Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

867N.01/8–2445

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State

[ Washington ,] August 24, 1945.

Mr. Secretary: I venture to bring to your attention the attached memoranda relating to the problem of Palestine which have been prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the Department. This problem is likely to assume an acute form during the next few months and may be brought to your attention by the British during your stay in London.²⁴ The strong internal and international reaction to the President’s comments on the subject of Palestine during a recent press conference serves to give an indication of the delicacy and importance of this problem.

No solution of the Palestine problem can be found which would be completely satisfactory to both the Arabs and the Jews. Many plans for the future of Palestine have been advanced. Some are so impractical that they deserve no consideration whatsoever. The attached memoranda present a summary of four plans for the possible settlement of the Palestine question and a summary of observations upon them. The four plans are as follows:

1. Palestine: Status as a Jewish Commonwealth.

2. Palestine: An Independent Arab State.

3. Proposed Plan for the Partition of Palestine Under the Trusteeship System.

4. Proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine.

We are aware that Palestine has become a problem in American internal politics as well as one in the field of foreign relations. The President and his political advisers are in a much better position than we to evaluate the domestic political factors involved and, therefore, we do not presume to give advice in this regard.

We feel, however, that we would be derelict in our responsibility if we should fail to inform you that in our considered opinion the active support by the Government of the United States of a policy favoring the setting up of a Jewish State in Palestine would be contrary to the policy which the United States has always followed of respecting the washes of a large majority of the local inhabitants with I respect to their form of government. Furthermore, it would have a strongly adverse effect upon American interests throughout the Near and Middle East. We believe it would be almost inevitable that the long-established American cultural, educational and religious institutions in the Near East would be placed in a difficult position and might be forced to suspend their activities; that American trade would probably be boycotted; that American economic interests, including our oil concessions in Saudi Arabia and in other Arab countries would, be jeopardized. At the present time the United States has a moral prestige in the Near and Middle East unequaled by that of any other great power. We would lose that prestige and would be likely for many years to be considered as a betrayer of the high principles which we ourselves have enunciated during the period of the war.

On the other hand, States to support the recognition of Palestine as an independent Arab State would almost inevitably mean that we would be endeavoring to assist in setting up a regime which would fail to give to the large Jewish minority in Palestine the just and equitable treatment to which that minority is entitled. Encouraged by announcements made by governmental authorities and private persons and organizations in the United States and Great! Britain during the last twenty-five years, tens of thousands of ardent Jewish nationalists have immigrated into Palestine and have been devoting their lives unselfishly, in the face of tremendous hardship and frequently of physical danger, to the task of laying an economic and political basis for a Jewish homeland. It is almost certain that these settlers would encounter difficulties from any Arab Government which might be set up in Palestine, regardless of the safeguards which we might endeavor to erect. Furthermore, as a result of past policies of this Government with regard to a Jewish National Home, a large amount of Jewish-American capital has been invested in Palestine, and it would possibly not be secure in an Arab State.

The proposed plan for partition under the trustee system also has serious defects. A technical Royal Commission sent to Palestine by the British Government in 1938²⁶ in order to attempt to devise a practical plan of partition found that there were almost unsurmountable obstacles to this kind of a solution of the Palestine problem.

Plan No. 4 for the proposed trustee agreement for Palestine would not satisfy either the Arabs or the Zionists since it is in the nature of a compromise. Nevertheless, our present opinion is that some kind of a solution similar to this plan, which has been prepared by members of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, in close cooperation with other interested Divisions of the Department, after months of research and study, would be preferable to the other plans suggested herein from an international point of view. Our support of a plan of this nature might subject us to considerable criticism among the more extreme Arab nationalists. It would not, however, stir such acute resentment as would be aroused by our support of the plan for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. Similarly our support of such a compromise plan would give rise to protests on the part of the Zionist organizations in the United States and of some of their friends and political allies. We are inclined to believe, however, that the more moderate Arabs and Jews would be likely to regard the adoption of a plan of this character as being as equitable a solution as any that could be found in the circumstances.”

In our opinion it is important that Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and, if possible, France should endeavor to reach an Agreement among themselves with regard to the future of Palestine and, after having done so, consult with the Jews and with the Arabs before putting their plan into effect. Otherwise, there is a danger pat one or more of these great Powers might endeavor to pass on to the other Powers the responsibility for the decision made, with the result that both Arabs and Jews might have grounds to hope that with a sufficient amount of agitation on their part the decision could be revised. Such a situation would almost inevitably lead to years of political instability in Palestine and in the Near East. Moreover, Palestine is a problem of world-wide importance and should in our judgment be dealt with by the five major Powers.

The detailed plans of which the enclosures are summaries are in the possession of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. The Division has been studying and living with the difficult Palestine problem for many years and would be glad to make available to you or to anyone whom you might care to designate such information and specialized knowledge as it has been able to acquire.

Loy W. Henderson

[Annex 1]

[ Washington ,] August 24, 1945.

Four Proposed Plans for a Palestine Settlement

1. NE has drafted four different plans for a settlement of the Palestine problem. These plans are based upon extensive research work done by members of NE and of the now defunct Division of Territorial Studies extending over a period of almost three years.

Two of these plans are designed to meet respectively the Zionists’ demand for a Jewish State and the Arabs’ demand for an Arab State. The third plan is based on partition, and the fourth is a compromise plan.

Each of the four plans is accompanied by observations in regard to the implications inherent in the implementation of each plan.

