881.00/8–2045
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)
On Sunday, August 19, Mr. Middleton, Second Secretary of the British Embassy, called the Division of African Affairs of the Department and stated that he had a telegram relating to Tangier which he would like to discuss. Mr. Timberlake70 received him in the Department and, after talking over the telegram, accompanied him to the residence of Mr. Henderson in order to discuss it more in detail.
Mr. Middleton stated substantially as follows:
The British Embassy had received a telegram from its Government stating that the British Government had definitely decided that it [Page 642] could not agree to the exclusion of Spain from the temporary administration of Tangier; that the British Government planned, if the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its demand for the exclusion of Spain, to join with France, as the two great Powers adhering to the Tangier Statute of 1923, in restoring on a temporary basis the regime set up under that Statute and illegally overthrown by Spain. All the Powers signatories of that Statute, with the exception of Italy, would be included in the new temporary regime and the United States and Russia would also be invited to participate. The British delegation to the Conference in Paris planned to make a proposal along this line at a meeting to be held on August 20. The British Government would appreciate obtaining some idea of what the attitude of the United States would be toward such a proposal.
The British and French delegations at the Paris Conference would be willing to promise that an international conference would be held in the not too distant future for the purpose of determining upon a permanent international administration for Tangier and the United States and the Soviet Union would be invited to this conference. The British and French hoped that by the time such an international conference would convene, the Franco regime in Spain would have been replaced by a regime acceptable to the United Nations. The French and British delegations at the Paris Conference were also prepared to promise that the United States and the Soviet Union would be invited to participate in an appropriate manner in the temporary administration of Tangier.
Mr. Henderson replied substantially as follows:
He could not, without consultation with his superiors, state what the attitude of the United States Government would be to what the British had in mind. He wished to point out, however, that if Great Britain and France had the idea of falling back upon legalism in order to avoid making a choice between the Franco Government and the Soviet Government, they could not logically, without the consent of the other signatories of the 1923 Statute, promise the United States and the Soviet Union that the reestablished statutory regime was to be of a temporary nature, and that the statutory regime would be terminated upon the successful conclusion of an international conference called for the purpose of determining upon the permanent regime of Tangier. It seemed to him that before Great Britain and France could make promises of this kind, they should be authorized so to do by the Powers adhering to the Statute of 1923. Was he to understand from the statements made by Mr. Middleton that the British Government was proposing to break up the Conference in Paris and to consider it as a failure?
[Page 643]Mr. Middleton replied that he would at once suggest to the British Government that before making promises of the character contemplated, it obtain authorization so to do from the other Powers signatory to the Statute. The British Government hoped that it would not be necessary for the Conference to break up as a failure. It was to be hoped that at the conclusion of the Conference an announcement would be made to the effect that an agreement had been reached providing for the convening of an international conference within a period of say six months for the purpose of working out a permanent international administration for Tangier. There was still of course the possibility that the Russians might be willing to agree to the inclusion of Spain provided a statement was issued to the effect that such inclusion did not imply a departure from the Potsdam Declaration of August 2, 1945, on Spain, but that it seemed to be the only practicable means in the present circumstances of taking into account the interests of the Spanish nation.
Mr. Henderson informed Mr. Middleton that it would not be possible to obtain a decision with regard to what the American attitude would be toward the British line of policy in time to permit instructions to reach Mr. Villard by the afternoon of August 20. He assumed that if the British made the proposal contemplated, Mr. Villard would state that he could make no reply until he had received instructions and that he would communicate with the Department.
Mr. Henderson added that in case the decision should be made to reestablish the 1923 Statutory Regime on a temporary basis, it was extremely important that the United States receive satisfactory assurances that the regime would be temporary and would not in fact become permanent as the result of the inability of the interested Powers to agree upon the kind of permanent regime which should take its place.
- Clare H. Timberlake of the Division of African Affairs.↩