867N.01/10–2645
Memorandum by the Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ), Temporarily in the United States, to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Henderson )
Based on my experience in Syria and Lebanon, you ask brief reply to the following question: “Is the lack of clarity in our present attitude with regard to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine and towards other Zionist policies, notably opening the doors of Palestine to mass Jewish immigration, affecting the conduct of our relations with the countries of the Near East and the development of economic and cultural ties?”
My answer is: “Yes, the conduct of our relations with Syria and Lebanon has been distinctly affected during the three years of my [Page 792] service at Beirut and Damascus by lack of clarity in our attitude with regard to this problem.”
To the people of Syria and Lebanon, from university graduate to mountain villager, there is no more burning issue in the field of international relations. Palestine is their next-door neighbor; they fear Zionist expansionism.
It is not illogical, therefore, that to them an important measure of the bona fides of the policies of any one of the great Powers is its attitude towards the Palestine problem. An Arabic proverb often quoted in this connection is: “The friend of my enemy is also my enemy.”
When I arrived in the Levant three years ago, its people and leaders, like those of all “our” world, placed high in political discussion the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms and the Pact of the United Nations.
The first question often put to me by these leaders was how my Government expected to apply these principles to Syria and Lebanon. I had the answer in my basic instructions. It was clear, positive and, in the circumstances, satisfying.
Rarely, however, was discussion permitted to stop at that point. Their most common second question was as to our Palestine policy. The best I could say in reply was that we would take no basic action except in consultation with Jews and Arabs. This was negative, lacking in clarity, and unsatisfying.
During the ensuing three years there has been no basic change. To these same Arab leaders the principles of San Francisco now replace those of the earlier war period. Democracy and self-determination are still fundamental.
To conclude: Our Palestine policy is at best “suspect”. It has clouded and continues to cloud our relations with Syria and Lebanon.
As to economic and cultural ties, as distinct from “relations” in general, I can best say, to keep this memorandum to the brevity you ask, that Americans in Syria and Lebanon, from educator and missionary to business man and trader, in varying degrees but without known exception, feel insecure as to the future of their work because of this lack of clarity in our Palestine policy. To them also it is “suspect”.
They sympathize with the Arab view voiced fervently and with increasing bitterness. They would deplore official American Government support of the basic aim of political Zionism: The establishment of Palestine as an independent Jewish State.
To them, unless that question be answered with unequivocal negative, mass Jewish immigration into Palestine cannot be viewed except [Page 793] as being primarily designed to build a Jewish majority, precedent to the establishment of such a state.
These Americans—and in pertinent knowledge and patriotism they need take second place to none elsewhere—hope above all to see their Government seize what today is within its grasp, moral leadership of the Arab world, and build thereon, or strengthen, economic and cultural ties.
To this end they feel their Government should adopt a positive regional policy; and this cannot be done so long as lack of clarity continues to characterize attitude with regard to this distressingly confusing Palestine problem.