867N.01/10–1045
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State
(Acheson)
to the Secretary of State
[Washington,] October 10, 1945.
Subject: Palestine
After our talk this morning, I consulted Mr. Henderson. His attached
memorandum is a suggestion for the first steps in the program you
outlined.
The appointment with the Arab Ministers with you has been fixed for
Friday. I suggest that tomorrow you may wish to discuss the attached
memorandum with the President so that you will be free to take the
position with them outlined in paragraph 4 of Mr. Henderson’s
memorandum.
Both Mr. Henderson and I suggest that it may be unwise to start
consultations with the Arabs and Jews in the next few weeks since that
will both be before we have had an opportunity to reach agreement with
the British upon a common plan and it will also start a good deal of
public controversy. Under Mr. Henderson’s proposal we would not reach
that stage for some little time.
I suggest that you might wish to discuss this with the President orally
rather than send a memorandum to him since memoranda on this subject
seem to have a way of getting out.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near
Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
Washington, October 10,
1945.
Subject: Suggested Immediate Program for Dealing
with the Palestine Question
Mr. Secretary: (1) Both President
Roosevelt and President Truman have given assurances to Arab and
Jewish leaders that no decision should be taken affecting the basic
situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and
Jews. Because of recent statements appearing in the press regarding
correspondence between President Truman and Mr. Attlee relating to
the immigration of European Jews into Palestine, there is much
concern in both Jewish and Arab circles lest basic decisions be made
with regard to Palestine without consulation with them. The White
House and the Department have received a number of inquiries,
particularly from Governments of
[Page 764]
Arab States, regarding our present policy
toward Palestine, and replies to these inquiries can not be much
longer delayed.
(2) King Ibn Saud has asked the President for his approval to make
public the contents of the memorandum of conversation between
President Roosevelt and himself on February 14, 1945 and the
correspondence exchanged between himself and President Roosevelt in
the spring of this year on the subject of Palestine.
(3) In order to clarify the situation and at the same time to meet
the proposals of Ibn Saud, we suggest that arrangements be made for
a correspondent at a White House press conference in the near future
to ask the President whether it is true that the American Government
has at various times given assurances to Jewish and Arab leaders
that they should be consulted before a decision is reached
respecting the basic situation in Palestine and whether there has
been any change in the policy of the American Government in this
respect. We further suggest that the President make a reply to this
inquiry along the lines of the suggested statement attached hereto
as enclosure no. 1.64
(4) In our opinion we have no adequate basis for refusing King Ibn
Saud’s request to publish President Roosevelt’s letter to him of
April 5, 1945. However, the publication just now of the memorandum
of the conversation between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud
would have unfortunate consequences both in this country and abroad.
We therefore suggest that a date for the President’s statement to
the press and for the publication of the letter be decided upon and
that a telegram along the lines of the attached be sent at once to
our Legation at Jidda.
(5) It is our further recommendation that you receive as soon as
possible the Ministers of the four Arab States which have diplomatic
representatives in Washington and who are pressing for an
appointment with you to discuss our present policy with regard to
Palestine. During the course of this conversation, you may desire to
make to them informally statements similar to those which we have
suggested the President make at his press conference, omitting, of
course, any reference to President Roosevelt’s letter to Ibn
Saud.
(6) We also suggest that immediately following the issuance by the
President of a statement to the press along the lines proposed, the
Department send out appropriate replies to the inquires which we
have received both from our missions abroad and from various Arab
governments.
