunity and the open door,” the President said: “So
do we; we want this to be the basis of our relations with China and
with every country of the world.”
When Mr. Wadsworth said: “If the United States fails them, they will
turn to Russia and will be lost to our civilization,” and added:
“There need be no conflict between us and Russia in that area,” the
President said that he would like these countries to turn toward
both Russia and the United States. He agreed that there was no
reason for a conflict between Russia and the United States in that
area. When Mr. Wadsworth followed with the remark that no better
field could be found “in which our policy and that of Russia can be
made to dovetail with minimum friction,” the President intimated his
agreement.
When Mr. Wadsworth reached the four particular questions set forth in
the attached statement, the President answered each question
individually in substance as follows:
Question 1 (treaties)–In response to this question the President
said: “You may tell them that.” He added that the United States was
prepared to enter into treaties of that character with all
countries.
Question 2 (the dispatch of technical experts of a financial,
agricultural and military character to the Near East)–In response to
this question, the President said: “You may tell them that too.”
Question 3 (proposed official visit to the United States of certain
Chiefs of State)–The President commented: “The King of Egypt was to
visit us this month.” Mr. Tuck explained to the President the
reasons for which the King of Egypt had not come at the time
expected, but added that he was still most anxious to visit the
United States and would advise the Cairo Legation at least one month
in advance of the proposed date in the hope that it would prove
acceptable to the President. The President intimated his
consent.14
Mr. Wadsworth commented with respect to the desire of the Presidents
of Syria and Lebanon to visit the United States, that they wished
personally to assure Mr. Truman that their countries, which are
different from all other countries in that they have no treaty
relations with any countries, wish to sign their first treaties with
the United States and to use such treaties as models for their
treaty relations with other states; also that they wished to assure
him that they wished their closest relations with any foreign power
to be with
[Page 17]
the United
States. President Truman replied that he would be glad to see the
two Presidents in the United States and he hoped that the visits
could be arranged.
Question 4 (political Zionism)–The President smiled and said: “That
is the sixty-four-dollar question.” He
said that it is the kind of a question that he simply couldn’t
answer at the present time. This question had been causing him and
Mr. Byrnes more trouble than almost any other question which is
facing the United States. The Democratic and Republican parties last
year, during the campaign, had made certain pledges with regard to
the future of Palestine which did not give consideration to the
international political situation in that area. He was working on
the matter at the present time and would discuss it with Mr.
Attlee.15 It was hoped that something could be
worked out with Mr. Attlee as a result of discussions with the
British, with the Jews and with the representatives of the Arab
governments to which the Ministers are accredited.
The Ministers told the President that they understood the difficulty
of the problem, that what he had just said was of tremendous help to
them. There was a fear among the Arabs that an attempt might be made
to bring about a solution of the Palestine problem as a surprise
without giving them a chance to participate. The President replied
that both President Roosevelt and he had given assurances that the
Palestine problem would not be disposed of without full prior
consultation. He added that, of course, the final solution might not
be agreeable to everybody, but that at least all would have an
opportunity to state their side of the case.
The President continued that he hoped that the Ministers would return
to their posts and would explain that the question was a burning
issue in the domestic politics of the United States and that the
American Government would try to work out the whole matter on an
international plane. He reiterated that no unilateral decision would
be attempted. He pointed out that if Palestine could only take some
refugees from Europe16 to relieve the
pressure, it would alleviate for the time being the situation in
Europe, and it might satisfy some of the demands of the
“humanitarian” Zionists and give us an opportunity to turn our
attention to a permanent solution of the political problem. In his
opinion, there could be no immediate solution. Palestine would
probably be an issue during the election campaign of 1946 and 1948
and in future campaigns.
[Page 18]
Mr. Henderson observed that the arrangement just made with the
British for a joint commission to study the Jewish problem and the
contribution Palestine can make to its solution might well go far
into taking the Palestine problem out of domestic politics,
particularly if we were able to obtain the services on the
Commission of national figures who would take an objective view of
the whole situation in the Near East. The President agreed and said
the problem should be put on a high plane above local political
issues.
The President then observed that it had been arranged between him and
President Roosevelt that he should visit all these countries of the
Middle East and other countries on an extended tour as Vice
President. He was to have left last April. He regretted immeasurably
that this had been impossible.
Mr. Henderson said that he hoped that the President would find it
possible before the Ministers said their final farewell to him to
assure them that the State Department had been reflecting his policy
in instructing them that the Government of the United States had no
intention of withdrawing from the Near East as it did after the last
war and of becoming a mere passive bystander in that area, but that
the United States intended to continue to carry on an active policy
in that part of the world. The President said that he could give
such assurance, that in spite of campaigns waged in the press by
various isolationist publicists with the purpose of discouraging the
American people from assuming international responsibilities, so
long as he was President of the United States, the Administration
would continue in the course he had already outlined. (The President
was apparently referring to his recent New York speech.17)
The President wished the Ministers and Mr. Pinkerton continued
success in their work.
