Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

867N.01/6–2745

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Evan M. Wilson of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[Washington,] June 27, 1945.

Participants:	Mr. David Ben Gurion—Jewish Agency2
	Mr. Eliezer Kaplan—Jewish Agency
	Dr. Nahum Goldmann—Jewish Agency
	Mr. Henderson—NEA
	Mr. Merriam—NE
	Mr. Wilson—NE

Dr. Goldmann brought Mr. Ben Gurion and Mr. Kaplan in to meet Mr. Henderson and to discuss the Palestine question. Mr. Ben Gurion outlined the Zionist position at some length, going back to the Balfour Declaration and the White Paper and stressing the opposition of the Jews of Palestine to the present policy of the British Government. He declared that unless “this intolerable regime” were modified, there was bound to be trouble, since in his words the Jews could not continue indefinitely to put up with the breach by the administration of its obligations to the Jewish people. What the Jews desire, he said, was to be allowed to set their own house in order without interference from outside elements. For example, they objected to a situation in which their demands in Palestine, which they regarded as legitimate, could not be met because Lord Killearn³ in Cairo had to appease some Egyptian pasha. The Jews could not, he asserted, recognize that an Egyptian pasha or a Bedouin shaikh, or an Iraqi bey had any rights or interest in the Palestine question. The Arabs of Palestine were, of course, legitimately interested in that country and there was no intention of disturbing them or calling their rights into question. Jews and Arabs had lived there in amity for many years and there was no reason why they should not continue to do so, provided the Arabs elsewhere left them alone.

Dr. Goldmann and Mr. Kaplan both agreed with Mr. Ben Gurion that the claim of any Arabs outside Palestine to any interest in the problem was preposterous.

Mr. Ben Gurion continued that the Jews for the past few years had received promises from Allied leaders which had caused them to believe that they would eventually see the fruition of their aims in Palestine, if only they kept quiet during the European war. Now that that war was over the Jews were beginning to ask what was holding up the implementation of these pledgs. Mr. Ben Gurion said that the world must not underestimate the strength of the Jews’ feeling on this point. The Jews had no desire to have any trouble with the British Government and they knew perfectly well that if the worst came to worst, they would not last long against the combined might of the British Empire. They would, however, fight if necessary in defense of their rights and the consequences would be on Great Britain’s head if the Jews were provoked into some action which no one wanted to see. In other words, the Jews were determined to have their demands met and if the British should decide otherwise, the fault would be that of the British Government.

In reply to a question from Mr. Henderson as to whether the Arabs were not likely to make trouble in the event that the British should adopt a pro-Zionist solution in Palestine, Mr. Ben Gurion and his companions expressed complete confidence in their ability to deal with the Arabs. Mr. Ben Gurion said that he Knew the Arabs well and that they would not really put up any kind of a fight. The Bedouins of the desert were, of course, good fighters but it was well known that they had no interest in the Palestine problem and so the leaders of the Arab States would not be successful in rallying their people to support of the Arab position on Palestine.

Mr. Henderson asked whether it would be correct to say that the immediate objective of the Zionists was to obtain a lowering of the bars to Jewish immigration into Palestine. Mr. Ben Gurion, seconded by Dr. Goldmann and Mr. Kaplan, said that while it was, of course, imperative to reach a settlement on immigration at the earliest possible moment, they were opposed to any attempt to solve the Palestine problem by piecemeal methods. The position was well known and they had come to the point where they could no longer accept anything less than the granting of all their demands, including the immediate establishment of a Jewish State.

Mr. Henderson thanked Mr. Ben Gurion and his colleagues for giving us their presentation of their views, which he assured them would be carefully noted by the Department.

2. David Ben-Gurion was Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, located at Jerusalem; London was the headquarters of the Jewish Agency itself. Article 4 of the Mandate for Palestine made provision for the recognition of a Jewish Agency “… as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine.…”; and from 1922 until 1929 an organ of the World Zionist Organization acted as such. In 1929 agreement was reached between Zionists and non-Zionists for the inclusion of the latter in the Agency, as provided for in the same article 4, and the enlarged Jewish Agency was officially recognized by the British Government in a letter dated August 6, 1930. The Executive of the Agency, located at Jerusalem, came to function virtually as a government existing side by side with the Mandatory Government.
3. Miles W. Lampson, Baron Killearn, British Ambassador to Egypt.