2. Plan No. One—Palestine: Status as a Jewish Commonwealth.

This plan proposes that the Biltmore Program²⁷ of the Zionists be carried out by placing Palestine temporarily under the trusteeship system with Great Britain as the administering authority. The proposed trusteeship agreements set forth as the principal and special objective the creation of those conditions, including unrestricted Jewish immigration and land purchases, which will lead to the creation of a Jewish majority and the early recognition of Palestine as an independent, democratic Jewish commonwealth.

The plan provides for an interim trustee government with wide powers given to a Jewish agency in order to enable the government with the aid of a Jewish agency to undertake those economic and political measures which would lead to the creation of an independent Jewish commonwealth.

3. Plan No. Two—Palestine: An Independent Arab State.

This plan proposes that the demands of the Arabs for an independent Arab Palestinian State be met after a transitional period under the present Mandatory Power. During the transitional period, the Arabs of Palestine shall draft a constitution for submission to the General Assembly by the United Nations. Provision is made for a Bill of Rights and adequate protection of the Jewish minority. Immigration would be controlled by the local government, but would be based upon the principle of economic need and economic absorptive capacity without discrimination on the basis of race, religion or nationality.

4. Plan No. Three—Proposed Plan for the Partition of Palestine Under the Trusteeship System.

This plan proposes that Palestine be partitioned into three political entities each under trusteeship, with Great Britain as the administering authority for each of the three trusteeship territories. Trusteeship territory A would consist of an area including Haifa and Jerusalem, the undeveloped areas of the Jordan Valley and the Negeb, and such territory as would provide for the safeguarding of the sacred shrines and the protection of the main lines of communication. Trusteeship territory B would be a Jewish State, and Trusteeship territory C would be an Arab State. The Trusteeship Council would appoint a technical commission to decide upon the actual boundaries of the three trusteeship territories.

5. Plan No. Four—Proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine.

This plan proposes that Palestine as a Holy Land sacred to Christians, Jews and Moslems be given a special status as an international territory under the trusteeship system with Great Britain as the administering authority. It proposes that the Arabs and Jews of Palestine be recognized as national communities with the right to organize communal governments having jurisdiction over all those rural districts, villages, towns and cities where the Arabs and Jews respectively are in the majority, with the exception of Haifa, Jerusalem, the undeveloped areas of the Jordan Valley and the Negeb. It makes provision for future immigration without restrictions as to race, religion or nationality, for the regulation of land transfers on an equitable basis for both Arabs and Jews, and for the economic development of the undeveloped land areas of the Jordan Valley and the Negeb.

[Annex 2]

[ Washington ,] August 24, 1945.

Observations on Four Proposed Plans for Palestine

1. Plan No. One—Palestine: Status as a Jewish Commonwealth.

This plan, which would fulfill Zionist demands, would certainly provoke widespread discontent among all Arabs and Moslems, would result in civil war in Palestine and diplomatic if not armed intervention in more than one Arab State. This plan would be profoundly injurious to American cultural, religious and commercial interests, in all the Arab and Moslem countries of the Near East, and it would probably result in the cancellation of the important American oil concession in Saudi Arabia. United States endorsement of this plan would be a serious blow to American prestige throughout the Near East.

On the other hand, this plan would fulfill the promises made to the Zionists in the relevant planks of the 1944 platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties and endorsed by the Presidential candidates of both parties. It would be applauded by the American Zionist organizations.

2. Plan No. Two–Palestine: An Independent Arab State.

This plan, which would fulfill Arab demands, would certainly provoke widespread discontent among all Zionists and most Jews, would result in civil war in Palestine and diplomatic if not armed intervention by the Arab States. The probable armed resistance to this plan by Palestinian Jews would necessitate the maintenance of large armed forces in Palestine for a considerable period of time. The support of this plan by the United States would have very serious political repercussions in American domestic politics.

On the other hand, the Arabs throughout the Near East would be greatly pleased with this solution, and United States support of it would increase American influence and prestige in all Near Eastern countries.

3. Plan No. Three—Proposed Plan for the Partition of Palestine Under the Trusteeship System.

This plan is based on the assumption that a unitary Palestine is not possible because of irreconcilable antagonisms between Arabs and Jews. The partition of Palestine would not meet the demands of either the Arabs or the Zionists. It is doubtful whether the Arabs would give their approval willingly to this settlement; there are, however, some indications that some of the Zionist leaders might assent to, the partition of Palestine as the only way out of an impossible impasse.

If this settlement were imposed by the unanimous backing of the three great Powers, the United Kingdom, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the United States, the Arab States might feel compelled to acquiesce without offering armed resistance. It would be likely to arouse widespread discontent in the Arab and Moslem worlds which would be somewhat unfavorable to American interests.

4. Plan No. 4—Proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine.

This plan is clearly a compromise solution which would meet with disapproval of both Arabs and Zionists. It presents some intricate problems of administration and will require international financial assistance in order to carry out economic development projects which are a part of the general plan.

On the other hand, this plan would not be likely to provoke widespread discontent in Arab States resulting in violence and armed intervention, nor be likely to result in reprisals against the United States injurious to American interests. This plan would probably receive considerable support from non-Zionist Jewish groups who may be expected to look upon it as a reasonable compromise solution.

24. For documentation regarding the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London, September 11–October 2, see vol. ii, pp. 99 ff.
26. See British Cmd. 5854, (1938): Palestine Partition Commission Report (The Woodhead Report).
27. An “Extraordinary Conference” of American Zionists, attended by such leaders of international Zionism as Dr. Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, met at New York City’s Biltmore Hotel in May 1942, and on May 11, 1942, formulated its views in a number of resolutions which became known as the Biltmore Program. The closing paragraph of the resolutions stated: “The Conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world.”