881.00/8–245: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 2—5:15 p.m.]
2742. In letter to FonOff of July 28 British Chargé43 informed Soviet Govt that British and French Govts now proposed opening of Tangier talks in Paris on Aug 6. Object of talks was described as (1) prescribing of Spanish action for evacuation of zone and reestablishment of provisional international administrative regime on basis of 1923 statute; (2) setting out of de facto for reestablishment of international administration; and (3) arranging for conference of powers signatory to Algeciras Pact. Soviet Govt is invited by French and British Govts to participate.
With respect to Soviet Govt’s interest and insistence on being consulted in this matter the following may be said:
A direct Soviet interest in Tangier as such is difficult to discern. It is our understanding that historically the international regime in Tangier grew up more or less on local and de facto basis largely by negotiation and arrangement among local consular representatives of great trading nations. Czarist participation in Algeciras Conference was presumably result of presence and prominence of Czarist consular representative at Tangier and of the fact that questions had come to threaten general European peace and Russia, as one of great powers signatory to the 1880 Madrid Conventions, was naturally invited to [Page 624] attend. Neither of these considerations would apply today. Tangier question is not threatening general peace. Soviet Union has never had trade worth mentioning with Tangier or Spanish Moroccco and has no representatives there.
Failure of other powers to consult Russia in 1923 and 1926 was hardly surprising. Soviet leaders had only recently repeatedly denounced in most violent terms all “unequal” treaties and regimes of capitulation and had formally proclaimed what Soviet encyclopedia calls “full and unconditional renunciation by the Soviet State of the unequal treaties concluded by former Russian Govts”. Soviet Russia had thus demonstratively disassociated itself from the Algeciras Pact and effort to consult it on this subject would doubtless only have evoked at that time a colorful revolutionary pronunciamento denouncing all interference in Morocco by great powers and calling on Moroccan proletariat to arise and eject them.
Soviet interest in Tangier can also not be explained by vague references to Russian access to the open sea and security of Russian shipping through Gibraltar. In modern era passage through Gibraltar has never presented any serious difficulty for Russia. Use of Straits by Soviet shipping has been so insignificant that if interest in Tangier question were to be calculated on this basis several powers much smaller than Russia would surely have a prior voice.
In view of above it seems clear that present Soviet expression of interest can be motivated only by:
- (1)
- General considerations of Soviet prestige and of recovery of Tsarist diplomatic assets with which Soviet leaders are preoccupied at this juncture to a painful degree; and
- (2)
- Desire to get an iron in Spanish fire.
Of these motives the latter is clearly of greatest importance for future.
Those who deal with Soviet representatives on Tangier question will probably find Soviet attitude determined less by interests of a stable and fair administration in Tangier than by political situation in Spain. As long as Spain is governed by a regime which denies political liberty to Leftist groups and closes Spanish territory to Soviet agents of all sorts, Soviets will presumably favor maximum Spanish exclusion from Tangier. Should elements subject to Soviet influence and penetration gain dominant voice in Spanish affairs, Soviet attitude toward Tangier might change.
Soviet attitude toward Spanish Moroccan affairs in general has never been clarified and probably never even formulated in recent years. If participation of Russia in these talks is followed by stationing of Soviet representative in Tangier it may be expected that in initial period his activity will be confined to building up contacts and [Page 625] collecting information about conditions there. Evolvement of official Soviet policy would probably have to await completion this initial period.
Whatever policy may eventually be followed outwardly, however, Russians may be expected to endeavor at all times to keep a hand in with all various conflicting elements, including local Moroccan population; and it must be borne in mind that there is still nothing in their philosophy or methods which would prevent them from appearing at some future time, if they should find it desirable to do so, as champions of an oppressed colonial people against menace of foreign imperialism.
To Dept 2742, rptd to Paris 269, London 385, Lisbon for Madrid.
- Frank Roberts.↩